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Abstract
This Master dissertation analyses the dynamics of German and French construction of  
European identity with regard to the inclusion of the East-European EU member states on  
the case of Estonia. The analysis is oriented around the key date of the EU's East-European  
enlargement on 1 May 2004 in order to assess changes in identity constructions due to the  
enlargement of Europe's political-economic unit, the EU. The research contributes to the  
debate on the Eastern vs. Western divide in European identity by focussing on the national  
distribution and (re)construction of European identity and the concrete examples of France  
and  Germany.  If  European  integration  beyond  a  political-economic  unit  is  sought,  
understanding the dynamics of in- and exclusion of the East-European member states is  
indispensable. The analysis relies on a combined quantitative and qualitative analysis of  
frames in all German and French quality news magazines between 2000 and 2011. An  
increased inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere can be observed in the case  
of  France  and Germany.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  limited  for  both countries  in  several  
aspects, some of them related to the respective national identity. Estonia's inclusion thus  
seems only partly  related to  the enlargement  of the political-economic unit  of  the EU.  
Knowledge of the factors influencing processes of in- and exclusion will help to define the  
necessary steps towards cultural-historical cohesion in both the framework of the EU and  
other occasions of intra-European dialogue.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  European  project  seems  to  consist  of  two  distinct  but  closely  intertwined 
components: A political-economical dimension, realised primarily in the European Union, 
and a cultural-historical dimension present both in intellectual definitions and in popular 
perceptions of Europe in everyday life and in the media as part of it. The cultural-historical 
dimension provides a basis for defining goals and purpose of the European project, a basis 
for  identification  and creation  of  legitimacy,  solidarity  and popular  participation  in  the 
political  Europe.  The political-economical  dimension,  in  turn,  provides  a  framework to 
realise cultural-historical visions of Europe, it provides the means to foster and shape the 
emergence of a common and shared identity.
The  European  Union  as  political-economical  realisation  of  a  cultural-historical 
European project has, between 1951 and 2004, to a certain extent, generated a community 
of  experience  and  memory  among  its  members.  Simultaneously,  it  has  actively  been 
fostering the emergence of a shared identity. In 2004 and 2007, when the EU incorporated 
many of the countries it formerly defined itself in opposition to, a new challenge emerged: 
Not only the bridging of different national identities and related visions of Europe, along 
with the different national memories, cultures and languages, but also the opening and re-
definition of previous identity constructions towards inclusion of the new member states, 
formerly othered as communist. This is particularly complex, as in the old member states 
pertinacious and negatively connoted discourses on “Eastern Europe” have persisted since 
the Cold War era.
Yet the inclusion of the new member states into an integrated identity is crucial for 
the functioning of a wider European project: To avoid power imbalances or their abuse, to 
foster intra-European dialogue and the determination of shared goals, to deepen European
integration and possibly take it one step further. Furthermore, on the level of the individual 
new  member  states,  the  inclusion  may  have  important  consequences,  for  instance  on 
foreign financial investment, tourism or population flows. 
For these reasons I aim to analyse whether French and German constructions of 
European identity are opening up towards the new member states. I decided to focus on 
France and Germany as they are frequently the driving force behind the European Union 
while simultaneously possessing largely divergent national identities, ties to East-Europe1 
(EE) and initial positions on the EU's Central and East-European Enlargement (CEEE). The 
case of Estonia has first and foremost been chosen for the importance that being recognised 
as an integral part of Europe has in her own national development. Furthermore, Estonia 
presents a combination of features relevant for the analysis of inclusion: First, she shifted 
within just 15 years from a position as an integral part of the Soviet Union (i.e. not only of  
the Warsaw Treaty) towards EU membership.  Second, she actively promotes a national 
narrative on her inherent, but during Soviet times suppressed, cultural Europeanness and 
Westernness. Last, her sphere of everyday experience is, due to her economical surge over 
the past  decade and the emphasis on tele- and cybercommunications,  similar to  that of 
many  West-European  states.  These  three  points  make  Estonia  a  case  of  (1)  political 
inclusion of the most othered Other, (2) intense contestation of this othering through the 
nation's narrative and (3) similarity as to everyday experience. An inclusion of Estonia into 
German and French constructions of European identity would thus signify that the Eastern 
vs. Western divide may be modified through the conjunction of political inclusion, intense 
contestation of the divide by EE states and a similar everyday reality. My exact research 
question is thus: Is Estonia, in France and Germany, today more regarded as an integral part 
of Europe than before her EU accession in 2004? If so, in relation to what events, topics or 
aspects? 
European  identity  has  been  extensively  researched,  especially  concerning  elite 
1 East-Europe (EE) refers to the European states formerly covered by the Soviet Union or associated to it in 
the Warsaw Treaty or otherwise under communist rule, i.e.: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. I use the term “East-Europe” in opposition to the historically 
marked “Eastern Europe” which will only be used in the context of negatively connoted discourses with 
reference to the past.
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discourses on European identity (e.g. Baasner 2008), normative or cultural aspects defining 
the borders of the European project (e.g. Todorov 2008) and also the concrete European 
identification of the single citizen (e.g. Bruter 2006).  Furthermore, an important amount of 
attention has also been devoted to research of the Eastern vs. Western divide of Europe (e.g. 
Kuus 2006, Eder/Spohn 2005) and the inclusion of the new member states. However, this 
has rarely been researched on the assumption of specific national constructions of European 
Identity  and  not  yet  for  Estonia's  inclusion  into  French  and  German  constructions  of 
Europe.
In order to fill this gap, I analyse quantitatively and qualitatively the dynamics of 
representation of Estonia in French and German quality news magazines between 2000 and 
2011. I first establish my theoretical framework on the basis of identity and media theory, 
then  explain  the  empirical  background  concerning  the  different  relevant  factors  in 
Germany's and France's inclusion of Estonia in constructions of European identity. On this 
basis, I develop a combined methodology based on quantitative Content Analysis and a 
subsequent qualitative text analysis. Finally, I present and evaluate the results before ending 
with a conclusion and recommendations for further research.
Before starting the analysis, I would like draw attention to the fact that collective 
identity  constructions  are  fluid,  thus  in  constant  change.  Yet,  as  to  the  reproduction 
processes involving rooting in cultures and a mass public, the change of collective identities 
is slow. A Western European2 identity has been constructed as a European identity over the 
past  50  years.  Thus,  when  analysing  the  inclusion  of  Estonia  in  German  and  French 
constructions of Europe for a period of eight years after CEEE, I cannot expect dramatic 
changes. Still, I can determine whether tendencies towards inclusion emerge – or whether, 
on the contrary, intra-European boundaries are maintained or even reinforced after CEEE.
2 “Western”  refers to the EU15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Identity constructions are a highly abstract research object that cannot be measured 
directly. I will thus establish a theoretical framework that helps me to define (1) what I  
mean by constructions of European identity, (2) where I can find them and (3) how I can 
evaluate them. 
2.1 What are “Constructions of European Identity”?
To explain what I mean by “constructions of European identity”, I need to split the 
term in its two components: “constructions” and “European identity”. 
As for the “constructions”,  I depart  from the point of view that social  reality is 
constructed. Berger/Luckmann ([1966]1991) argue that an objective reality does not exist. 
Instead,  it  is  constructed  through  human  action:  People  objectivate  their  subjective 
perceptions in objects such as signs, especially language (Berger/Luckmann 1991:50). As 
language spatially, temporally and socially transcends the “here&now”, it bridges different 
subjective zones within the reality of everyday life and creates a meaningful whole, an 
integrated  reality  for  society  (Berger/Luckmann  1991:54).  Furthermore,  through  its 
symbolic function, language classifies and objectifies experiences and thereby builds up a 
social stock of knowledge, available to individuals in their everyday life (Berger/Luckmann 
1991:56).  The  European  project  is,  just  as  a  nation,  not  a  natural  entity  (see  below). 
Therefore, both require (1) societal definition of their constitutive concept (see below) and 
(2)  individuals  in  whose  minds  the  community  is  imagined  (Anderson  1983).  I  thus 
consider European identity as being constructed through  the interaction of  individuals in 
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society, via communication, i.e. objectivation through language. Constructions of European 
identity simultaneously contribute to the social stock of knowledge and are limited by it 
through pre-existing concepts. 
Following this approach, the large variety of languages within the EU, then leads to 
a variety of social  stocks of knowledge with their  respective constructions of European 
identity. These different constructions of European identity are usually national, for two 
reasons: First, most of the languages spoken within the EU are languages of a nation-state. 
Second, distinct national identities exist within the EU and are closely intertwined with 
constructions  of  European identity  (Spohn 2005),  as  outlined  for  France  and  Germany 
below. Last, the largely national construction of European identity is reinforced by the lack 
of a shared European public sphere:
[T]he ‘public sphere’ within which political life takes place in Europe is largely 
a national sphere. To the extent that European issues appear on the agenda at 
all,  they  are  seen  by  most  citizens  from a  national  perspective.  The  media 
remain largely national, partly due to language barriers; there are few meeting 
places where Europeans from different Member States can get to know each 
other and address issues of common interest. (European Commission 2006:4)
As to the second term to be defined, “European identity”, I need to take a step back 
and start by defining identity. Three types of identity can be found in literature: individual, 
social  and  collective  identity.  Identity  on  an  individual  level  has  been  defined  as  an 
individual's self-concept (Tajfel 1982:2) and social identity as 
that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of 
their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and the 
emotional significance attached to that membership (ibid.) (Taifel 1982:2).
Following this definition, an individual needs to know about the aspects defining the group 
as  a  whole to  be able  to  identify with  it.  Social  identity  thus  seems to consist  of  two 
components: a concept of a group and a feeling of belonging based on that concept.  This 
takes us to the third type of identity mentioned above: Collective identity. It is frequently 
used interchangeably with social identity, yet with a slightly different focus: The research 
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object is frequently this concept of a group, i.e. shared self-catgorisation (Turner/Oakes 
1989:264-265) and the definitions of belonging based on it, more detached from the single 
individual. It  is  this  construction  of  European  identity  as  collective  identity  that  I  am 
interested in here: the societal construction of a concept of Europe and the in- or exclusion 
of Estonia as to this concept. 
This  concept  of  European  identity  has  frequently  been  defined  with  the  most 
relevant parameters being: (1) shared norms which may refer to both immaterial norms 
such as  values  and material  norms such as  a  certain  living  standard  (Arnaud 2000:21, 
Miard-Delacroix  2008:18,  Spohn  2005:3);  (2)  shared  memories  which  mostly  imply  a 
shared vision of 20th century history (Baasner 2008:9, Todorov 2008, Spohn 2005:3); (3) 
shared  interests  both  with  regards  to  the  European  project  and  with  regards  to  non-
European partners (Arnaud 2000:21); (4) a shared sphere of experience both synchronically 
in everyday experience and diachronically in a shared experience of European integration 
(Baasner 2008:9, Bruter 2005:32); (5) a shared sphere of communication (Baasner 2008:9, 
Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:5) and (6) a shared sphere of institutional organisation through 
politics  or  legislation,  with  the  EU  as  its  main  actor  (Miard-Delacroix  2008:18,  Von 
Oppeln/Sprungk 2005:8). As it appears, some of these aspects are predominantly cultural, 
such  as  values  or  memories,  others  are  predominantly  political,  such  as  interests  or 
institutional  organisation.  Yet,  cultural  and  political  aspects  are  not  entirely  separable: 
Shared cultural values, for instance, can be a basis for shared political goals. On the other 
hand, a shared sphere of institutional organisation may lead to a shared sphere of everyday 
experience. This leads back to the initially mentioned close interrelation between Europe as 
a  cultural-historical  project  and  its  political  realisation  in  the  EU.  When  talking  about 
European identity, I thus refer to the concept and definitions of belonging based on this 
concept  constructed within the framework of the EU, yet,  on the basis  of the cultural-
historical vision for Europe.
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2.2 Where can Constructions of European Identity be found?
If  I want to analyse the collective,  social  and national construction of European 
identity, I need to determine what the actors and scenes involved in this construction are. 
On this basis, I will outline why media representations, in their categorising function, make 
societal constructions of reality explicit. 
Actors and Scenes of societal Construction of collective Identities
To do so, I will apply theories on national identity to European identity. National 
identity having extensively been researched, I believe, the theories I picked provide the 
most developed framework to understand the social construction of collective identities. 
This step may be contentious, as European identity is often regarded as a meta-identity to 
national identity. Yet, my argument relies on three points: First, as outlined above, I believe 
that – at the present stage – no single European identity exists, but European identity is 
nationally constructed and (re)distributed. Then, second, the conceptualisation of European 
identity as (1) “a weak addendum to strong national identities” or (2) as an identity that will 
in  the  long term “restructure  the  existing  national  identities  by  decoupling  a  European 
collective identity from the collective identities bound to the nation state” (Spohn 2005:2) 
is ultimately determined by the national constructions of European identity, as illustrated 
through the  examples  of  France  an  Germany below.  Third, the  European Union and a 
nation have several relevant features in common, that make it possible to apply theories of 
national identity to European identity. If a nation is
 
an extensive set of non-relatives who think and feel that they have important 
things in common and that they differ so much from other large groups, that 
they constitute a distinctive and self-contained society (De Beus 2001:292),
then the construction of a European identity appears to be not fundamentally different from 
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the  construction  of  a  national  identity:  both  are  “modern  and  massive  collectives  of 
strangers”  (De Beus  2001:292).  In  addition,  further  parallels  between a  nation  and the 
European Union exist: (1) common political institutions and the need to legitimate them (2) 
a shared sphere of life with unconditioned moving, working, exchange of goods and the 
fostering of this space through elites (3) shared symbols such as flag, anthem or currency, 
(4) clearly defined borders of the political entity, but not of the “natural” borders of the in-
group (5) the creation of an identity, where it did not exist previously. On this basis, I will  
now identify different actors and scenes in the national construction of collective identity.
Gellner,  (1983:52)  points  at  the  crucial  role  of  cultural,  political  and  economic 
institutions:  they standardise and disseminate culture and knowledge.  European identity 
seems  to  equally  originate  from  an  elite  initiative,  yet  –  as  opposed  to  Gellner's 
functionalist approach – a multitude of motivations may be assumed for elites to contribute 
to the process of construction of European identity. Anderson (1983), outlines the role of 
media and print-languages in the creation of unified fields of exchange and communication 
(Anderson 1983:44).  Furthermore,  he points at  the creation of “imagined communities” 
through the dissemination of national ideas and the reinforcement of boundaries in their 
content (Anderson 1983:6). Europe may just as a nation be conceptualised as an “imagined 
community”  with media  playing a  crucial  role  in  the  distribution  of  its  identity.  Billig 
(1995:10-12, 174) adds to this approach that framing is as important as the content, and 
suggests that only the combination of subtle re-iterations of nationhood in the realm of the 
everyday, including media, with the exceptional, spectacular staging of nationhood renders 
them natural, unquestioned entities (Billig 1995:8-10). Edensor's (2002) approach adds to 
this by conceptualising national identity as a multidimensional matrix:
[I]dentity  is  best  conceived  as  a  process  of  continually  weaving  together 
fragments of discourse and images,  enactions,  spaces  and times,  things,  and 
people into a vast matrix, in which complex systems of relationality between 
elements constellate around common sense themes. (Edensor 2002:30)
Within  these  matrix,  Edensor  suggests,  “[t]he  mass  media  has  proved  to  be  the  most 
important way of disseminating representations of the nation” (Edensor 2002:141). Applied 
to  European  identity,  its  creation  in  the  circular  interrelation  of  a  multitude  of  actors, 
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factors, topics on various scenes may thus be stated with the media as one of the most 
important.  Edensor  further  suggests  the  fluidity,  flexibility  and  largely  unreflective 
maintenance of this matrix (Edensor 2002:2,17,29-30). Applied to European identity, these 
characteristics  provide  a  theoretical  justification  for  the  simultaneous  maintenance  of 
different national constructions of European identity.  
The construction of European identity through the interplay of various actors on 
different scenes leads me to clarify my conceptualisation of the roles of elite, society and 
individual.  The  interrelation  of  the  latter  two  is  explained  above.  Elites  then  set  new 
impulses in the circular, national reproduction of European identity. These impulses are 
then  taken  up  in  the  matrix  of  reproduction,  reshaped  and  integrated  in  the  existing 
construction  in  the  social  stock  of  knowledge  by  the  whole  of  society,  i.e.  interacting 
individuals.  Being aware of this complexity leads me to acknowledge that an exhaustive 
analysis of European identity constructions goes, if at all possible, far beyond the scope of a 
Master dissertation. I will thus focus on one of the major scenes of identity construction 
identified above: media.
Media Representations as Source for the Analysis of Identity Constructions: Representation  
and Categorisation
Having  identified  media  as  one  of  the  major  scenes  of  largely  unreflective 
construction  of  European identity,  I  will  now argue that  media  are  a  particularly good 
source  for  the  analysis  of  identity  constructions.  This  is  due  to  two  aspects:  (1)  the 
categorisations entailed in media representations and (2) their function as a mouthpiece of 
society through framing.
Representation, as outlined by Saussure ([1916]1995) and Hall (1997), inherently 
entails categorisation. Saussure established that a sign consists of two inseparable aspects: 
the  signifiant,  the  embodied,  perceptible  representation,  and  the  signifié,  a  mental 
representation of a segment of reality (Saussure 1995:97-99). Hall goes beyond Saussure's 
foundations when establishing that Saussure's system of representation is actually a double 
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one: the system of signifiants represent the signifiés and the system of signifiés representing 
elements of reality (Hall 1997:18). 
I  am  particularly  interested  here  in  the  aspect  of  categorisation.  According  to 
Saussure,  signifiés,  our  mental  representations  of  elements  of  reality,  have  no  natural 
borders  and  are  only  defined  as  distinct  entities  in  opposition  to  each  other.  These 
definitions are conventionalized in society. At the same time, society conventionalizes the 
originally arbitrary relation between signifiant and signifié in a code, a system of rules of 
representation  and categorisation  specific  for  each  language (Saussure  1995:105).  As a 
result, only the use of sign systems, language being the most important one, allows us to 
categorize,  perceive  and  communicate  about  the  world  (Saussure  1995:112).   More 
importantly, the other way around, no use of language or representation is possible without 
simultaneous categorisation.
Following  Hall  (1997),  it  is,  however,  crucial  to  acknowledge  that  meaning  in 
society depends on larger units than the single sign and is, as a cultural product, never  
ultimately fixed. Hall draws on Foucault's theory here to argue that the code is not a closed 
system, but as part of culture subject to constant change (Hall 1997:35). 
Foucault was concerned with the relations between meaning, knowledge, power and 
truth in society (Hall 1997:49-54). He views discourse as a system of representations in a 
certain society at a certain historical moment. These discourses entail statements, meaning, 
and are simultaneously the means by which a society is able to communicate over a certain 
topic. They simultaneously forge knowledge and “truth”, both being closely interrelated to 
power: (1) Knowledge is a form of power; and (2) power decides what knowledge is to be 
applied  and  forms,  in  conjunction  with  knowledge,  truth  (ibid.).  Foucault  draws  on  a 
concept of power as circulating in society.
As  a  result,  meaning  can  be  viewed  as  relatively  categorized  in  systems  of 
representation,  such as narratives,  discourses and statements.  Simultaneously,  it  is  open 
ended in society and never ultimately fixed.
For  the  empirical  analysis  I  therefore  conclude:  (1)  Constructions  of  collective 
identity can be understood through the analysis of media representation, as representations 
inherently categorise and categorisation is a main factor in identity construction; (2) the 
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analysis cannot be based on the single sign, but needs to take into account the textual and 
extra-textual context of representations; (3) discourses as generating powerful categories in 
the domains of knowledge and truth need to be taken into account when looking at identity 
constructions; (4) the meaning of representations and systems of representation is open-
ended and thus susceptible to change over time.
A second reason for media being a particularly good source for the analysis of social 
constructions of collective identity is their circular interrelation with society as a whole, and 
their function as a mouthpiece of society. Hall (1971 in Davis 2004) first conceptualises 
this relationship.  Taking a Marxist approach, he claims that media align themselves with 
the ideology of the current dominant power, interested in maintaining hegemony (Davis 
2004:  45-52).  Then,  media,  by  categorizing,  legitimizing  and  disseminating  their 
categorisations, control the meaning of situations as they evolve in favour of the current 
dominant power (Davis 2004: 62). This is possible, as media texts, as texts in general, carry 
a “preferred reading” that determines to a large extend the way they are decoded by the 
recipients  (Hall  1980:29).  Media representation,  from this  point  of  view,  is  systematic, 
institutionalized and ideological (Davis 2004:45-50).  
Although following Hall's approach generally, I would like to put into perspective 
several points. First of all, especially with the arrival of globalisation, “media” cannot be 
understood as a single entity in society. Rather should they be viewed as “mediascapes” 
(Appadurai [1996] 2005:35) consisting of a plurality of media organisations which operate 
on  different  channels  and  vary  in  structure,  ownership  and  ideology.  Second,  power 
structures  seem equally affected by globalisation.  If  in  today's  society,  power emanates 
rather  from within society,  and from various different  sources (Lash 2007),  there is  no 
central  power  that  media  could  align  with.  As  a  consequence,  media  may  align  their 
representations to the most widespread ideas in society, yet, not with a single one and not 
necessarily  with  the  one of  the ruling power.  Last,  material,  economical  and structural 
factors  in  the  emergence  of  media  representation  have  to  be  taken  into  account  more 
strongly, as also suggested by Hall (Hall 1997:59). These points are not to contradict Hall's 
idea, but to demonstrate its limitations. I thus follow Hall's approach as to the idea that 
media (1) are one of the most important scenes building knowledge, meaning and thus also 
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European identity in society and that (2) media representations follow the most widespread 
and influential ideas, opinions and discourses in a given society and reinforces them. Media 
then work as a mouthpiece: they make more salient existing societal categorisations, re-
disseminate them and thereby contribute to the reproduction of national constructions of 
European  identity.  This  process  of  media  working  in  a  way  to  make  certain  social 
categorisations more salient has been researched under the definition of “framing”:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more  
salient  in  a communication  text,  in  such a way as  to  promote  a particular  
problem definition,  causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment  
recommendation for the described item. (Entman 1993, emphasis original)
Framing  thus  adds  a  level  of  intentional  categorisation  to  the  already  inherently 
categorising representation. Representation then “works as much as through what is  not 
shown, as through what is” (Hall 1997:59). Framing consists of two closely intertwined 
processes:  Decisions  on  whether an  issue  is  represented  and  decisions  on  how it  is 
represented  (Scheufele/Tewksbury  2007:13-16).  It  is  this  reinforcement  of  salience  of 
societal  categorisations  through  framing  that  make  media  representations  a  particularly 
good source for the analysis of constructions of European identity.
Society impeding on the Weight of the individual Author
Having established why I believe media representations to be a particularly good 
source for the analysis of constructions of European identity,  I now need to identify the 
author of media representation. Certainly, every article has its physical author. But to what 
extend is this author representing his or her individual perception? And to what extent can 
then conclusion be made on society-wide constructions? I will argue that the weight of the 
individual author is rather limited from three perspectives: (1) the role of the individual in 
social constructions of reality, (2) the interrelation between media and society and (3) the 
categorisations made in representation and framing. 
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First,  as to the role of the individual in social constructions of reality, following 
Berger/Luckmann  ([1966]1991),  I  have  established  above  that  the  society's  stock  of 
knowledge, and thus constructions of European identity, are build up by the individuals' 
objectivations of their subjective perceptions. Yet, in turn, individuals are guided in their 
perceptions and evaluations  by the already pre-existing social  stock of  knowledge they 
integrate  during  socialisation  (Berger/Luckmann  1991:58).  As  a  result,  the  individual 
journalists may well frame their articles from their particular standpoints at the intersection 
of several realities, yet, these realities are pre-defined by society and form in their sum the 
society's integrated reality.
Second, as pointed out by Hall's approach on the circular relation between media 
and  society  (see  above),  it  appears  that  certain  ideas  and  categorisations  dominate  in 
society's realities. If media tend to align their representations with these dominant patterns 
of categorisation, the individual journalist needs to consciously take a stance of critical 
distance in order not to reiterate these established patterns of categorisation. I argue that 
this is rarely the case, especially not with regard to constructions of collective identities, as 
these are constructed largely unreflectively (see above).
A third  angle  to  determine  the  weight  of  the  individual  author  are  features  of 
categorisation in both (1) sign-based representation and the (2) process of framing. As for 
sign-based representation, Saussure outlined the  societal conventionalisation of a code to 
interpret  signs  (see  above).  The  categorisations  made  inherently  through  the  use  of  a 
particular natural language are thus societal rather than individual. Second, a closer look at 
the framing process helps to understand the relatively small weight of the individual author. 
Scheufele gives a good overview on the different locations of frames and their interaction 
in his “Process Model of Framing” (1999):
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On the basis of a review of empirical studies, Scheufele develops a model to explain 
the processes involved in framing. He differentiates between “Media frames” as the textual 
frames found in media representations and “Audience frames” as the mental frames, i.e. 
categorisations, of audiences. Then, he identifies four key processes concerning frames: the 
journalistic production of frames, their dissemination to the audience, their effects on e.g. 
behaviour and their  effects back on the journalistic production. In the process of frame 
building,  Scheufele  links  journalistic  frames  back  to  the  following  “Inputs”:  (1)  social 
norms  and  values,  (2)  pressures  of  interest  groups  and  elites,  (3)  the  ideological  and 
political  orientation  of  journalists  (4)  organisational  pressure  and  constraints  and  (5) 
journalistic routines (Scheufele 1999:109-110). Leaving aside journalistic routines which 
mainly consist of the use of already existing frames to accelerate the production process 
(Scheufele 1999:108), we are thus left with four major impacts on the framing process. Yet,  
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Fig. 1: A process model of framing research (Scheufele 1999:115)
all of them leave relatively few space for the individual author.
First, social norms and values relate to the culture surrounding the production and 
reception process. Van Gorp (2007:61) defines culture as an organised set of beliefs, codes, 
myths,  stereotypes,  values,  norms – and frames – in  the collective memory of  a  given 
society.  As none of these factors can be changed by the individual,  Gorp suggests that 
frames are largely situated externally of the individual, in a cultural “stock of frames”, and 
as such, similar to a code, enable the reception of produced messages (Van Gorp 2007:61-
64). The journalist,  when producing the text,  thus chooses from a pre-existing stock of 
frames known by the public, rather then framing every topic anew as it comes up (ibid.).
The second point, pressures of interest groups and elites, relates to the role of media 
in society as outlined by Hall and put into perspective above. 
Third, the political and ideological orientation of the journalist or journal's editor 
impacts on the framing process. This will be taken into account in the methodological part 
by choosing material that covers the whole range of political/ideological orientations in the 
respective society. A point to remain aware of is the prevailing of national loyalty over 
journalistic professional values when issues of perceived national interest are at stake, as 
demonstrated by Nossek (2004:363).
Fourth,  organisational  pressure  and  constraints  relate  to  questions  of  media 
ownership and profit, and the constraints they impose on media content, as outline e.g. in 
Herman/Chomsky (1988).  In  order  to  increase  profitability,  a  journalist  or  the  editorial 
board are thus likely to select common frames over exceptional ones, and generally those 
that promise the more interesting story.
As demonstrated,  the framing freedom of the individual journalist  appears to be 
limited by number of societal constraints. Therefore, the analysis of media representation 
permits  to  make conclusions  on frames that  go beyond those of  the individual  author: 
societal frames and categorisations express identity constructions.
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2.3 How can Constructions of European Identity be evaluated?
This  section  serves  to  determine,  how exactly  I  will  evaluate  identity  constructions.  I 
believe  that  identity,  because  of  its  complexity  and  fluidity,  is  best  understood  in 
contextualising comparisons: over time and in between countries, hence the comparative 
design of the study. This section serves to outline what aspects of frames I believe to be 
relevant for the social construction of European identity and which I thus intend to assess.  
Considering the European project, just as a nation, a social group constructed through the 
objectifications  of  individuals'  subjective  sense  (see  above),  I  need  to  consider  the 
individual's “psychological processes which are responsible for the “cognitive construction 
of groups” (one's  own and others)”  (Tajfel  1982:3).  I  will  draw here on Tajfel/Turner's 
(1986) Social  Identity  Theory (SIT) and its  development  in  Self-Categorisation Theory 
(SCT). Both theories are empirically grounded and have reached wide recognition among 
scholars. 
SIT  states  that  the  process  of  identity  building  is  a  process  of  comparison: 
Individuals and groups compare themselves to  other  individuals  and other  groups,  find 
differences and evaluate them (Turner/Oakes 1989:234, Brown 2000:747). It is crucial that 
the evaluation of these differences results in a positive evaluation of the self or the in-group 
as opposed to the other or the out-group. In this case, an in-group identity is formed and 
self-esteem  enhanced.  If  the  evaluation  of  the  in-group  compared  to  the  out-group  is 
negative,  the  individual  de-identifies  with  the  group.  Stating  this,  SIT  simultaneously 
addresses (1) the notion of superiority often found in conceptualisations of group identities 
and  (2)  the  fact  that  inclusion  automatically  entrains  exclusion.  However,  it  does  not 
account  for  identification  with  low-status  groups.  To  explain  this  point,  SIT has  been 
developed in SCT. SCT explains “group formation as a transition from personal to social 
identity”  (Turner/Oakes  1989:240)  through  categorisation.  To  put  simply,  it  states  that 
categorisation  leads  to  group  formation,  which  in  turn  then  leads  to  group  cohesion 
(Turner/Oakes  1989:237).  In  this  process,  the  origin  of  the  categorisation  is  of  no 
importance: whether it is a result of comparison or external categorisation subsequently 
accepted  by  the  individuals,  identity-building  ultimately  results  from  it  (Turner/Oakes 
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1989). Note also that SCT views comparison and categorisation as interdependent: On the 
one hand, some form of categorisation is prerequisite for comparison. On the other hand, 
comparison leads to reinforced categorisation. Once categorisation and the resulting group 
formation are completed,  individuals  start  attributing characteristics  that  are  supposedly 
shared by the members of the group to their own self. In this process of self-stereotyping, 
both in-group and out-group are perceived as more homogeneous than they actually are 
(Turner/Oakes 1989:267).
Understanding these processes of group formation allows me to identify the aspects 
I  need  to  focus  on  if  I  want  to  evaluate  in-  and  exclusion  of  EE in  constructions  of  
European  identity.  Following  SIT  and  SCT  these  aspects  are:  (1)  categorisation,  (2) 
comparison  as  to  evaluation  and  hierarchical  positioning  and  (3)  homogenisation.  As 
outlined above, these processes do not occur in a linear order, but mutually influence each 
other. They provide the basis for my empirical analysis. 
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3. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
Having  established  the  theoretical  framework,  I  will  now  outline  the  empirical 
background of the study that allows me to apply the theory to my cases. The research is 
contextualised  in  the  emergence  of  a  European  identity  within  the  EU  as  a  political 
realisation  of  a  cultural-historical  project  of  Europe.  As  outlined  above,  I  believe 
constructions of European identity to be largely national. Therefore, I will outline German 
and French constructions of European identity on the background of their specific national 
identities. Furthermore, I will define their respective ties to EE, especially Estonia, as well 
as  certain  discourses  on  Eastern  Europe  in  WE.  Both  will  serve  to  conceptualise  the 
empirical analysis and to evaluate its results.
3.1 German and French Constructions of a (Western) European Identity
In  view  of  my  constructivist  ontological  and  epistemological  position,  an  objective 
assessment of German and French constructions of European identity is not possible. This 
section serves to outline those aspects I consider relevant for the following analysis.
The political-economic realisation of a European project emerged after the Second 
World War with the desire of both France and Germany to anchor Germany in a political 
community and prevent a recurrence of German expansive ambitions (Stark 2010:18). Yet, 
since, their respective constructions of European identity developed in interrelation with 
their  national  identities.  Von  Oppeln/Sprungk  (2005:11)  point  to  the  large  variety  and 
divergence  of  elite  discourses  on  European  identity  in  both  countries,  and  hence  the 
difficulty of clearly delineating constructions of Europe. Yet, certain dominant patterns can 
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be clearly discerned. For Germany, this is the construction of Europe and the EU as (1) a 
community of values (Miard-Delacroix 2008:17), (2) a community of interests and a civil 
power  on  the  international  scene  (Miard-Delacroix  2008:22,31,  Von  Oppeln/Sprungk 
2005:8) and a project deserving (3) virtually unlimited German support (Guérot 2006:2). 
All  three  points  illustrate  the  weight  of  the  German  national  narrative  of  historical 
responsibility. Furthermore, they point at an apparent paradox: Whereas Europe and the EU 
seem to be constructed as a  structure overarching the nations and acting on a basis  of 
subsidiarity, European identity, values or interests frequently seem to substitute the lack (or 
a lack of clear definition or expression) of national ones (Miard-Delacroix 2008:17, Von 
Oppeln/Sprungk  2005:8,  Guérot  2006:2):  Europe  seems  to  replace  the  nation.  This 
argument is supported by a recent empirical study on German national identity (Buß/Klein 
2009) coming to the following conclusion: (1) A German national identity exists in the 
private, unspectacular everyday realm of the individual citizen, turned towards the inside 
rather  than  the  outside.  It  is  not  publicly  staged  or  promoted.  (2)  Regionalisation, 
Europeanisation or globalisation of identities frequently prevail over national identification. 
(3)  For  its  historical  burden,  German  national  identity  is  most  frequently  related  to  a 
perceived particular – pacifist – responsibility towards the international community. The 
last point will become particularly important for Germany's approach to EE (see below).
As for France, the construction of Europe seems to be different, if not opposite, to 
the German one, in several aspects. This concerns several aspects: First, in France, Europe 
and the EU have for a long time been constructed not as a substitute, but as an enlargement  
of the own nation: the EU has been conceptualised as a “super-State à la française, a super-
France”3 (Arnaud 2000:10) based on French values of the civic nation and her model of the 
welfare state (Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). This approach constructs the EU as a quasi-
nation and thus blurs the boundaries between Europe and the nation, regarded as operating 
on the same level. By the same token, Europe becomes a way to maintain French influence 
in the world and represent her interests (Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). This construction of 
Europe  is  equally  related  to  the  own  national  identity  which  seems  to  be  strong  and 
confidently turned towards the outside (as evident from publications such as: Haut Conseil 
3 “un super-Etat à la française, un super-Hexagone”
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de l'Integration 2009). Her strong national identity and resulting constructions of Europe as 
an extended France is largely based on (1) France's former position as a great power with 
two large colonial empires, (2) her long-lasting position as a model for the intellectual,  
noble or cultural elite throughout royal courts in Europe and (3) the fact that Enlightenment 
started  in  France  and  first  produced  a  definition  of  inalienable  human  rights  with  the 
“Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen” (1789) (Röseberg 2001: 24). Closely 
related to especially the third point is also the tradition of a (formerly “civilizing”) mission 
for the world, implying the international diffusion of certain values claimed to be French, 
and French culture (see e.g. Décret n°59-889, art. 1). 
These German and French constructions of European identity are different, yet there 
seems to be some overlap, as without agreement on certain basics the European project 
would not exist in its present form. This overlap seems to be intensely fostered by the EU 
as political frame of the European project. Bruter (2005) convincingly argues that the EU 
has attempted to create a  shared identity in   (1) the creation of symbols,  such as flag, 
anthem, passport or currency, which due to their abstract character allow for identification 
without precise knowledge – or definition (?) - of European identity (Bruter 2005:76); and 
(2) the EU's “efforts on human mobility, easiness of travel, students and youth exchange 
programmes,  and  workers  mobility  programmes”  (Bruter  2005:32)  creating  a  space  of 
shared experience. Indeed, all aspects of my definition of European identity (see above), 
can be argued to have been reinforced by the EU. Yet, the fostering of a shared identity in 
this form is restricted to the space limited by membership in the EU. I therefore argue that 
what has been constructed as a European identity in the past 60 years, and what is still 
regarded as a European identity in Germany and France, is actually a Western European 
identity. 
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3.2 European Identity in Opposition to “Eastern Europe”
This (Western) European identity seems to have been, also beyond the Cold War 
era, based on the exclusion of the Russian and Eastern European Other, lacking a positive 
self-definition (Hettlage 1999:253). The inclusion of part of EE into the EU in 2004 and 
2007, thus leads to a situation with two apparent possibilities for redefinition of identity 
constructions:  (1)  the  inclusion  of  the  new members  into  the  existing  constructions  of 
European,  i.e.  Western  European,  identity  or  (2)  the  re-definition  of  European  identity 
towards an entirely new construction inclusive for both new and old EU member states. 
However, neither of both alternatives seem to have been achieved yet. Kuus (2007) presents 
numerous examples from politicians speeches (such as Chirac's and Fischer's), newspapers 
(such as the Economist), scholarly papers and the Western aid community to suggest that 
EE “was not incorporated into the imagined community of a united Europe. It was instead 
assigned a special place in Europe's waiting room” (Kuus 2007:27).
The continuing othering of EE is especially evident in widespread discourses on 
Eastern Europe in WE. I will now briefly synthesise previous research on these discourses, 
as these discourses constitute one aspect in my empirical analysis. 
Several authors (such as Kruus 2007, Murawska-Muthesius 2006, Ekekrantz 2004, 
Brubaker  1998,  Kürti  1997) have analysed medial  discourses  on Eastern Europe.  Their 
results  reveal  different  types  of  negatively  connoted,  othering  discourses:  First,  EE  is 
depicted as (1) backward, immature and underdeveloped with respect to “normality” in WE 
(Kuus 2007:28-31; Murawska-Muthesius 2006:304; Ekekrantz 2004). Thus, EE is, second, 
a learner in “a period of transition coached by the West”, (2) new, dynamic and in rapid 
change (Kuus 2007:28;). Third, EE is depicted as an (3) insecure place, due to its unclear 
Eastern border  and some of  its  other  features  such as  nationalism,  thus  simultaneously 
constituting a source of insecurity to the West (Kuus 2007:22, 31; Bruter 2005:81). Fourth, 
EE is constructed as a homogeneous aggregation of (4) weak, victimized and marginalized 
nations, lacking agency and a functioning civil society as a result of their communist past 
(Murawska-Muthesius  2006:  280,  304).  Last,  EE  is  constructed  as  a  place  where  (5) 
nationalism, ancient hatreds and passion prevail over civic nationhood, modern tolerance 
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and reason (Brubaker 1998: 281).
As evident from these discourses,  none of the two option of inclusion of EE in 
Western constructions of European identity has yet been realised. Nevertheless, a change in 
constructions of EE is clearly discernible. As opposed to the former division of Europe into 
an Eastern and a  Western part,  a new, tripartial  formation of  Europe has  emerged and 
shifted Easternness further eastwards. Now there is  “the European core, Central Europe, 
which is not yet fully European but in tune with the European project; and the Eastern 
peripheries of Europe, effectively excluded from membership” (Kuus 2007:22). This equals 
a graduation of Europeanness, where “no-one is not European, but more or less European, 
more or less close to the centre” (Kuus 2007:27-30). Yet, even if this change took place, the 
standards for Europeanness in the new, tripartial formation of Europe seem to still be set by 
WE. Thus, Western constructions of European identity appear to remain constructions of 
Western European identity. Particular attention will be paid to this aspect in the empirical 
analysis.
3.3 Different ties of Germany and France to EE, especially Estonia
My above definition of European identity presents the community of memory and 
experience as two of its important aspects. I thus need to take into account France's and 
Germany's respective relations to EE in order to evaluate the empirical results.
Germany's bonds to EE are strong and provoke on the French side a perception of 
EE as Germany's “backyard4”, a sphere of privileged German influence (Stark 2006:105). 
The strong political bonds of Germany to EE were reinforced by Germany's division during 
the  Cold  War  and  Willy  Brandt's  “Ostpolitik”  (Stark  2006:106).  Historically,  there  are 
equally strong connections with EE. For Estonia, from the crusades in the 12 th and 13th 
century onwards, there has been a continuous German presence in the territories belonging 
to Estonia: Colonisation, trade relations in the Hanseatic League, Baltic German feudal rule 
4 “Hinterhof”
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for several centuries and German occupation during WWI and WWII (Kasekamp 2010: 11-
15, 20, 31, 37, 51, 57, 93, 124). Culturally, German connections with EE are as strong as 
they are ambivalent. As a result of shifting borders, about 1/5 of citizens in the FRG have 
background in a German East that no longer exists (Liulevicius 2009: 238). However, this 
connection is ambivalent as delicate personal stories of flight and displacement lead to the 
tabooing and ignoring of the GDR and EE territories in society (Fürnrohr 1995:30). Today, 
with  the  network  of  Goethe  Instituts,  a  well  developed  cultural  connection  to  EE and 
Estonia  exists  on an  institutional  level  (see  Goethe  Institut:  Weltweit).  Yet,  despite  the 
external opening, inside the German society, classifications from the Cold War era seem to 
persist.  In  2011,  the  German  Federal  Agency  of  Civic  Education  classified  Estonia  as 
Eastern European and associates her, together with Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, 
with Russia:
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Fig. 2: Peoples in Eastern Europe and Northern Asia (BPB 2011:Völker in Osteuropa und 
Nordasien)
The very sparse Estonian cultural presence in Germany (see Estonian Embassy in 
Berlin 2012) does not seem to have an impact on these constructions. In the economic 
domain, German presence in EE is strong, with EE markets being perceived as enlarged 
German domestic markets with low cultural barriers (De Champris 2004:26). A network of 
institutions supports this development (ibid.), for Estonia for instance the German-Baltic 
Chamber of Commerce (see Deutsch-Baltische Handelskammer).
France, in comparison, has had much less and sparse contact with EE, so that EE 
seems  to  be  a  geographically  far  and  diffuse  space  that  has  not  been  explored  either 
geopolitically, economically or commercially, except for French cultural diplomacy (Stark 
2006:104). Historically, the closest a French army ever got to Estonia were battles on the 
Baltic littoral during the Crimean War (1853-1856) (Kasekamp 2010:72). Politically, very 
few interest has been shown, for instance in the Versailles conference, for the fate of the 
Baltic States, viewed as a part of Russia (Kasekamp 2010:99,105). More recently, political 
categorisations seem to have undergone some change as evident in the joint visit of Tallinn 
and  Helsinki  by  the  French  Prime  Minister  François  Fillion  in  2008  (Portail  du 
Gouvernement 2008). As for the cultural domain, France's network of cultural institutions 
is  –  despite  its  clearly  more  important  presence  worldwide  –  in  EE just  slightly  more 
developed than the German one (Stammer/Thomas 2004:37).  It  maintains,  however,  an 
institution in Tallinn (see: Institut  Français Estonie).  Yet the other way round, Estonian 
cultural presence in France is barely noticeable: Very few associations exist in addition to 
the  official  representation  (see  Estonian  Embassy  in  France  and  Association  France-
Estonie). Economically, too, French connections to EE are sparse,  mainly due to the big, 
quasi-monopoly entities that structure French economy (De Champris 2004:27).
From the differences in especially political and historical bonds to EE emerged the 
initially different positions of France and Germany towards CEEE. France's  policy was 
largely perceived as opposing CEEE in fear of German domination (Skảlnes 2005:215) or 
as relegating it to an uncertain future (Stark 2006:110), even though French diplomacy later 
disclaims these interpretations (see e.g. Majza 2003). Germany, in contrast, immediately 
after the end of the Cold War started promoting CEEE (Stark 2006:109). Yet German civil 
society did not unanimously support CEEE, which is obvious in publications as Van Laer's 
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Osteuropa und Wir (2007) or surveys among the population (Miard-Delacroix 2008:22).
These  differences  in  bonds  with  EE and Estonia  and  in  the  respective  national 
identities  result  in  different  approaches  to  EE.  I  will  briefly  summarise  them,  as  they 
provide valuable background for the evaluation of the empirical results.
Germany seems to approach EE under the angle of support for development, largely 
motivated by her perceived historical responsibility: 
Indeed, if the Germans (…) need to inspire their foreign policy by their past, 
and if one considers that poverty in Eastern Europe is the result of forty years of 
communist  rule,  which in  turn are  a  consequence  of  the expansion of  Nazi 
troupes  to  Eastern  Europe,  then  the  “backward”  side  of  Eastern  European 
countries is due to Germany. Then, it would be logical that the Germans make 
for Eastern Europe as a whole the same efforts of reconstruction that they made 
for the former GDR.5  (Stark 2006:110)
Furthermore, Germany as Europe's largest economy also has a very concrete interest in 
supporting  EE's  development:  The  ending  of  her  status  as  “a  borderland  of  stability” 
(Liulevicius 2009: 235). France, in opposition, seems to approach EE, largely unknown to 
her,  more  hesitantly  and  in  her  more  general  tradition  of  attempting  to  spread  certain 
values: “The values of democracy, respect for human rights, good governance, we defend 
them everywhere, in Asia just like in Latin America or in Eastern Europe.”6 (Sarkozy 2006 
Cotonou). Diplomatic papers equally show that France seems to conceive of her support to 
EE on a moral level:
We need to make Europe not only in the interests of free nations, but also to be 
able to accommodate the nations of the East, who, once delivered from their 
subjections they suffer until now, will ask us for accession and for our moral 
support.7 (Schuhman, Robert 1963 quoted in Majza 2003:447)
5 “En effet, si les Allemands […] doivent inspirer leur politique étrangère de leur passé, et que l'on 
considère que la pauvreté en Europe de l'Est est le résultat de quarante années passées sous le régime 
communiste, qui sont elles-mêmes une conséquence de l'expansion des troupes nazies en Europe de l'Est, 
le côté “arrière” des pays de l'Est est dû à l'Allemagne. Il serait donc logique que les Allemands fassent 
pour l'ensemble des pays est-européens les efforts de reconstruction faits pour l'ancienne RDA.”
6 “[L]es valeurs de démocratie, de respect des droits de l’homme, de bonne gouvernance, nous les 
défendons partout, en Asie comme en Amérique latine ou en Europe de l’Est.”
7 “ Nous devons faire l'Europe non seulement dans l'întérêt des peuples libres, mais pour pouvoir y recueillir 
les peuples de l'Est, qui, délivrés des sujétions qu'ils ont subies jusqu'à présent, nous demanderaient leur 
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In addition, a certain diffuse anxiety of German expansionism with regard to EE seems to 
mark France's approach (Stark 2006:108).
Germany and France seem thus both to view themselves as superior to EE, and 
simultaneously as an aid for its development: Germany on a economical level and France 
on a moral one. This and the different connections to EE will play a role when evaluating 
the analysis' results.
3.4 Bi-Directionality of the Inclusion Process: Estonia's Efforts to (re-)integrate into 
the West
If a certain shift in constructions of (Western) European identity can be stated, this 
seems to be,  at  least  partly,  a result  of the bi-directionality  of the inclusion process.  A 
number  of  EE nations  have  since  the  mid-nineties  been  branding  their  nations  as  less 
Eastern and more Western, i.e. more European. Estonia is an excellent example of how the 
process of inclusion may be reinforced by the desire of a whole nation to re-brand herself:
The Baltic peoples expect that the self-evident outcome of political liberation 
will be their Return to Europe. (…). Their wish to be accepted again by the 
West and to be recognized as an integral part of the Western cultural realm is a 
more  substantial  driving  force  in  their  development  than  mere  economic  or 
political motivation could ever be. (Lauristin 1997:29)
Yet it is not fully evident whether the issue is indeed the same for both directions of the 
process:  Whereas  Estonia  attempts  to  be  recognised  as  part  of  an  established  WE 
community, two alternatives of inclusion are conceivable for WE constructions of European 
identity as outlined above. Yet, Estonia, in her strive for recognition as Northern, i.e. WE, 
seems  to  sustain  and  perpetuate  the  construction  of  European  identity  as  a  Western 
European identity. In any case, it is important to understand Estonia's national re-branding 
adhésion et notre appui moral. “
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as the context of a possibly changing coverage in the empirical analysis.
Estonia,  since the end of Soviet rule,  is in the process of intensely defining her 
national  identity  (Lauristin  1997:26,  Ilves  2009),  since  the  tripartial  categorisation  of 
culture in the Soviet era did not leave room for the formation of distinct, modern national  
identities (Lauristin 1997:27-28). The abundance of Estonian institutions and organisations 
around nationhood and language (see Estonian Institutions) indicates the enduring intensity 
of  this  process.  An  important  part  of  her  national  re-definition  is  the  adoption  of  the 
narrative  of  Soviet  occupation  (Lauristin  1997:31).  This  narrative  seems  to  have  been 
chosen as it permits for “rupturing all possible links to the Soviet Union and Russia” (Pettai 
2010:  154).  Yet  it  risks  to  have  the  opposite  effect  as  it  perfectly  strengthens  Western 
discourses of Eastern Europe as a number of weak and victimized states (see above).
Estonia pursues her re-branding on several scenes: (1) On the basis of linguistics, 
Toomas Ilves (president of Estonia since 2006) introduced in 1998 the concept of the Yule 
countries to construct a new, alternative socio-geographical entity:
The people of the Yule countries – Brits, Scandinavians, Finns and Estonians – 
consider themselves rational. (…) we are businesslike and logical, stubborn and 
hard-working.8 (Ilves 1998:30-31) 
He since tried to promote the concept abroad (see e.g. Ilves 1999). (2) In the domain of 
symbols, discussions on the Westernisation of Estonia's flag and international name took 
place under the cabinet of Maart Laar (1999-2002). As for the flag, a more Northern design 
bearing a cross was suggested. As for Estonia's international name, it was suggested to 
chance it to “Estland” in order to get rid of the ending “-ia” perceived as too Eastern since 
resembling names such as Macedonia, Albania and Armenia. However, a final decision was 
never  taken  (Lagerspetz  2003:54-55).  (3)  In  the  domain  of  genetics,  Estonia's  ethnic 
belonging to WE was attempted to be proven in genetic studies in 1996, comparing the 
genetic material of Estonians to those of West-Europeans (Feldman 2001:10). 
All  these examples illustrate Estonia's efforts to (re-)integrate into a WE sphere. 
8 “Jõulumaade rahvused – britid, skandinaavlased, soomlased ja eestlased – peavad ennast kaine mõistuse 
etaloniks. […] oleme meie asjalikud ja loogilised, visad ja töökad.”
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However, Estonia's (re-)integration to the West appears to be suspiciously looked upon by 
“more  distant  European  metropoles”  (Lauristin  1997:31-35).  If  recognition  of  a  post-
communist  country  as  belonging  to  the  Western  sphere  is  related  to  “shared  historical 
experiences  and  opportunities  for  communication”  (Lauristin  1997:31-35),  then  her 
recognition should be easier in Germany than in France. The empirical analysis will shed 
light  on  this  assumption.  Knowing about  the  bi-directionality  of  the  re-construction  of 
European identity will help to interpret the empirical results.
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4. RESEARCH QUESTION
The  theoretical  background  of  the  dissertation  thus  posits  (1)  the  national 
construction of European identity with the media as one of the most important actors, (2) 
the importance of the processes of categorisation, comparison and homogenisation in the 
collective  construction  of  identity  through  the  interaction  of  individuals,  (3)  the 
categorising function of media representation, inherent in language and further enhanced 
through framing and their  (4) representation of the different realities and the integrated 
reality of a society in the applied frames.  Empirically,  I  posit  (1) the construction of a 
Western European identity as a European identity over the past 50 years in the EU15 and 
thus in France and Germany, (2) the existence of negatively connoted discourses on EE in 
WE and (3) Estonia's striving for recognition as an integral part of Europe.
From this theoretical and empirical research arises the following research question: 
Is Estonia, in France and Germany, more regarded as an integral part of Europe today than 
before her EU accession in 2004? If so, in relation to what events, topics or aspects? 
When  evaluating  the  results  on  the  basis  of  the  theoretical  framework,  special 
attention will be paid to the aspects (1) whether the inclusion concerns political-economic 
or cultural-historical aspects of European identity and (2) what the nature of the change is: 
inclusion into a pre-existing (Western) European identity or a profound re-definition of a 
European identity?
To answer the research questions, each of the employed methodologies will focus 
on specific aspects. First, a quantitative Content Analysis will give a general overview on 
changes that occur as to (1) categorisations, (2) topic areas, (3) presence of discourses on 
Eastern  Europe,  (4)  evaluation  and (5)  hierarchical  positioning of  Estonia.  As  outlined 
above, I consider these aspects relevant to make conclusions on the inclusion of Estonia 
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into constructions of European identity. In a second step, a qualitative analysis will serve to 
determine  the  meaning  of  certain  categories  of  the  Content  Analysis.  The  analysed 
categories  correspond  to  real  frames  and  were  chosen  after  Content  Analysis  for  two 
reasons: (1) they appeared to be specifically contentious or shifting in meaning and, more 
importantly, (2) all chosen frames are othering frames. It is this second point that gives the 
qualitative  analysis  a  purpose  that  goes  beyond  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  quantitative 
categories.  If  constructions  of  European  identity  have  previously  been  based  on  the 
opposition to  the  Eastern European Other (see above),  then it  is  especially through the 
analysis of othering frames that I can determine as to what aspects Estonia is today more 
included into a European identity than before CEEE.  The qualitative analysis will examine 
three aspects:  (1)  the meanings of  the respective frames and their  interrelation,  (2) the 
parameters of European identity (see above) with respect to which Estonia is included or 
othered (3) changes that occur over time. Whether a possible increased inclusion is due to a 
profound  change  of  European  identity  constructions,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  Estonia's 
increasing compliance with norms of Westernness may equally become clearer.
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5. METHODOLOGY
As outlined above, identity constructions are a highly abstract research object that is 
difficult  to grasp because of its  complexity and constant change.  In this  section,  I  will 
outline  my  choice  of  methods  and  data  and  explain  why  I  believe  them  to  be  most 
appropriate to answer my research question.
5.1 Methods 
Constructions  of  European  identity  are,  I  believe,  best  measured  through  a 
combined qualitative and quantitative methodology: Due to the society-wide construction 
of collective identity and the relatively slow development of identity constructions over 
time, a large amount of data from several different sources needs to be analysed over a long 
time span. At the same time, media representations are through their categorising function 
inherently interpretative and can, in turn, only be accessed through interpretation. 
Quantitative Content Analysis accounts for the first point. It permits to analyse a 
large amount of relatively unstructured data over a period of several years (Krippendorf 
2004:44).  Furthermore,  it  allows for the simultaneous,  systematic  assessment and inter-
comparison of several dimensions on a synchronic and diachronic scale. It thus seems most 
appropriate  to  gain  a  holistic  understanding  of  the  development  of  representations  of 
Estonia in France and Germany over the past decade. Yet, in my case its explanatory power 
is limited, as correlations between several variables cannot be made due to the relatively 
small  amount  of  available  data.  A  qualitative  text  analysis  will  therefore  permit  to 
understand the meaning of frames, their interrelation with topics as well as their change 
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over time. Qualitative analysis constitutes an open approach to the text that does not impose 
pre-defined categories. Furthermore it allows for contextualising the analysis and for the 
consideration of details. These points make the method an ideal complement to Content 
Analysis.
Both of my methods rely on a constructivist ontology and epistemology. My use of 
Content Analysis,  even though developed on the basis of a foundational ontology for a 
positivist epistemological approach (Titscher et al. 2007:56), is thus equally based on the 
qualitative characteristics of text as outlined in Krippendorf (2004:22-23).
In  the  Content  Analysis,  I  deal  with  six  dimensions  apart  from  the  general 
information on date (V1), year (V2), title (V3), magazine (V4), genre of the article (V5) 
and length of the article (V6). These are: First, the framing perspective (V7) and second, 
Estonia's  geopolitical  framing  (V8,  V9,  V10)  as  to  the  insights  they  provide  on 
categorisation and homogenisation. I decided to analyse both quantitatively (as opposed to 
e.g. an open coding) because the categories to use emerged clearly from the above research 
on the empirical background and, because of the pioneer character of the study, I needed a 
rigid  framework  to  gain  an  overview  that  is  as  objective  as  possible.  The  coding  of 
Estonia's  geopolitical  framing  on  three  levels  of  importance  does  not  contradict  the 
principle that categories in Content Analysis should be mutually exclusive and complete 
(Titscher et al. 2000:59). It simply becomes necessary through the fact that Estonia is in 
numerous  articles  predominantly  associated  with  a  certain  geopolitical  setting  but  also 
categorised within other settings throughout the same article.  I  further coded, third,  the 
framed topics (V11, V14, V17) as in  conjunction with other  variables they may reveal 
certain topics of in- or exclusion; fourth, the presence of a discourse on Eastern Europe in 
relation to the framed topic (V12, V15, V18) as they shed light on the extent and aspects of  
in- and exclusion, fifth, the evaluation of Estonia in relation to the framed topic (V13, V16, 
V19) and finally the hierarchical positioning of Estonia with respect to the main Western 
unit of reference (V20). These dimensions and their respective categories were established 
on the basis of (1) the theoretical framework and empirical background, especially on the 
psychological processes of identity construction and the outline of discourses on Eastern 
Europe in WE, (2) a screening of articles of the years 2000, 2002/2003 and 2011 prior to 
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the coding and (3) a pilot coding. All dimensions, criteria for their assessment and examples 
can be found in the Coding Sheet (see appendices). The coding is intentionally not limited 
to explicit  contents such as keywords. Instead,  based on the theoretical assumption that 
meaning in a text depends on larger units than the single sign (see above), the coding takes 
into account implicit meanings in tone, use of vocabulary and context.
The qualitative analysis is mainly oriented around the aspects described with the 
research questions (above). I proceeded as follows: (1) extraction of the relevant passages 
from  the  articles  of  the  respective  qualitative  sample,  (2)  analysis  of  content  of  the 
passages, taking into account also vocabulary and textual structures, (3) grouping of the 
passages  according  to  content  and  time  of  publication.  In  the  second  step,  the  textual 
analysis  is  inspired  by Fairclough's  scheme for  Critical  Discourse Analysis  (Fairclough 
1989:110),  as  it  provides  a  good  overview  of  relevant  aspects.  Yet,  my  approach,  as 
opposed  to  Fairclough's,  does  not  aim  at  a  discourse  analysis.  Instead,  it  aims  at  the 
qualitative assessment of explicit and implicit content and categorisations as this is what I 
consider revealing of constructions of European identity (see above).
5.2 Limitations of the Research Design
Both  methodologies,  as  every  methodology,  also  have  their  drawbacks.  Content 
Analysis,  aiming at  generalisation through categorisation,  it  is  inevitably imprecise and 
reductive.  Furthermore,  despite  frequent  claims  for  it  to  be  an  objective  methodology 
(Glynn 2004:108), it  is actually not. First, the categories used to code the content are a 
result of my previous research, which, in turn, is influenced by several factors such as my 
interests and previous knowledge, termed by Temple (1997) the researcher's “intellectual 
autobiography”. Second, the coding of the articles is, despite rigid rules, ultimately a result 
of my interpretation of the text, as meaning is a result of the interaction of the readers with 
the text. As a result, an influence of my very own standpoint at the intersection of several 
realities cannot be avoided.
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The influence of the researcher on the research is even stronger in the qualitative 
analysis.  Being  even  less  structured  than  Content  Analysis,  the  interpretative  freedom 
entails the risk of over-interpretation or one-sidedness. Furthermore, as only a small amount 
of data can be qualitatively analysed, generalisations cannot be made.
These  criticisms,  however,  need  to  be  put  into  perspective.  First,  as  to  the 
application of categories in Content Analysis, it  seems that  any type of research – also 
qualitative research – seems to be based on categorisations by the researcher, namely his or 
her  personal,  mental  frames.  The  advantage  of  Content  Analysis  is  that  the  applied 
categorisations  are  both  made  explicit  and  justified  through  research  of  the  empirical 
background. Furthermore, to avoid misleading conclusions related to categorisation, I will 
pay attention to larger, more obvious trends during evaluation, knowing that the boundaries 
of categories are not always unambiguous.
Second,  as  to  the  interpretative  base  of  both  methodologies,  I  depart  from the 
understanding that social reality is always constructed and therefore cannot be objectively 
assessed. However, in order to make my assessment inter-subjectively comprehensible, I 
make my own background explicit  as recommended in Temple (1997). My background 
consists  of  socialisation  in  Germany  and,  since  I  left  school,  an  intense  personal, 
professional and academic preoccupation with France where I lived for two years. As a 
consequence,  I  am  familiar  with  both  languages  and  cultures,  yet  my  knowledge  on 
Germany is more intuitive whereas my knowledge on France is to a larger extent academic. 
As for the French language, although my level is near-native, I cannot entirely exclude that 
I may have overlooked certain metaphors based on a more exhaustive knowledge of French 
culture.   
Last,  the  drawbacks  of  the  respective  methodologies  are  reduced  through  their 
combination:  Content  Analysis  provides  a  systematic  overview,  whereas  the  qualitative 
analysis accounts for the analysis of meaning in context and its change. The interrelation 
and  compensation  of  mutual  drawbacks  is  also  taken  into  account  in  sampling:  The 
qualitative analysis takes into account not only those articles that were to a certain category 
in  Content  Analysis  and  thereby  compensates  for  the  latter's  inevitably  reductive 
categorisation. 
34
5.3 Data Source 
The choice of news magazines as data source of my analysis is related to features 
concerning both media in general and news magazines in particular. As to media, I outlined 
above that I consider them a particularly good source for my research aim because of the 
societal frames they contain. Second, media are “archives” of identity definitions and thus 
one of the very few sources providing genuine access to identity definitions ten years ago. 
Third,  media  analysis  is  “an  “unobtrusive”  or  “nonreactive”  research  method  (Glynn 
2004:108) and therefore minimises the influence of the research process on the results. The 
choice  of  news  magazines  out  of  other  media  relies  on  several  reasons.  First,  these 
magazines are produced by a nation's upper and middle class for this nation's upper and 
middle class and those best correspond to the society-wide, aggregate approach to identity 
definitions I aim to take. Second, news magazines, depending less on the current flow of 
news than newspapers, have more freedom to choose their topics. In addition, their articles 
are  usually  longer  and more illustrated.  News magazines  thus  provide most  exhaustive 
frames.  Thereby  the  explanatory  power  of  the  analysis  increases.  Third,  printed  news 
magazines  cover  Estonia  more  regularly  as  for  instance  audiovisual  magazines.  For  a 
diachronic analysis, this regularity of coverage is indispensable. Last,  all  chosen 
magazines enjoy a high level of trust in their respective societies and therefore make the 
impact of their frames back on societal constructions of European identity most probable.
The analysis will comprise all quality news magazines from Germany and France 
with a relevant circulation. These are for Germany:  Der Spiegel,  Focus  and Die Zeit;  for 
France: L'Express, Le Point and Le Nouvel Observateur. Unfortunately, the only magazine 
for  the  Franco-German  sphere,  ParisBerlin,  could  not  be  included  because  of  the 
unavailability of data.
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Circulation 
(rounded average 2011)
Founded in Political orientation
German magazines
Focus 550 000 1993 Middle-right
Die Zeit 500 000 1946 Social-liberal
Der Spiegel 950 000 1947 Initially  leftist,  however 
more  recently  moving 
towards neo-conservatism
French magazines
L'Express 620 000 1953 centrist
Le Nouvel 
Observateur
500 000 1964 middle-left
Le Point 410 000 1972 Middle-right
Fig. 3: Overview over analysed magazines9
These magazines have several points in common. First, they all appear weekly with 
a circulation of around 500 000 exemplars, except for Der Spiegel, whose circulation is 
about twice as high. Second, they all are anchored in the societies of their respective nation 
for several decades and enjoy an image of providing trustworthy, high quality journalism. 
Third, they are all aiming at a readership composed of the elite, upper and middle class of 
their respective nation. Third, their mixture of long and short articles is relatively similar, 
except for Die Zeit who tends towards longer articles. Last, none of the journals officially 
follows an explicit political line, yet all of them can clearly be assigned to a certain political 
orientation (as outlined above) and cover in their sum both in Germany and France the 
range from centre-left  to  centre-right.  Possible  influences of  the journalist's  political  or 
ideological orientation on the framing are thus balanced.
As for the choice of articles, the overall population was selected using the search 
terms 
9Sources: Der Spiegel 2011: Auflagenmeldung,  Der Spiegel 2012: Sieben Gründe für eine Belegung,  Der 
Spiegel: Konzept,  Der Spiegel: Geschichte,  Focus: Deutschlands Nachrichtenmagazin,  Focus: Memo, Die 
Zeit: Verlagszahlen,  Die Zeit: Marketing,  Die Zeit: Wie alles begann, L'Express 15/02/2012,  Le Point: 
Contacts,  Le Nouvel Observateur: Positionnement et chiffres-clés
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“HEADLINE(estnisch)  or  BYLINE(estnisch)  or  HLEAD(estnisch)  or 
HEADLINE(Estland) or BYLINE(Estland) or HLEAD(Estland) or HEADLINE(Esten) or 
BYLINE(Esten)  or  HLEAD(Esten)  or  HEADLINE(Estinnen)  or  BYLINE(Estinnen)  or 
HLEAD(Estinnen)” 
for Germany and 
“HEADLINE(Estonie)  or  BYLINE(Estonie)  or  HLEAD(Estonie)  or 
HEADLINE(estonien!) or BYLINE(estonien!) or HLEAD(estonien!)” 
for France in the NexisUK database. For Die Zeit and Le Nouvel Observateur not being 
available from NexisUK, the articles have been determined by the search function of their 
Internet archives. As these search functions are not as detailed as the one on NexisUK, I 
cannot exclude that certain articles might have been overlooked.
Out of a total population of 305 articles I excluded all articles longer than 170 words 
mentioning Estonia only once in an enumeration. The final sample for the Content Analysis 
then comprised 243 articles. The sample for  qualitative analysis was compiled out of the 
articles  ascribed  to  a  certain  category  in  either  first,  second  or  third  priority  in  the 
quantitative Content Analysis. To reduce the large sample while maintaining complexity, all 
articles  in  which  the  relevant  passage  was  shorter  than  two  lines  were  excluded. 
Furthermore,  I added those articles that contained the respective frames but, due to the 
inevitably reductive coding scheme, could not be assessed in Content Analysis. Therefore, 
the  qualitative  analysis  explores  essentially  the  meanings  of  certain  categories  of  the 
Content Analysis, yet goes beyond it in the inclusion of a few uncoded framings. 
The time span for the analysis  has  been set  to  2000-2011 which allows for the 
inclusion  of  time  before  Estonia's  EU  accession.  Simultaneously,  it  excludes  possible 
particularities in representation related to the start of accession negotiations in 1998, which 
would take the analysis one step further and goes beyond what I can cover in this Master 
dissertation.  The time period was, for the quantitative analysis, divided into pre- and post-
CEEE (01/05/2004) in order to be able to detect changes due to the inclusion of Estonia 
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into the political-economical unit of Europe. Certain particularities are, however, analysed 
with regard to the single years. In the qualitative analysis, I set time periods according to 
the respective results.
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6. RESULTS
This section serves to present the results of the empirical analysis.
6.1 Results of the quantitative Content Analysis
I will first give a general overview over the composition of the sample. The amount 
of articles on Estonia is with a total of 141 in German magazines almost a third higher than 
in French magazines with a total of 102 articles. 
The  distribution  of  articles  over  the  years  is  very  unequal  and  rages  from  26 
(Germany 2007) to 2 (France 2000, 2002):
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Fig. 4: Distribution of articles per magazine, absolute numbers
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In  both  French  and  German  magazines  in  the  period  between  2004-2008  more 
articles on Estonia have been published. When looking at the transition from 2003 to 2004, 
a strong surge in the number of articles published on Estonia is observable: for Germany, 
the number has more than tripled,  for  France doubled.  Most  of  the increased attention 
seems to  be  due to  EU enlargement:  articles  on the  enlargement  itself,  but  also  travel 
documentations or cultural portraits dominate in both French and German magazines. In 
German magazines, a further significant peak is reached in 2007, due to the covering of the 
discussion,  riots  and cyberattacks around the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue in 
Tallinn.  In  French  magazines,  a  moderate  peak  is  reached  in  2008  in  relation  to  the 
covering of Herman Simm being discovered as a spy for Russia  in the NATO and the 
inclusion  of  the  EE  states  into  the  Schengen  area.  Since  2008,  no  general  trend  is 
discernible, however the attention Estonia receives in German and French magazines seems 
to converge. 
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Fig. 5: Distribution of articles per year, absolute numbers
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When evaluating the lengths of articles, it appears that Estonia receives significantly 
more attention in German magazines. When looking at single years, a particularly high 
amount  of  medium  and  long  articles  is  visible  in  2004  for  both  French  and  German 
magazines, as well as for the whole period 2004-2008 in French magazines, both in relation 
to the recent EU enlargement.
Before starting the analysis, a few limitations need to be pointed out: First, no data 
has  been  available  for  Le  Nouvel  Observateur  for  the  period  2000-11.2003,  which 
corresponds, calculated on the average number of articles/year in this magazine, to about 5 
missing articles. Second, the absolute number of articles published on Estonia is as follows:
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Fig. 6: Attention devoted to Estonia
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Fig. 7: Absolute number of articles on Estonia before and after CEEE
 The low number of articles published in French magazines on Estonia before her 
EU accession will be taken into account in the evaluation. Third, some aspects have been 
coded  with  different  levels  of  importance  or  a  high  number  of  categories  to  assure  a 
maximum of preciseness. Yet, due to the low number of articles a systematic correlation (a) 
of the three levels of importance or (b) with the other variables assessed in relation turned 
out not to provide reliable results. In these cases I will,  for (a), only give a systematic 
overview  of  the  dominant  framing  and  add  observations  from  the  other  levels  where 
appropriate; and for (b) relegate the analysis of interrelation of frames, topics and meaning 
to the qualitative analysis.
I will now give an overview over the assessed dimensions.
Framing Perspective
Certain changes are discernible in the choice of a framing perspective with regard to 
Estonia pre- and post-CEEE:
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As for German magazines, the national framing perspective remains stable at 64% 
in both periods. It is with 100% particularly strong in 2005 due to a large amount of articles 
in the domain of politics and particularly on the integration of the new EU members. The 
framing perspective of Europe as a whole increases, mainly due to the coverage of the 
NATO  agent  Simm  issue  in  2008.  However,  the  EU15  perspective  does  not  entirely 
disappear  with  the  end  of  EU15.  Instead,  certain  issues  are  still  framed  from  a  WE 
perspective,  such  as  in  2006  financial  investment  in  EE,  in  2008  the  opening  of  the 
Schengen area to the new EU members and in 2011 the end of restrictions on free mobility 
for workers from EE in Germany. This perspective seems frequently to be connected to 
issues raising popular anxiety, for instance on migration. In general, it is to note that the  
high  rates  of  the  national  framing  perspective  are  partly  due  to  the  coding  criteria:  a 
national perspective was assumed for all articles not evidently taking another stance. 
As for French magazines, the national perspective seems equally strong – mainly for 
the  same  coding  related  reason  as  above  –  and  increases  significantly  after  the  2004 
enlargement.  When  set  in  relation  to  the  absolute  number  of  articles,  the  national 
perspective appears to be particularly frequent in 2005 (10 articles) and mostly related to 
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Fig. 8: Framing perspectives (V7)
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the topics of the recent EU enlargement and accounts of communist history. When looking 
at single years, it is evident that in French magazines the national perspective increases 
significantly after the 2004 enlargement at the expense of the Europe-wide perspective. 
For  both  French  and  German  magazines,  the  national  perspective  generally 
dominates and is particularly strong in 2004/2005 related to coverage of the recent CEEE. 
In  German  magazines,  post-CEEE,  the  EU15  perspective  significantly  reduces  but  is 
maintained for topics concerning a perceived threat, whereas in French magazines it nearly 
disappears. Its reduction in German magazines goes along with a more frequent holistic 
European perspective, whereas in French magazines the EU15 share falls to the national 
perspective. 
Estonia's geopolitical Categorisation
Estonia's dominant geopolitical categorisation evaluates clearly:
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Fig. 9: Estonia's most important geopolitical categorisation (V8)
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Concerning  German  magazines,  the  range  of  dominant  geopolitical  framings  of 
Estonia  is  more  varied  after  her  EU  accession.  It  goes  along  with  a  decrease  of  her 
dominant framing as a nation, a Baltic State and part of Eastern Europe and the increase of 
her framing as part of Europe as a whole. The latter is related to the coverage surrounding 
the  accession,  but  also  to  the  fact  that  Estonia  is  now more  often  used  as  a  point  of 
reference in statistical EU wide comparisons. However, when Estonia is dominantly framed 
as part of Europe as a whole, she is usually also framed as a nation and as part of Eastern 
Europe  as  indicated  by  the  other  levels  of  categorisation  (V9,  V10).  Furthermore,  her 
association to Russia increases. This frame, after her EU accession, usually goes hand in 
hand with Estonia's second and third most important framing as a nation and as part of 
Europe as a whole or the NATO. Thus the overall meaning seems to be more complex than 
a straightforward association to Russia and will  be analysed in detail  in the qualitative 
analysis. Last, Estonia's framing as an Eastern European country decreases only slightly, 
and she is not at all framed as part of Northern Europe.
Concerning French magazines, Estonia's geopolitical categorisation is equally more 
varied after her EU accession. Whereas before, she was most frequently framed as a nation 
and part of Eastern Europe, after her EU accession five different categories have more and 
almost equal weight: her categorisation as a Baltic State, as part of Eastern Europe and 
Europe  as  a  whole,  her  association  to  Russia  and  spontaneous  geopolitical  framings. 
Estonia's categorisation as part of Europe as a whole, is for both periods, like in German 
magazines,  frequently related to  her framing as a nation on other  levels,  and unlike in 
German magazines,  not systematically related to her framing as Eastern European. The 
Eastern  European  as  most  important  frame  visibly  decreased  with  no  change  in  the 
associated second or third frames. Furthermore, the framing of Estonia being in Russia's 
sphere  of  influence  increased,  yet  its  meaning  seems  as  contentious  as  for  German 
magazines.  Finally,  the  large  part  of  framing  as  NATO  country  before  Estonia's  EU 
accession is due to Estonia's accession to the NATO on 29/03/2004 before she joined the 
EU.
When  looking  at  both  French  and  German  magazines,  it  becomes  evident  that 
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Estonia's framing as belonging to Europe as a whole has increased. This is particularly 
obvious, when taking into account the second and third most important frames and the 
ambiguous meaning of her association to  Russia.  Furthermore,  it  appears  that Estonia's 
categorisation as Eastern European seems to decrease more easily in French magazines than 
in German magazines and that generally new categorisations are more widely adopted in 
French magazines than in German magazines.
I will now look more closely at specific periods. For France, the years 2000-2002 have 
been grouped, as there is not enough data available (2-4 articles/year).
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In German magazines, Estonia's categorisation as belonging to Europe as a whole 
holds  a  stable  level  of  around 25% since 2007 with  the  exception  of  2009 where this 
framing  is  completely  absent.  Her  association  to  Eastern  Europe  has  been  particularly 
strong in 2004 and 2005 and is since fluctuating around the same level as before her EU 
accession. Since 2006, Estonia's association to Russia is increasing (explanation as above) 
as well as her association to the NATO. Yet, it is remarkable that Estonia's joining of NATO 
in 2004 does not seem to have been a newsworthy event, since her main categorisation as 
member of NATO only started in 2008 with a delay of 4 years. The same delay is visible for 
her categorisation as part of Europe as a whole. Furthermore, since 2005 Estonia starts to 
be  represented  in  spontaneous  geopolitical  frames  which  is  related  to  her  increased 
inclusion into statistical comparisons as e.g. on state finances or murder rates throughout 
Europe. Last, in 2011 the first dominant framing of Estonia as a Nordic Country appears.
For  French magazines,  two years are  conspicuous:  Neither  in 2009 nor in  2011 
Estonia has been dominantly framed as a nation. This result is first due to the low number 
of articles in both years (6/year) and second to the fact that in both years the framing as a 
nation is relegated to the second or third most important level. In the period from 2005-
2007 a strong framing of Estonia as part of Europe as a whole is evident and linked to  
coverage of  her  recent  EU accession.  Simultaneously her  framing as Eastern European 
significantly decreases and increases again after 2009. The graphic also shows Estonia's 
increased  association  to  Russia,  especially  for  the  period  2007-2009  (explanation  see 
above). Furthermore, the framing of Estonia in spontaneous spacial formations appears in 
2004 and increases since due to statistical comparisons. Last, the chart clearly shows that 
the  first  dominant  framing  of  Estonia  as  a  Baltic  State  appeared  in  2004 and that  the 
importance of this category has since increased. This is particularly striking, as even in the 
second and third most important geopolitical framings of Estonia, the Baltic frame did not 
play a role before 2004. The categorisation of Estonia as part  of Northern Europe or a 
Nordic Country is absent in French magazines.
When comparing French and German magazines, it is obvious that before Estonia's 
EU accession, she is in French magazines more frequently framed as Eastern European (25-
33%)  than  in  German  magazines  (13-17%).  The  frequency  of  the  Baltic  State  frame 
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decreases  in  German  magazines  since  Estonia's  EU accession,  but  increases  in  French 
magazines.  For  both,  French and German magazines,  Estonia's  association to  Russia  is 
contentious and includes Estonia's simultaneous categorisation as part of Europe as a whole 
or  the  NATO.  Furthermore,  Estonia's  categorisation  in  spontaneous  spacial  formations 
increased since her EU accession (explanation see above). Equally her categorisation as 
part of Europe as a whole increased, in French magazines in the aftermath of CEEE but 
decreased since, and in German magazines with a delay of about 3 years. Yet, Estonia's 
self-categorisation  as  a  Nordic  country  seems  to  have  found  its  way  only  to  German 
magazines, and only very recently.
Topics related to Estonia
The  topics  covered  in  relation  to  Estonia  equally  demonstrate  a  certain 
development:
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As to the framed topic, for both French and German magazines, it is visible that the 
range of regularly covered topics is much more diverse after CEEE than before. One of the 
most striking findings is, for both French and German magazines, again, the covering of 
Estonia's relations to Russia exclusively after her EU accession (explanation see above). 
For  both  countries  the  EU enlargement  remains,  also  after  CEEE,  an  important  topic. 
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Fig. 11: Most important topic related to Estonia (V11)
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Equally noticeable for both French and German magazines is the large amount of travel 
documentations  in  preparation  of  CEEE,  which  after  CEEE  develops  differently:  For 
German magazines, the number of travel documentations reduces – just as the coverage of 
cultural issues in general, whereas in French magazines travel documentations reduce after 
CEEE in favour of an increased coverage of other cultural subjects in relation to Estonia. 
Two  further  differences  between  French  and  German  magazines  are  conspicuous 
independently from the time-period: Whereas in French magazines communism as part of 
history is regularly covered, the focus in German magazines lays on transition. 
Discourses on Eastern Europe related to Estonia 
I will  now move on to the development of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to 
Estonia.
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Fig. 12: Types of discourses on Eastern Europe related to Estonia (V12)
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As for discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia, a general decrease of the 
presence of discourses on Eastern Europe is visible on the level of the most important topic.
In  German  magazines,  the  presence  of  discourses  on  Eastern  Europe  drops 
significantly from 80% to 60%. Especially the discourse of Estonia as a learner diminishes, 
while all other types of discourses remain stable.
In French magazines, the presence of discourses on Eastern Europe reduces from 
70% to 60%, with a reduction of all types of discourses except the discourse of weakness.  
The latter is mainly related to coverage of the cyberattacks and tensions with Moscow after 
the relocation of the Bronze Soldier in 2007.
The relation of discourses on Eastern Europe to a certain topic will be analysed in 
the qualitative analysis. Yet, two correlations are already noticeable when looking at single 
years:  First,  in  2008 in  German  magazines  the  amount  of  articles  using  the  insecurity 
discourse is particularly high and related to the NATO agent Simm issue, depicting Estonia 
as a source of insecurity for the NATO. Second, in 2010 in French magazines only 30% of 
the articles mention a discourse on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia (compared to 60% 
on average).  This drop can be related to the high number of articles on cultural  issues 
(travel, music, books) with no use of discourses on Eastern Europe.
In  both  German  and  French  magazines,  the  presence  of  discourses  on  Eastern 
Europe for further topics covered in an article is significantly lower and remains stable for 
both time periods around 30%.
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Evaluation of Estonia 
Changes are also visible concerning the evaluation of Estonia:
When looking at the evaluation of Estonia (V13, V16, V19), related to the most important 
topic  some  changes  are  clearly  discernible.  In  German  magazines,  her  ambivalent 
evaluation reduced in favour of a stronger positive or neutral evaluation. The remaining 
negative evaluations are most often related to conflictual relations with Russia, sometimes 
also  to  discourses  of  backwardness  in  relation  to  Estonia.  For  French  magazines,  the 
significant  rise  of  negative  evaluations  of  Estonia  is  equally  related  to  a  decrease  of 
ambivalent evaluations and the start of coverage of her association to Russia. Nevertheless 
the positive evaluation of Estonia increases slightly in both French and German magazines 
with respect to a large variety of topics.
When  relating  the  evaluation  of  Estonia  back  to  the  presence  or  absence  of 
discourses on Eastern Europe, enough data to make reliable conclusions is only available 
for the post-accesion period: The presence of a discourse on Eastern Europe frequently 
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Fig. 13: Evaluation of Estonia as to most important topic (V13)
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entails  a  negative  or  ambivalent  evaluation  of  Estonia,  for  both  French  and  German 
magazines. For instance, the positive, neutral or absence of evaluation totals around 90% in 
both countries when Estonia is not related to any discourse on Eastern Europe. When one of 
these discourses is present, however, only 70% of the articles in German magazines and 
75% of the articles in French magazines evaluate Estonia positively, neutrally or not at all.
Hierarchical Positioning
The hierarchical positioning of Estonia develops as follows:
In German magazines, a substantial decrease of inferior positioning of Estonia in 
favour of a higher equal or ambivalent hierarchical positioning is visible. As to Estonia's 
superior positioning, it is, before her EU accession related to 2 articles: the first, one on her 
referendum for  EU accession,  evaluates  this  practice  as  more  democratic  compared  to 
German  magazines,  where  even  fundamental  EU  related  decisions  are  taken  by  the 
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Fig. 14: Hierarchical positioning of Estonia (V20)
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government.  The other  article  covers music.  After  Estonia's  EU accession,  her  superior 
positioning concentrates around topics of IT-innovation (such as E-voting and the NATO's 
IT-defence centre in Tallinn) and the Estonian economic success-story.
Concerning French magazines, the inferior positioning of Estonia equally decreased 
since her EU accession, mainly in favour of no positioning at all.  Furthermore, a small 
percentage of articles do now position Estonia as hierarchically superior, which was not at 
all the case before. These four articles relate to arts (2), E-voting (1) and Estonia's excellent 
state finances (1). 
When  comparing  French  and  German  magazines,  it  appears  that  before  CEEE 
German  magazines  tended  to  depict  Estonia  more  often  as  hierarchically  inferior  than 
French magazines – 66% and 57% respectively.  French magazines,  instead,  viewed her 
more often as hierarchically equal than German magazines – 29% and 14 % respectively. 
This difference may be related to the equally stronger presence of discourses on Eastern 
Europe in  German magazines.  After  CEEE there  is  no  difference  between  French  and 
German magazines as to their inferior, equal or superior positioning of Estonia. Differences 
exist  only between the  ambivalent  positioning,  stronger  in  German magazines,  and the 
absence  of  positioning,  stronger  in  French  magazines.  Yet,  both  positionings  visibly 
increase in both countries compared to pre-CEEE.
6.2 Results of the qualitative Analysis
In the qualitative analysis I analysed the categories (1) Estonia association to Russia 
(category 10 in V8, V9 and V10), and Estonia's depiction as (2) backward, (3) a learner and 
(4) an insecure place or a source of insecurity (categories 3, 4 and 5 in V12, V14 and V18).  
The choice of categories and the research questions are explained above.
I will analyse the different types of discourse for German and French magazines 
respectively and give a summarising overview in the end.
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Estonia's Association with Russia
The meaning of Estonia's association with Russia seems to be similar in French and 
German magazines.
German magazines
In German magazines Estonia's association to Russia is related to three recurrent 
theme complexes. First, Estonia is associated to Russia in a larger geopolitical setting often 
around topics related to the EU/NATO accession. This meaning visibly shifted over the past 
ten years. Before Estonia's EU and NATO accession, Estonia was regarded as belonging 
exclusively to Russia's sphere of influence. This included the perceived risk to provoke 
Russia when too closely collaborating with Estonia and occurs especially in relation to 
Estonia's NATO accession, for instance in:
Putin seems to be present as a silent guest at the table in every one of Schröder's 
talks. The process of advancing the links of the Baltic States to the West is “not 
directed against Russia” assures the chancellor publicly and ubiquitously.10 (Der 
Spiegel, 06/12/2000)
After EU and NATO accession, Estonia is, instead, portrayed as one of the states formerly 
under Russian sphere of influence, and now constantly in the process of dissociating herself 
from Russia. This portrait occurs in relation to her general protest against the separation of 
geopolitical spheres of influence in the EU, her refusal to attend the commemoration of the 
end of WWII in Moscow and her active opposition against Russia's invasion of Georgia:
On a  stage  in  the  centre  of  Tiflis  the  five  Eastern  Europeans  from Poland, 
Ukraine  and  the  Baltic  States  held  each  others  hands  firmly  and  solemnly 
promised to defend Georgia's freedom. “Russia”, yelled Poland's president Lech 
Kaczinski (…), “wants to restore her hegemony, but these times are over now!” 
And  his  Estonian  counterpart  Toomas  Hendrik  Ilves  shouted  in  Georgian 
through the Microphone: “I am a Georgian” - just like US president John F. 
10 “Putin sitzt bei jedem Gespräch Schröders gleichsam als steinerner Gast mit am Tisch. Der Prozess der 
Westanbindung des Baltikums sei “nicht gegen Russland gerichtet”, beteuert der Kanzler öffentlich und 
allerorten.”
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Kennedy promised solidarity and protection against the Soviet power to Berlin's 
inhabitants in 1963 by declaring: “Ich bin ein Berliner”.  (…). While “New-
Europeans” and Americans already identified the culprit in the recent conflict in 
Caucasus, politicians from the “old Europe” reacted with more composure.11 
(Focus, 18/08/2008)
In these accounts, a division between “old” and “new Europe” is often not only explicitly 
stated,  or  insinuated  through  the  claim  that  the  new  members  are  easily  manipulated 
through the US, but also implicitly emphasised. For instance, in the above example the 
reactions of the Estonian and Polish presidents are framed as insecure, childlike and defiant 
overreactions towards Russia through the use of vocabulary and punctuation: Estonia's and 
Poland's  presidents  “yelled”  and  “shouted  [...] through  the  microphone”,  whereas  the 
American  president,  in  a  similar  situation,  “promised”  by  “declaring”.  These  points 
suggests that Estonia is now being seen as constantly in the process of dissociating herself 
from Russia, rather than as a full member of a united European sphere. Albeit included into 
a European community of institutional organisation (the EU, or, as a Western community, 
the NATO) and, partially,  into a community of interests opposed to the Other (Russia), 
Estonia is, just as EE as a whole, othered as to her national memories and the resulting 
action (harsh opposition to Russia, compliant support of the US). This is further enhanced 
by Estonia's depiction as a source of insecurity within NATO (see below). Yet, compared to 
previous definitions of Estonia's geopolitical belonging, a shift is clearly discernible.
A second theme in Estonia's association to Russia concerns bilateral issues between 
Estonia and Russia and occurs especially in relation to the relocation of the Bronze soldier 
and the associated riots and cyberattacks. The ten articles in the sample relating to this topic 
show different trends in the respective magazines. Whereas Die Zeit reiterates old clichés 
and others both Estonia and Russia by characterising them as irrational and unwilling to 
cooperate, Focus, in opposition, clearly includes Estonia into a civilised European sphere 
11 “Auf einer Bühne in der Innenstadt von Tiflis hielten sich die fünf Osteuropäer aus Polen, der Ukraine und 
dem Baltikum fest and den Händen und gelobten feierlich, die Freiheit Georgiens zu verteidigen. 
“Russland”, schmetterte Polens Präsident Lech Kaczinski (…), “will seine Vorherrschaft wiederherstellen, 
aber diese Zeiten sind vorbei!” Und sein estnischer Amtskollege Toomas Hendrik Ilves rief in georgischer 
Sprache durchs Mikrofon: “Ich bin ein Georgier” - ganz so wie 1963 US-Präsident John F. Kennedy den 
Berlinern mit den Worten “Ich bin ein Berliner” Solidarität und Schutz gegen die Sovietmacht versichert 
hatte (…). Während für “Neu-Europäer” und Amerikaner der Schuldige im jüngsten Kaukasuskonflikt 
längst ausgemacht ist, reagierten Politiker des “alten Europa” zurückhaltender.”
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suffering from intolerable aggressions of her impulsive neighbour Russia. Der Spiegel takes 
an  intermediate  position  by  altering  between  both  depictions.  This  categorisation  of 
behaviour includes or others Estonia in the depiction of her action on the geopolitical scene 
as respectively conform or deviant from European norms of reason and civilisation, these 
norms being understood as West-European (see above: Brubaker 1998). Both Focus and 
Der Spiegel evoke the revival of the Cold War, with, however, Estonia on the Western side,  
pointing again at her inclusion into the shared sphere of institutional organisation.
A third type of association of Estonia to Russia occurs in the depiction of Russian 
culture in Estonia's everyday societal life. German stereotypes of Russian everyday lifestyle 
(poverty,  alcohol)  are  reiterated,  and their  association  to  Estonia  simultaneously  others 
Estonia as to standards in everyday lifestyle, e.g. in the description of Lasnamäe:
Built 20 or 30 years ago to settle as many Russians as possible. Here people 
swallow collectively huge amounts of alcohol at 8 in the morning, rummage on 
small,  filthy markets in used clothes, stand around on the street.12 (Die Zeit, 
23/05/2002)
This meaning does not seem to have undergone much shift in the analysed period. It is  
often used to illustrate either the starting point or the downside of the Estonian success 
story and usually includes references to Estonia's Soviet past, less often references to her 
initial economic dependence on Russia.
Overall, for German magazines, a partial shift in meaning can thus be stated: In a 
geopolitical  setting,  Estonia  is  now much stronger  included into  a  European sphere  of 
common institutional organisation, and, partially, interests. Yet, within this sphere, and also 
in  a  bilateral  setting,  her  belonging  remains  ambivalent  as  illustrated  above.  For  her 
association to Russian culture, finally, no shift takes place.
French magazines
As for French magazines,  Estonia's  association to  Russia  is  complex and not as 
12 “Gebaut vor 20, 30 Jahren, um möglichst viele Russen anzusiedeln. Hier kippen die Menschen morgens 
um acht kollektiv Alkohol, wühlen auf kleinen, schmuddeligen Märkten in gebrauchten Klamotten, stehen 
auf der Straße.”
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clear-cut and manifestly evolving as in the German magazines. Only one article dates to the 
pre-accession period. Post-accession, associations to Russia are usually made on a bilateral 
level. Two topics recur: (1) Russia’s unjustified aggression of Estonia and (2) the conflict 
on  “historical  truth”  between  the  two  countries.  Both  topics  occur  especially,  but  not 
exclusively, related to the Bronze Soldier.
As to Estonia's aggression by Russia, Russia is usually othered as the impulsive, 
unpredictable villain opposing victimised and westernising Estonia:
Outcry in Moscow. But also among Estonia's Russian speaking minority (…) 
who takes  offence.  The Russian authorities  threaten to  break off  diplomatic 
relations, urge the boycott of Estonian products and demonstrators besiege the 
embassy in Moscow. In Tallinn, the pro-Russians confront the police. Result: 1 
person killed and 150 wounded.
Lots of damage for the sake of a monument. And in Moscow, the resentment 
towards her Baltic ex-republics who have changed sides towards the West, is 
still intense. Just like in Estonia, independent since 1991, member of the EU 
and  the  NATO  since  2004...  and  striving  to  erase  fifty  years  of  Soviet 
occupation.13 (Le Point, 10/05/2007)
In- and exclusion as to several aspects are contained in these accounts. The above example 
shows: (1) Inclusion of Estonia into a community of values in opposition to exclusion of 
Russia through the depiction of her political strategies non-conform to (Western) European 
norms of reason (see above); (2) Simultaneous exclusion of Estonia from this (Western) 
European community of values as she comprises part of the Russian Other in her Russian 
minority; (3) Further exclusion from this sphere of values as to the equation of Estonia's 
reaction with Russia's reaction; (4) Exclusion from a (Western) European community of 
memory through depiction of Estonia's Soviet past as an aspect requiring erasing. Estonia is 
thus  partially  included  into  the  European  Self,  but,  just  like  in  German  magazines, 
represented as a new member evolving towards becoming fully European. In other articles, 
13 “Tollé à Moscou. Mais aussi parmi la minorité russophone d'Estonie (…), qui y voit un affront. Les 
autorités russes menacent de rompres les relations diplomatiques, appellent au boycott des produits 
estoniens et des manifestants font le siège de l'ambassade à Moscou. Beaucoup de degats pour un 
monument. Et la rancoeur toujours vive de Moscou vis-à-vis de ses ex-républiques baltes passées à 
l'Ouest. Comme l'Estonie, indépendante depuis 1991, membre de l'Union européene et de l'Otan depuis 
2004... Et soucieuse d'effacer cinquante années d'occupation soviétique.”
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this is stressed through depictions of a defiant Estonian attitude towards Russia, especially 
with regard to history and her need for protection by her Western partners.
As to the conflict  about historical truth,  depictions continually alter  between (1) 
both the Estonian and the Russian/Soviet version of history being equally valid and (2) the 
Russian version being invented. Notably, the Estonian version of history is never depicted 
as false which might be evaluated as an essential  inclusion of Estonia into a European 
community of memory when dealing with Russia as the Other. Yet, even when the Estonian 
version of history is  approved,  her independence is  dated to 1991 which attests  only a 
partial  understanding of Estonia's view on history (this phenomenon is also frequent in 
German magazines). 
Last,  Estonia association to Russia seems to be an underlying motive in a large 
variety of subjects, ranging from her good knowledge of Russia as advantageous for EU 
investors to a canard on Estonian farms declaring themselves independent Soviet Republic. 
Sometimes these associations lack a direct logical connection, as in:
On the  first  of  January,  Estonia,  Baltic  Republic  of  1,3 million  inhabitants, 
became the 17th member of the eurozone. This allows her to even more cut her 
ties with Russia.14 (Le Point, 06/01/2011)
These last type of associations to Russia formally insist on Estonia's ongoing or completed 
dissociation from Russia.  Yet,  the sole mentioning of her dissociation from Russia in a 
context where there is no imminent need for it, implies the underlying assumption of an 
unspecific, continuous association to Russia. 
Due to the lack of articles on Estonian-Russian relations in the pre-accession period, 
no change of meaning can be assessed. Yet, the sole fact that only Estonia's EU and NATO 
accession makes her relations with Russia worth media coverage suggests an inclusion into 
the shared sphere of institutional organisation, and possibly interests and experience. 
14 “Le premier janvier l'Estonie, république balte de 1,3 million d'habitant, est devenue le 17e membre de 
l'euro. Cela lui permet de couper plus encore les liens avec la Russie.”
59
Estonia as backward, immature or underdeveloped
The depiction of Estonia as backward is much more present in German magazines, 
than in French. However, for both a development can be stated.
German magazines
In  German  magazines,  the  depiction  of  Estonia  as  backward,  immature  or 
underdeveloped  carries  several  meanings.  First,  it  can  refer  to  material  poverty  of 
individuals or the whole society, for example in: 
In Kopli, ten minutes by car away from the city centre, people ail in holes that 
you could formally call houses, as they have walls and a roof. But no electricity, 
no running water, no sanitary arrangements and life threatening fireplaces. It 
smells, like rats, like schnapps and even worse. Natalja and her husband Walerij 
live here, both are unemployed, with their three children, in one and a half room 
(…). It is not rare that they are hungry, first the parents and later in the month 
also the children.15 (Die Zeit, 11/03/2004)
The description of material  poverty is  usually used to illustrate the downside of 
Estonia's rapid economical growth and general societal transition (termed in the following 
“Estonian  success-story”).  Sometimes  it  is  associated  to  depictions  of  criminality  and 
insecurity. Also the incapacity or the outdated methods of the Estonian state when dealing 
with it are mentioned. In this form, discourses of backwardness are othering Estonia as to 
norms and experience, respectively compared to West-European standards. Simultaneously, 
the negative connotations of these discourses clearly assign an inferior position to Estonia. 
The same connotations and effects go with a second meaning of backwardness: the 
depiction of Estonia as lacking societal maturity. This lack of maturity can concern society 
as a whole or specific domains such as politics, sciences or economy. Mostly, it is evaluated 
negatively, as for instance in:
15 “In Kopli, zehn Autominuten vom Stadtzentrum entfernt, vegetieren Menschen in Lächern dahin, die man 
formal natürlich Häuser nennen kann, weil sie Wände und ein Dach haben. Aber keinen Strom, kein 
fließendes Wasser, keine sanitären Anlagen, lebensgefährliche Feuerstellen. Es stinkt, nach Ratten, nach 
Schnaps, nach Schlimmerem. Nataljia und ihr Mann Walerij leben hier, beide arbeitslos, mit drei Kindern, 
in anderhalb Zimmern (…). Nicht selten hungern sie, erst die Eltern, später im Monat auch die Kinder.”
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Data protection is not a topic for debate in a state, where the daily struggle to 
survive in the still unfamiliar post-communist capitalism costs a lot of energy16 
(Der Spiegel, 18/09/2000).
In this case, it is mostly also connected to discourses of insecurity or even threat, for 
individuals,  Estonian  society  or  Western  partners.  However,  also  ambiguous  and  even 
positive evaluations of societal immaturity can be found, as for instance in:
Provincial,  so  what?  The  provinciality  –  in  a  positive  sense  –  of  the  new 
members  may  turn  out  to  be  a  blessing  for  the  alliance.  The  seven  post-
communist societies joining the alliance are to a large extend absorbed in their 
own issues and have in many respects less sense for their global responsibility 
than the old NATO members. This may rescue the alliance almost bursting with 
its own excessive ambitions.17 (Die Zeit 01/04/2004)
This  type of  discourse can stand on its  own,  but also be related to  accounts  of 
threat/insecurity and equally to illustrate the ambiguity of the Estonian success-story. It is 
partially  including,  as  to  a  community  of  institutional  organisation  and  interests,  yet 
excluding as to experience and memory with reference to West-Europe. As above, it entails 
connotations of Estonia's inferiority.
A third meaning found in the discourses of backwardness, is the one of rural idyll:
When Franz starts filming with his camcorder a farmer scything the high grass 
by the road, Edgars [the tourist guide] asks loudly: Why would you film anyone 
at work?
But  these  are  the  pictures  that  the  cyclists  from the  West  want  to  see:  the 
grandmother  with her  crutch stooping down in the bed of cabbage,  the girl 
walking with a bucket to the drawing well, families picking blueberries in the 
forest. This looks like my childhood in Swabia: the poverty, the woodsheds, the 
16 “Mit einem Thema wie Datenschutz setzt sich dagegen kaum einer auseinander in einem Staat, in dem der 
tägliche Überlebenskampf im immer noch ungewohnten postkommunistischen Kapitalismus viel Kraft 
kostet.”
17 “Provinziell, na und? Die Provinzialität der Neuen könnte sich noch als Segen für die Allianz erweisen. 
Die sieben postkommunistischen Gesellschaften, die nun dem Bündnis beitreten, sind sehr auf sich selbst 
bezogen und haben in mancher Hinsicht weniger Sinn für ihre globale Verantwortung als die alten Nato-
Mitglieder. Indes könnte das für ein Bündnis, das ob der eigenen Überforderung fast zerspringt, sogar die 
Rettung sein.”
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little  gardens  with  beds  to  grow  one's  own  food,  says  Maria.18 (Die  Zeit 
09/07/2006)
This meaning implies several connotations. First, positively, it is connected to purity 
and stability with Estonia depicted as a place to escape “Western” hectic and pressures. It is 
othering  as  to  norms  and  experience,  yet  in  an  exoticising,  positively  connoted  way. 
Second, it is connected to discourses of material poverty, othering as to the same respects, 
yet negatively connoted. In both cases, Estonia is assigned an inferior position.
The  meanings  of  backwardness  develop  over  time.  Discourses  of  backwardness 
were  most  often  related  to  insecurity  or  threat  in  the  years  2000-2002.  This  meaning 
disappears after 2006. In turn, the meaning of backwardness as idyllic first appears in 2004. 
Discourses on backwardness are most frequently othering from WE through their explicit 
reference to Estonia's Soviet past. 
French magazines
As for French magazines, the meanings of backwardness are with only 7 articles in 
the qualitative sample clearly less present and complex. They are not related to specific 
contents. All articles depicting Estonia as backward portray her either (1) in a group with 
other EE countries and, after 2006 (2) in comparison with other EU countries. Both groups 
may other Estonia through content in norms and experience, yet, the later group includes 
her through the comparison with other EU countries simultaneously into a common sphere 
of based on institutional organisation. These articles represent Estonia as societal immature 
in domains such as medicine and economy. In addition, moral plays a role:
But actually, communism leaves us truly gigantic ruins: Economical ruins: All 
you have to do is visit these countries to understand their situation. Political 
ruins, of course, as you cannot simply reconstruct a democracy, easily, in a few 
months.  And,  what  is  more  and even profounder,  societal  ruins.  The  social 
18 “Als dann ein Stück weiter Franz mit seinem Camcorder einen Bauern filmt, wie er mit der Sense das 
hohe Gras am Wegesrand mäht, fragt Edgars laut: Warum nimmt man bloß jemanden bei der Arbeit auf?  
Solche Bilder aber wollen die Radler aus dem Westen sehen: das Mütterchen mit der Krücke, das sich im 
Kohlbeet bückt, das Mädchen, das mit dem Eimer zum Ziehbrunnen läuft, Familien, die Heidelbeeren im 
Wald pflücken. Das sieht hier aus wie in meiner Kindheit im Schwäbischen, sagt Maria, die Armut, die 
Holzschuppen, die Gärtchen mit Beeten zum Selbstversorgen.”
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fabric  has  been  destroyed,  the  elites  have  been  destroyed,  the  points  of 
orientation  have  been  destroyed...  Moral  benchmarks,  for  instance,  have 
disappeared  to  a  large  extend.  Thousands  of  girls  from  the  East  prostitute 
themselves in the West. This is an enormous catastrophe. And also all these 
mafias...  (Interview  with  the  French  author  of  a  book  on  communism, 
L'Express, 03/10/2002).19
The represented moral inferiority of Estonia (elsewhere also in relation to the lack of gay 
rights in Estonia) clearly others her and puts her, from a French stance, into an inferior 
position.
As for the development of meaning, no change can be stated for the content. Yet, as 
to  the  textual  representation  an  inclusion  into  a  common  sphere  of  institutional 
organisation,  experience  and  interests  seems  to  appear  in  the  textual  structure  of 
representation, i.e. the comparison with other EU countries.
Estonia as a Learner
The framing of Estonia as a learner is connected to a much larger variety of topics in 
France and in Germany.
German magazines
In  German  magazines,  discourses  of  Estonia  as  a  learner  are  mostly  related  to 
narratives  of  the  Estonian  success  story.  Three  topics  are  most  often  covered  in  these 
narratives:  First,  Estonia's  rapid reaching of a high-level of technologisation of society, 
specifically concerning Internet and mobile communication. Especially the payment by sms 
is recurrently depicted and thus seems to be perceived as a particular proof of progress – if 
not technological superiority. Second, Estonia's economical liberalisation is very present 
19 “Or, en fait, le communisme nous laisse des ruines absoluments gigantesques. Ruines économiques: il 
suffit d'aller visiter ces pays pour voir de quoi il retourne. Ruines politiques, bien sûr, parce qu'on ne 
reconstruit pas une démocratie comme ça, en quelques mois. Et puis, beaucoup plus en profondeur, ruines 
de la société. Le tissu social a été détruit, les élites ont été détruites, les repères ont été détruits... Les 
repères moraux, par exemple ont en grande partie disparu. Il y a des milliers de filles de l'Est qui se 
prostituent à l'Ouest. C'est une énorme catastrophe. Plus toutes les mafias...”
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along with the representation of her strong and rapid economical growths. Third, the young 
age of high ranking decision makers in politics and economy is frequently focussed on. 
These three elements are interwoven in almost all accounts of the Estonian success story. 
The first two aspects and are both: including through the depiction of similar norms and a 
similar sphere of experience, yet excluding through the insistence of the (nearly) completed 
development. Furthermore, the third aspect reinforces exclusion as to the same respects, 
norms and experience. All three aspects posit a hierarchical equal or superior position of 
Estonia. Some articles, in addition, insist on the initial aid by foreign investments from the 
Nordic countries equally reinforcing exclusion through an inferior hierarchical positioning.
Longer articles do, however, usually also insist on the downside of the Estonian 
success story and thus posit Estonia's inferiority. Especially four recurrent themes can be 
identified:  First,  the  insistence  on  the  superficiality  of  the  new wealth  and its  lack  of 
substance coming along with instability and the risk of an equally rapid decrease. In this 
storyline, comparisons with Ireland are sometimes drawn. Second, the inexperience of the 
young society in politics, economy and sciences is frequently pointed out in metaphors of 
dreams and illusion pointing at the risk of failure when reality catches up. Third, the lack of 
social welfare and the over-liberalisation of society is criticised along with the beginning 
split of society in winners and loosers of transition. Last, sometimes a threat for old EU 
members is identified – or denied – in either the cheap labour or the low taxes in Estonia.  
Sometimes Estonia is qualified as a possible threat to German economical interests. The 
first  three aspects other Estonia as to experience,  whereas the last  one others her as to 
interests but includes her as to institutional organisation.
References to Estonia's Soviet past appear in relation to her success story and other 
her as to memory, norms and experience. First, comparisons with Soviet times are drawn to 
illustrate the high degree and incredibility of Estonia's change. Since 2004, and especially 
in  2010/2011,  throughout  all  magazines,  a  causal  relationship  starts  to  be  introduced 
between Estonia's starting from scratch and her economical success, for instance in the 
technological domain:
Estonia's huge advantage is her complete restart 20 years ago. The computers, 
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the machines, the infrastructure of hospitals, everything is on a state-of-the-art 
level.20 (Die Zeit, 22/12/2010)
This also occurs with reference to society in general:
Smart  restart:  The small  republic  (1,3  million  inhabitants)  smartly  used  her 
restart  from  scratch  when  seceding  from  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991  and 
emphasized flat hierarchies and transparency.21 (Focus, 18/05/2011)
Furthermore, different types of Soviet legacy are related to her success story. First, material 
poverty  is  referred  to  as  a  challenge  to  overcome.  Second,  a  psychological  legacy  is 
sometimes identified in the defiance Estonians show with regard to Russia or Russians. 
Last, Estonian Russians are mentioned as a legacy from the Soviet era. They are typically 
portrayed as either (1) victims of the change, (2) successful businesspeople or (3) as the 
sole  Estonian  character  in  an  article.  The  latter  leaves  open  whether  the  journalist 
understood at all that different ethnic groups are living in Estonia or chose purposefully a 
Russian name to render the story more interesting as to common, exotic imaginaries on 
Russia in Germany.
As to inclusion or exclusions of Estonia, an evident trend can be discerned in the 
use of vocabulary and the general tone of articles: Whereas in the early 2000s the emphasis 
in articles laid on Estonia's wishful development, on the notions of “illusion”, “dream” and 
a surrealist progress of Estonia “Starship Enterprise”, it developed in the accession period 
to an enthusiastic, but patronizing account of Estonia's development, not freed yet from the 
notion of unreality. For both periods, Estonia is thus looked upon from a superior stance 
and thus excluded from belonging to a common European sphere. Yet, with the beginning 
of the financial crisis, the articles split into two groups: One group insists on disillusion and 
reality catching up with the inexperienced learner. This group takes a superior stance and 
others Estonia as to norms and experience. The other group continues to depict Estonia as 
20 “Estlands großer Vorteil ist, dass es vor 20 Jahren komplett neu gestartet ist. Die Computer, die 
Maschinen, die Krankenhausausstattung, alles ist auf dem modernsten Stand.”
21 “Geschickter Neuanfang. Die kleine Republik (1,3 Mio Einwohner) nutzte clever die Stunde null bei 
seiner Loslösung von der Sowjetunion im Jahr 1991 und setzte auf flache Hierarchien mit viel 
Transparenz.”
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the economic “wonderland” resistant  to any form of crisis  and starts  to  ask: What  can 
Germany/Europe  learn  from  Estonia?  This  question  is  usually  related  to  liberalism, 
transparency and higher efficiency thanks to the use of IT in public administration and 
politics. This group even inverses the positions of teacher and learner and includes Estonia 
into a common sphere of experience and interests.
Last but not least, discourses on Estonia as a learner also occur with very few other 
topics such as population decrease or political participation.
Overall,  a partial  development of discourses on Estonia as a learner can thus be 
stated, namely in the domain of Estonia's economic development after the financial crisis, 
inverting positions of learner and teacher and thus including her into a common sphere of 
interests and experience.
French magazines
As for French magazines, the passages concerning Estonia as a learner are generally 
shorter and usually less illustrated than in the German magazines. An important part equally 
concerns the Estonian success story, one of the more illustrated examples being:
Ene and her husband, business lawyer,  embody the new Estonia who threw 
herself without further consideration into ultra-liberalism. The Soviet slumber is 
far: Tallinn resonates now to the rhythm of business. At every corner, clothing 
and design shops are opening their doors.22 (L'Express, 07/08/2003)
The topics related to the Estonian success story are nearly identical to the ones in German 
magazines  and concern  (1)  Internet  with  focus  on  e-government,  (2)  rapid  economical 
surge  preventing  immigration  to  Western  countries,  (3)  the  importance  of  the  young 
generation in politics and economy and (4) financial starting aid by Nordic Countries. In- 
and exclusion of Estonia in relation to this aspects concerns, just as in German magazines, 
norms and shared experience. As opposed to German magazines, two further topics recur, 
namely (5) the framing of this transition process through carrot-and-stick schemes by the 
22 “Ene et son mari, avocat d'affaires, incarnent la nouvelle Estonie, qui s'est jetée à corps perdu dans 
l'ultralibéralisme. La torpeur soviétique est loin: Tallinn vibre désormais au rythme du business. A chaque 
coin de rue, des boutiques de prêt-à-porter ou de design ouvrent leurs portes.”
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EU pointing at an inclusion as to institutional organisation, and (6) the attractiveness of 
Estonia for outsourcing as long as she is still in the learning process.
(…) This country highly attracts investors thanks to her qualified, hard-working 
and very cheap labour force. It is hard to predict in how many years Estonia 
will catch up with her Nordic neighbours, but in the meantime she remains very 
attractive.23 (L'Express, 26/04/2004)
This last aspects others Estonia as to norms and interests, but includes her as to institutional 
organisation.
French articles being generally shorter, the portray of the Estonian success story is 
usually less comprehensive and includes less often accounts of its downside. Sometimes, 
risks  of  economic  overheating  and  inflation  are  mentioned,  and  with  the  start  of  the 
economical crisis insistence on the rapid economical crash can be found. Both other Estonia 
as  to  experience.  As opposed to  German magazines,  no  discourses  of  Estonia  being  a 
possible threat to old EU members is visible. Most of the articles on the Estonian success-
story,  appearing  from  2003  onwards,  contain  both  superior  and  inferior  hierarchical 
positionings yet a patronizing general tone.
As opposed to German magazines, the discourse of Estonia as learner is in French 
magazines related to a larger panel of topics. Independently of the success story, important 
weight is given to the role young people play in Estonian society, sometimes intertwined 
with criticism of their inexperience:
“Here, everything needs to be reinvented, radical decisions need to be made and 
older people, marked by the Soviet era, are often incapable to do so” (…). The 
older people, frequently referred to as the “lost generation”, are often annoyed 
by these young people who believe in economic liberalism without distinction 
and whose decisions sometimes have consequences of striking brutality.24 (Le 
Point, 22/01/2004)
23 “Hormis la proximité géographique, ce pays attire beaucoup d'investisseurs grâce à sa main-d'oeuvre 
qualifiée, travailleuse et très bon marché. Il est difficile de savoir en combien d'années l'Estonie comblera 
son retard sur ses voisines nordiques, mais, en attendant, elle reste très attrayante.”
24 “' Ici, tout est à inventer, il faut prendre des décisions radicales et les plus âgés, façonnés par l'époque 
soviétique, en sont incapables... '. (…). Quant aux plus vieux, que l'on désigne souvent comme une ' 
génération perdue ' , ils sont souvent agacés par ces jeunes gens qui croient au libéralisme économique 
sans nuances et dont les décisions ont parfois des conséquences d'une brutalité inouïe...”
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These accounts  most  obviously  other  Estonia as  to  experience.  A third important  topic 
related to the learner discourse is Estonia's EU accession, namely in the domain of minority 
rights and Estonia's supposed naïve belief in France's and Germany's power to stabilize the 
Euro. However, also the other way round, the EU sometimes is depicted as a learner when 
dealing  with  Estonia,  namely  when  dealing  with  the  –  exoticised  and  thus  othered  – 
Estonian language or, also, on the topic of minority rights:
The  president  of  the  parliamentary  assembly  of  the  European  Council,  the 
Dutch René Van der Linden has got an earful in Estonia and Latvia, where he 
came  to  lecture  on  the  status  of  the  Russian  speaking  minority  (…).  He 
multiplied mistakes and knowledge gaps, ignoring that non-citizens participate 
in local elections in Estonia (…).25 (L'Express, 11/10/2007)
These accounts one the one hand other Estonia as to norms. On the other hand the depiction 
of a learning process of the EU may indicate the beginning of an entire reconstruction of 
the European project. A  further  topic  implied  in  Estonia  as  a  learner  is  that  French 
magazines, as opposed to Germans, represent a certain awareness of the fact that EE is still  
widely  unknown by the  large  public.  This  accounts  are,  albeit  including Estonia  as  to 
institutional  organisation,  usually  patronizing  and  othering  her  as  to  experience,  for 
instance in:
In three days,  ten new member states will  come to join us in the European 
Union,  and,  on  the  whole  (…)  people  could  not  care  less.  Where  is  the 
minimum that in whatever human society in the world is due to the little new 
ones that join a club?26 (Le Point, 29/04/2004)
Last, Estonia is represented as a learner in depictions of her constant attempt to release 
herself from Russia or to digest her Soviet past,  for instance around topics such as the 
25 “Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, le Néerlandais René Van der Linden a 
essuyé une volée de bois vert en Estonie et en Lettonie, où il était venu faire la leçon sur le statut des 
minorités russophones (…). Il a multiplié les erreurs et les lacunes, ignorant que les non-citoyens 
participent aux élections locales en Estonie, (…).
26 “Dans trois jours, dix nouveaux Etats viennent donc nous rejoindre dans l'Union européenne et, grosso 
modo (...): tout le monde s'en fout. Où est le minimum que dans n'importe quelle société humaine au 
monde on doive à des petits nouveaux qui rejoignent un club?”
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replacement of the nuclear power plant or the introduction of the Euro. These accounts may 
include her as to institutional organisation, but other her as to memory and experience.
Overall, no substantial development for discourses of Estonia as a learner can be 
stated  for  French  magazines.  Whereas  pre-CEEE her  depictions  seem to  be  orientated 
towards the past (Estonia as a learner due to her Soviet past), in the accession period they 
seem to be more orientated towards the future (rapid change in preparation or as a result of 
CEEE). Yet, very recently (since 2010), a mixture of both depictions is again observable.
Estonia as a Place or a Source of Insecurity
Estonia's  depiction  as  a  place  or  a  source  of  insecurity  has  similar  meaning  in 
France and Germany.
German magazines
In German magazines, Estonia is mostly depicted as an insecure place or a source of 
insecurity when associated to Russia and/or the NATO. In this context, several meanings 
can be identified. First, Estonia is depicted as actively searching to provoke Russia, as in:
The relations between Russia and Estonia have not been good for quite a while 
already. The Estonian authorities delay the giving of citizenship to more than 
100 000 residents belonging to the Russian minority. They want them to learn 
Estonian first. Simultaneously,   (…) president Ilves, who lived over 20 years in 
the  US,  searches  for  proximity  with  Bush's  government.27 (Der  Spiegel, 
22/01/2007)
But also Russia is depicted as being the source of provocation:
The pathetic indignation in Russia and the drum fire of propaganda, lending 
27 “Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Estland sind schon länger nicht besonders gut. So verzögern 
die estnischen Behörden die Vergabe der Staatsbürgerschaft an mehr als 100 000 Einwohner, die zur 
russischen Minderheit zählen: Sie sollten erst Estnisch lernen. Zugleich sucht (…) Präsident Ilves, der 
über 20 Jahre in den USA lebte, die Nähe zur Regierung Bush.”
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patriotic splendour even to Russian youngsters looting alcohol shops in Tallinn, 
does deliberately not contribute to calming the situation or to mediation in the 
conflict.28 (Die Zeit, 02/05/2007)
In both scenarios, the depicted mutual provocation entails a risk for the NATO and her 
members,  as to the mutual  defence clause.  Estonia and Russia,  through their  irrational, 
provocation way of action are both othered from (Western) European ideals as to norms. In 
the same depictions, Estonia is represented as an insecure place within Russia's sphere of 
interest  with  the  NATO  increasing  her  security.  She  is  thus  included  in  a  sphere  of 
institutional organisation and interests (safety from Russia), yet othered again as to norms, 
namely her incapacity to protect herself. The Russian minority in Estonia plays a particular 
role in this scenario, either as a pretext for a possible Russian invasion, or as a source of 
unrest and trouble inside Estonia, especially in relation to the Bronze Soldier. These aspect 
others Estonia even more as to norms, under the assumption that a WE state would be able 
to deal with its immigrants in a way preventing this type of events. Furthermore, Estonia is 
– along with other EE states – depicted as a source of insecurity inside the organisation of 
the NATO: either as a compliant supporter of US interests or as to disloyalty and treason, 
both due to her communist past. These accounts include Estonia into the common sphere of 
institutional  organisation,  yet  they  other  her  as  to  memory  and  experience.  The  latter 
especially occurs with the Simm issue:
The case of Simm demonstrates what a risk the alliance took when extending 
after the Cold War step by step eastwards. Every single of the now 28 member 
states has access to almost all secret informations of the alliance. Already this 
fact sufficiently worries experts. But even more alarming is that members of 
the  old  elite,  whose  loyalty  belonged  to  a  completely  different  political 
system, are still working in the security systems of some of the new candidate 
[sic!] countries. People like Herman Simm.29 (Der Spiegel, 26/04/2010)
28 “Die pathetische Empörung in Russland und das Propagandatrommelfeuer, das noch den Plüntertrupps 
russischer Jugendlicher in Tallinns Alkoholläden patriotischen Glanz verleiht, trägt bewusst nicht zu einer 
Beruhigung der Lage und einer Vermittlung im Konflikt bei.”
29 “Der Fall Simm aber zeigt, welches Risiko das Bündnis einging, als es sich nach dem Ende des Kalten 
Krieges schrittwiese nach Osten ausdehnte. Jedes der mittlerweile 28 Mitgliedsländer hat nun Zugang zu 
fast allen Geheiminformationen der Allianz. Das allein ist für Experten schon beunruhigend genug. Noch 
besorgniserregender allerdings ist, dass in den Sicherheitsapparaten einiger Beitrittsländer [sic!] nach wie 
vor Angehörige der alten Elite arbeiten, deren Loyalität zuvor einem völlig anderen politischen System 
gehörte. Leute wie Herman Simm.”
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A second meaning of Estonia's insecurity is related to her depiction as backward. 
Pre- and post-CEEE, the depiction of poverty, uncivilisation or lack of data protection as 
entailing insecurity for the Estonian population is represented. These accounts other Estonia 
as to (Western) European norms. Pre-accession, also a risk for other countries is identified 
for instance in outdated equipment of Estonian tankers, othering Estonia as to the same 
aspects.
A third type of insecurity is represented in the economical domain. Either Estonia's 
low taxes and cheap labour or depicted as a threat to older EU states or Estonia, along with 
other East-European states, is represented as a source of migrants flooding the EU15 job-
markets. Both depictions include Estonia as to institutional organisation, yet exclude her as 
to interests. Sometimes, these scenarios are put into perspective, as in: “Also, various, often 
exaggerated fears of the consequences of EU accession exist in old EU states just as much 
as in the new ones.30”(Der Spiegel, 30/09/2002). 
A last, but very rare type of insecurity is the association of Estonia, with other EE 
states, to criminality (theft of cars, burglary) related to poverty and thus othering her as to  
WE  norms  despite  her  inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation.  In  both  articles,  the 
associations are, however, put into perspective.
When looking for development, a partially increased inclusion may be stated with 
respect  to  her  depiction  as  insecure  as  to  backwardness  and  criminality  and,  on  a 
geopolitical setting through the depiction of a shared institutional organisation and a shared 
interest in an alliance against Russia. Yet, although the depiction of Estonia in a geopolitical 
setting increases with her EU and NATO accession and may point at a generally increased 
inclusion as to newsworthiness, within these institutional frameworks she remains othered 
on the bases of categorisations form the Cold War era.
French magazines
Concerning French magazines, the main depiction of Estonia as a place and source 
30 “Dazu kommen mannigfache, oft übertriebene Ängste vor den Beitrittsfolgen bei alten wie neuen EU-
Partnern.”
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of insecurity is equally related to the NATO. The topics and respects of in- and exclusion 
are similar to those in German magazines: First, the mutual provocation with Russia and 
Estonia's need for Western protection includes Estonia as to institutional organisation and 
partially  as  to  interests.  However,  it  others  her  as  to  norms  through  the  depiction  of 
irrational  action  and  the  incapacity  to  protect  herself.  Second,  Estonian  Russians  are 
represented partly as well  integrated and partly as Moscow's 5th column or a source of 
insecurity on the Estonian territory:
Despite the reached agreements on the facilitation of access to citizenship and 
the learning of the Estonian language as one of the conditions for it, and despite 
some apparent progress concerning integration,  the mutual defiance returned 
extremely quickly after the riots the consequences of which are still visible in 
Tallinn.31 (L'Express, 17/05/2007)
These  accounts  partially  include  Estonia  into  a  European  sphere  as  to  experience 
(integration of immigrants), partially they exclude her as to norms (inability to deal with a 
source of insecurity on their territory). A last topic in the geopolitical context is the Simm 
issue, related to treason:
“This is a real catastrophe! says the editor of the agency Baltic News. Because 
of one of us, Russia, our enemy, received a copy of all our military secrets, and 
this since our independence.””What a humiliation”, adds the young prosecutor 
in his strict, black suit. We just came to join the Atlantic family and now one of 
us betrayed her.”32 (Le Nouvel Observateur, 18/12/2008)
As opposed to German magazines, the Simm issue is, however, less covered in general and 
the treason not explicitly generalised to Estonia as a whole. Instead, also accounts can be 
found that ascribe the treason to Estonia's inexperience and thus Estonia herself as a victim. 
Although Estonia in this case is, besides her inclusion as to institutional organisation, not 
31 “Malgré les facilités consenties ces dernières années pour favoriser l'accession à la citoyenneté, et 
l'apprentissage de l'estonien, qui en est l'une des conditions, malgré quelques progrès apparents de 
l'intégration, la défiance mutuelle est remontée en flèche à la suite des émeutes dont Tallinn porte encore 
les séquelles.”
32 “«Le ciel nous est tombé sur la tête! dit le rédacteur en chef de l'agence Baltic News, Ainar Ruussaar. 
Grâce à l'un d'entre nous, la Russie, notre ennemie, a reçu une copie de tous nos secrets militaires, et cela 
depuis notre indépendance.» «Quelle humiliation! ajoute la jeune procureur Lapp dans son strict tailleur 
noir. Nous venions tout juste de rejoindre la famille atlantique et voilà que l'un de nous la trahit.»”
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othered as to memory,  she is  still  othered as to experience.  As a  result,  Estonia is  not 
othered through the return to frames from the Cold War era, but instead as a new, unreliable 
member.
Further, less current topics associate Estonia to insecurity: First, coverage of drug 
criminality others her as to norms, i.e. the incapacity of the Estonian state to deal with it.  
Second, the depiction of Estonia as source of immigration to the West includes her as to 
institutional  organisation  and  experience,  yet  excludes  her  as  to  interests.  Third,  the 
emphasis on economical overheating as a result of the rapid change others her as to WE 
norms of speed of change.
Overall, for French magazines, a development in the othering content can hardly be 
stated. Yet, as outlined above for her association to Russia, only after Estonia's EU and 
NATO accession her  relations to  Russia  become a newsworthy event  in  the domain of 
security.  Therefore,  an  inclusion  into  a  common  sphere  of  institutional  organisation, 
interests and experience can be stated independently of the still othering content.
Overview of the Results of the qualitative Analysis
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Germany France
Association 
to Russia
Content: three types of contexts
1) larger geopolitical setting: 
initially: belonging to Russia's sphere of 
influence 
entirely othered 
after EU and NATO accession: newly 
Western and constantly in the process of 
dissociation from Russia 
ambivalent belonging: inclusion as to 
institutional organisation and interests (p),  
exclusion as to memory
=> clear development
2) bilateral setting: memory
inclusion as to institutional organisation 
and norms (p); exclusion as to norms (p)
3) association of Estonia to Russian culture
exclusion as to norms
=> no development
**
=>partial development, yet within the new 
borders still othered.
Estonian-Russian relations only post-
accesion covered
inclusion as to institutional organisation,  
interests and experience
=> development
Content (post-accesion period)
1) bilateral setting prevails:
a) conflict: Russia othered as aggressor, 
Estonia yet not fully included in the 
European sphere but represented as the 
“new” member  
inclusion as to norms (p), exclusion as to  
norms (p) and memory
b) views on history:
inclusion as to memory and norms (p),  
exclusion as to norms (p)
2) large variety of topics => diffuse 
association to Russia
diffuse exclusion
**
=> development towards inclusion, as EU 
and NATO accession only makes Estonian-
Russian relations newsworthy, yet 
depictions partially remain othering in their 
content.
Discourses 
of 
backward-
ness
Content
Initially:
1) uncivilisation and material poverty
othering as to norms and experience
2) societal immaturity
othering as to norms, experience and 
memory
Later:
Few presence and complexity.
Content
1) societal immaturity
2) moral underdevelopment or decay
both othering as to norms and experience
Categorisations
Before 2006 in a group with other EE states
74
3) positive re-evaluation of (2)
inclusion as to institutional organisation 
and interests, exclusion as to norms,  
experience and memory
4) rural idyll
exclusion as to norms and experience, yet  
positively connoted
**
=> Meaning and evaluation develops yet 
remains largely othering.
After 2006 in comparison with other EU 
countries
inclusion as to institutional organisation
**
=> Development towards inclusion through 
textual context of representation, despite 
continuous depiction of backwardness.
Discourses 
of Estonia 
as a learner
Content: Estonian success story
1) superior or ambivalent position: 
technology, economic liberalism, flexible 
society
inclusion and exclusion as to norms (p) and 
experience (p)
2) inferiority: risk, inexperience, social 
welfare, cheap labour
inclusion as to institutional organisation,  
exclusion as to experience and interests
3) othering: Soviet past and legacies
exclusion as to memory, norms and 
experience
Vocabulary and tone
before financial crisis:
othering as to experience and norms 
through the notion of “illusion”
after: split in two groups
a) continuous othering as in (2)
b) inclusion as to experience and interests 
through inversion of positions of teacher 
Content: four types of context
1) success story: ambivalent positioning
inclusion as to norms (p), experience (p)  
and institutional organisation, exclusion as  
to norms (p), experience (p) and interests
2) youth of society: inferior positioning
exclusion as to experience
3) EU accession: 
a) inferiority of new members
inclusion as to institutional organisation,  
exclusion as to norms and experience
b) ambivalent: EU in a learning process
inclusion pointing at entire reconstruction  
of European identity
4) othering: constant dissociation from 
Russia
exclusion as to memory and experience
Tone
patronizing, with few exceptions.
**
=> change during accession period, yet 
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and learner
**
=> partial development towards inclusion 
especially in the domain of economics and 
related to experience and interests
more recently again mixture between 
excluding depictions oriented towards the 
past and including depictions oriented 
towards the future
Discourses 
of Estonia 
as a place 
or a source 
of 
insecurity
Content: four different contexts
1) In the geopolitical setting:
a) searching to provoke Russia
b) provoked by Russia
both:  inclusion  as  to  institutional  
organisation and interests (p), exclusion as  
to norms
c) Russian minority as pretext for Russian 
intervention  or  as  source  of  unrest  inside 
Estonia
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation,  
exclusion as to norms
d)  compliant  supporter  of  US  within  the 
NATO and source of treason within NATO 
due to Cold War loyalties
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation,  
exclusion as to memory and experience
2) related to backwardness
exclusion as to norms
3) economical insecurity, work migration
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation,  
exclusion as to interests
4) criminality
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation,  
exclusion as to norms
**
Most articles from post-accession period, as 
Estonian-Russian relations only post-
accesion covered
inclusion as to institutional organisation,  
interests and experience
=> development
Content: three different contexts
1) In the geopolitical setting:
a) searching to provoke Russia
b) provoked by Russia
both:  inclusion  as  to  institutional  
organisation and interests (p), exclusion as  
to norms
c) Russian minority as pretext for Russian 
intervention  or  as  source  of  unrest  inside 
Estonia
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation  
and experience (p), exclusion as to norms  
(p)
d) source of treason within NATO, due to 
her inexperience
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation,  
exclusion as to experience
2) criminality
exclusion as to norms
3) migration
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=> partial  inclusion  since  EU and  NATO 
accession, yet especially in the geopolitical 
setting clear othering on the base of Cold 
War geopolitical categorisations. 
inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation  
and experience, exclusion as to interests 
4) economical overheating
exclusion as to norms
**
=> partial development: no development for 
the still  othering content. Yet development 
towards  inclusion:  Estonian-Russian 
relations are only after Estonia’s accession 
to  EU  and  NATO  relevant  as  to  security 
matters.  Yet,  within  this  institutional 
inclusion still remaining othering.
Fig. 15: Overview of the results of the qualitative analysis
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7. DISCUSSION
The results of the empirical analysis provide a complex picture as to the inclusion of 
Estonia into a common European sphere. In this section, I will relate the empirical results 
back to the theoretical and empirical framework. I recall that due to the abstract character of 
collective identity constructions it  is  impossible to assess them directly.  Instead,  on the 
basis of representation theory (Saussure 1916, Hall 1997) I make inferences on collective 
identity constructions through the analysis of media frames as making explicit realities in 
society. My basis of interpretation is the assumption that both what is represented and how 
it is represented constitute active framing decisions  (Scheufele/Tewksbury 2007:13-16). 
Special  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  processes  of  categorisation,  comparison  and 
homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989). The former two allow for conclusions on in- and 
exclusion.  With  regard  to  homogenisation,  in  turn,  phase  of  the  identity  construction 
process  may  be  determined,  since  both  the  in-  and  the  out-group  are  homogenised. 
Furthermore,  aspects  of  European  identity  as  outlined  on  the  basis  of  Arnaud  (2000), 
Baasner (2008), Bruter (2005), Guérot (2006), Todorov (2008) and Spohn (2005) will be 
taken into account.
7.1 German Constructions of European Identity
The use of frames for  the depiction of  Estonia in  German magazines  provide a 
fragmented,  but  clear  picture  of  Estonia's  increased  inclusion  into  constructions  of 
European identity.
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Inclusion...
The inclusion of Estonia into constructions of European identity will be evaluated 
with regard to the processes of categorisation and comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989).
Concerning  categorisation,  a  certain  inclusion  of  Estonia  into  constructions  of 
European identity can be stated: 
First,  the  chosen framing perspective reveals  the  categorisation  of  the Self  with 
respect  to  Estonia:  Are  both  located  within  the  same entity?  Here,  the  increase  of  the 
European-wide perspective at expense of the EU15 perspective may point to an increased 
inclusion.
Second, the geopolitical categorisation of Estonia equally indicates some inclusion: 
Estonia is more frequently categorised as part of Europe as a whole and the qualitative 
analysis reveals her partial inclusion also with regard to cultural aspects such as norms, 
when Russia appears as the Other. It is, of course, true that also her association with Russia 
increases. This increase is, however, related to the fact that before CEEE Estonian-Russian 
relations have barely been covered, as seen in the evaluation of topics. Furthermore, the 
qualitative  analysis  shows a  clear  development  towards  inclusion  in  her  association  to 
Russia in a geopolitical setting. Both points indicate her increased inclusion into a common 
European  sphere  of  interest.  Furthermore,  after  CEEE,  Estonia  is  more  frequently 
represented in spontaneous geopolitical categorisations. Her EU accession thus seems to 
promote her to a relevant point of reference in Europe-wide comparisons.
Third,  the  development  of  discourses  on  Eastern  Europe  in  relation  to  Estonia 
equally indicates an increased inclusion: their presence decreases. It is conspicuous that 
only the discourse of Estonia as a learner has substantially decreased. In conjunction with 
the  fact  that  coverage  of  Estonia's  economical  transition,  to  which  this  discourse  is 
predominantly related, remains stable in both periods, this decrease may indicate a real step 
towards inclusion, possibly due to the end of a political transition phase with Estonia's EU 
accession.  Furthermore,  within the remaining share of Estonia's  framing as a  learner,  a 
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partial  inversion of the positions of teacher and learner takes place in her  depiction as 
technologically more advanced or societally more innovative. With regard to hierarchical 
positions (Turner/Oakes 1989) this may equally indicate an increased inclusion. Finally, the 
share of some discourses remains stable in the quantitative analysis, yet their meaning shifts 
towards Estonia's inclusion. The discourse of backwardness undergoes some re-evaluation 
as actually having positive aspects. And the discourse on insecurity remains stable only due 
to the increase of coverage of Estonian-Russian relations post-CEEE which may indicate an 
actual decrease on its other meanings. Both point thus at an increased inclusion of Estonia 
into a common European sphere.
With  regard  to  the  process  of  comparison,  the  relation  between  evaluation  and 
inclusion  posited  in  theory  (Turner/Oakes  1989)  seems  contentious:  in  the  qualitative 
analysis,  the  re-evaluation  of  discourses  on  backwardness  demonstrates  how a  positive 
evaluation can entail an othering as to hierarchical position or certain aspects of European 
identity,  such  as  norms.  However,  two  points  support  a  correlation  between  positive 
evaluation and inclusion: First, the qualitative analysis on Estonia as a learner indicates that 
an inclusion to more than a political-economical unit, i.e. as to norms and experience, is 
indeed correlated with a positive evaluation. Second, Estonia is more frequently positively 
evaluated in absence of discourses on Eastern Europe.  Both points do indeed suggest a 
correlation  between  positive  evaluation  and  inclusion,  even  though  it  may  not  be  as 
straightforward as assumed on the basis of Turner/Oakes (1983). Therefore, an increasing 
inclusion can equally be stated: Estonia's negative evaluation decreases in favour of her 
positive and ambivalent evaluation. Furthermore, her hierarchically inferior positioning has 
with 30% even more dramatically decreased, mostly in favour of an equal positioning. Yet, 
it is to note that these results may partly be due to the high amount of very short articles on 
Estonia after her EU accession and the little room in these articles for explicit evaluation or 
hierarchical positioning. 
Independently  of  the  processes  of  categorisation  and  comparison,  the  dramatic 
increase of travel-documentations in the accession period suggests a certain readiness to 
engage with EE.
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...with Limitations
The inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere seems, however, to be 
limited.  This  becomes  clear  when  more  closely  examining  certain  dimensions  of  the 
process of categorisation (Turner/Oakes 1989).
First,  Estonia's  inclusion  as  an  integral  part  of  Europe  seems  to  be  limited  to 
positively connoted aspects. This becomes clear in the analysis of framing perspectives: 
Delicate topics continue to be covered from a EU15 perspective or a national perspective. 
This corresponds to Nossek's (2004) findings of the prevalence of a national perspective 
when national interests are at stake. Both the national and the European perspective being a 
safe option to go back to is most probably related to Germany's  partial  replacement of 
national identity through a European identity (Buß/Klein 2009). Yet simultaneously, this 
partial  replacement  makes  German  constructions  of  European  identity  much  more 
vulnerable to changes than e.g. in France, where European identity seems to add to national 
identity rather than partially replace it (Arnaud 2000, Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). The fact 
that this inclusion as to positive aspects regards mainly Estonia's EU accession may be 
explained by the strong support of European integration out of historical responsibility in 
Germany (Guérot 2006).
Second,  Estonia's  inclusion  is  limited  as  to  her  ongoing  depiction  as  a  “new” 
member catching up with the West. This confirms Kuus' (2007) results of a new, tripartial 
formation of Europe and indicates simultaneously that German constructions of European 
identity  are  still  constructions  of  a  Western  European  identity.  Evidence  for  this 
interpretation is provided by the changes within othering discourses: In the discourse of 
Estonia  as  a  learner,  accounts  of  Estonia's  technological  superiority  remain  frequently 
intertwined with depictions of insecurity, inexperience or backwardness. These degrade her 
technological superiority to one aspect in a learning process in which Estonia, on the whole, 
is inferior and constantly attempting to reach Western standards. Estonia is thereby, albeit 
included  as  to  norms  (p)  and  experience  (p),  still  othered  as  to  memories,  interests, 
81
experience (p)  and norms (p).   Furthermore,  the othering of  Estonia as a  new, inferior 
member is equally visible in the shift of meaning of the backwardness discourse: Estonia's 
depiction as backward surely undergoes a certain re-evaluation as positive. However, the 
underlying  pattern  of  categorisation  (Estonia  as  backward)  remains  unmodified  and 
continues  to  other  her  as  to  cultural-historical  aspects  such  as  norms,  experience  and 
memory. This partial inclusion may be explained by Germany's approach to EE based on 
historical responsibility (Stark 2006): It provides a basis for openness towards political-
economical  inclusion  and support,  yet  the  ambition  of  being  a  helper  implies  unequal 
hierarchical positions and thus prevents further inclusion.
Third, Estonia's inclusion into a common European sphere seems to be frequently – 
not exclusively  – limited to political-economical aspects of European identity (as defined 
above). The evaluation of the othering discourses shows: Whereas Estonia is frequently 
included as to institutional organisation and partially as to interests and experiences, she 
remains  othered  as  to  norms,  memory  and  sometimes  interests  and  experience. 
Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of Estonia's association with Russia reveals that the 
sudden newsworthiness of Estonian-Russian relations is related to a political reality rather 
than to a profound redefinition of constructions of European identity: Estonia's membership 
in the NATO makes her relations with Russia newsworthy on the background of the mutual 
defence  clause.  This  is  reflected  in  her  inclusion  as  to  institutional  organisation  and 
partially as to interests and norms, but remaining exclusion as to memory, norms (p) and 
interests (p) relying on her  – also cultural – association to Russia. 
Last,  Estonia's  inclusion  remains  limited  as  to  a  certain  rootedness  of  othering 
frames – especially the Eastern European frame – in the German societal stock of frames 
(Van Gorp 2007).  This  is  suggested by several  points:  (a)  Estonia's  framing as  part  of 
Europe  as  a  whole  –  although  increasing  –  frequently  entails  her  framing  as  Eastern 
European on the level of second or third most important framing; (b) the framing of Estonia 
as part of Europe as a whole only becomes current with a delay of about 3 years after  
CEEE, in opposition to France where it  appears very shortly after CEEE; (c) Estonia's 
dominant framing as Eastern European has not diminished; (d) frames from the Cold War 
era  immediately  resurge  in  case  of  a  perceived  threat  to  Germany  in  the  insecurity 
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discourse,  for  instance  in  the  agent  Simm  issue.  This  appears  even  more  striking  in 
comparison with France, where the insecurity discourse substantially decreases despite the 
coverage of Estonian-Russian relations only post-CEEE. The anchoring of these frames 
may be related to Germany's own profound experience of the Cold War in the division of 
the Self which explains an oversensitivity towards any issue that may be perceived as a 
threat from the East. To this may contribute that German contacts with EE reach far back in 
history,  and  that  societal  frames,  as  discourses  on  Eastern  Europe,  have  thus  been 
constructed and rooted for a long time already. Yet, a certain consciousness seems to exist 
about the reiteration of stereotypical frames on Eastern Europe: in the insecurity discourse 
depictions  of  insecurity  (migration)  and  stereotypes  (criminality)  are  usually  put  into 
perspective – as long as they do not concern a larger geopolitical setting.
 
Ongoing Re-Definition
This limited inclusion does not, however, seem to be the final stage of a process of 
European  identity  redefinition.  As  outlined  on  the  basis  of  Billig  (1995)  and  Edensor 
(2002), the national distribution of European identity is an ongoing process of reproduction. 
The evaluation of the empirical results with regard to homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989) 
shows that German constructions of European identity have not yet re-established patterns 
of re-iteration: First, Estonia's geopolitical categorisation is much more varied since CEEE 
and new categories like Estonia's framing as a Nordic country have just very recently been 
introduced in 2011. Second, the range of topics covered in relation to Estonia is now almost 
twice as varied as before CEEE. Third, the depiction of Estonia as a learner has recently 
split  into  two  groups  and  comprises  since  a  great  variety  of  evaluations,  hierarchical 
positionings  and  in-  or  excluding  respects.  And  fourth,  her  in-  and  exclusion  into  a 
European sphere with respect to Russia as the Other seems to depend on the respective 
magazine: a society wide consensus does not seem to exist yet. All these points suggest that 
constructions of European identity are currently in a phase of substantial re-definition in 
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Germany. 
7.2 French Constructions of European Identity
Dynamics in in- and exclusion of Estonia are equally visible in French frames.
Inclusion...
When evaluating the empirical results with regard to the processes of categorisation and 
comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989), an increased inclusion of Estonia into constructions of 
European identity may equally be stated.
First, the analysis of the framing perspective sheds light on the categorisation of the 
Self with respect to Estonia. The stability of the framing perspective Europe as a whole in 
both time periods  suggests  Estonia's  perception as part  of  Europe independently of the 
current borders of the EU.
Second, as for the geopolitical categorisation of Estonia, several points indicate an 
increased inclusion into a common European sphere: (a) Her framing as Eastern European 
decreased; (b) her framing as part of Europe as a whole increased, starting from 2005 and 
may point at a greater easiness of inclusion compared to Germany where this frame first 
becomes current in 2007; (c) her framing in spontaneous spacial formations increases and 
indicates Estonia's relevance as a point of reference in Europe-wide comparisons; (d) even 
her increased association to Russia may partly be interpreted as inclusion: Estonian-Russian 
relations  are  exclusively  covered  after  CEEE  and  indicate  through  the  extension  of 
newsworthiness an inclusion into a common sphere of institutional organisation, interests 
and experience. Furthermore, Estonia is partially included into a common European sphere 
as to norms and memory when Russia figures as the Other. As opposed to Germany, the 
inclusion seems thus to be less focused on political aspects of European identity (as defined 
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above).
Third,  changes  in  the  framing of  Estonia through discourses  on Eastern Europe 
provide  evidence  for  her  increased  inclusion:  (a)  The  overall  amount  of  discourses  on 
Eastern Europe diminished;  (b) the textual  structure of Estonia's  depiction as backward 
post-CEEE frequently integrates her into a framework with both West-European and East-
European states; (c) the learner discourse includes her as to institutional organisation and 
interests  and,  with  reference  to  technological  and societal  innovation,  as  to  norms and 
experience. More importantly, it  sometimes suggests an entire re-definition of European 
identity  through  the  depiction  of  the  EU  becoming  a  learner  with  CEEE.  Increased 
inclusion is further suggested by (d) the significant decrease of the insecurity discourse 
despite  Estonia's  increased  association  to  Russia  and  its  including  function  as  to 
institutional organisation and partially interests and experience.  Last,  (e)  the absence of 
discourses on Eastern Europe with cultural topics, and the – with reference to Germany - 
particularly  high  coverage  of  Estonia  with  cultural  topics  after  CEEE,  demonstrate 
inclusion also with respect to cultural-historical aspects.
Last,  the  evaluation  of  the  empirical  results  with  respect  to  the  process  of 
comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989) allows only ambivalent conclusions. On the one hand, an 
increased inclusion may be stated as to Estonia's positive evaluation increased despite the 
introduction of the new, often negatively connoted coverage of her relations  to Russia. 
Furthermore, her ambivalent evaluation decreased, which may indicate that societal frames 
(Van Gorp 2007) are becoming more concrete for Estonia,  previously part  of a diffuse, 
distant EE space (Stark 2006). On the other hand, both phenomena may, at least partially, 
be explained through the higher number of short and very short articles after Estonia's EU 
accession  and  the  fact  that  they  leave  less  space  for  comprehensive,  ambivalent, 
representation.  Yet,  Estonia's  increased  negative  evaluation  may  not  be  interpreted  as 
increased exclusion: it is mainly due to the coverage of relations with Russia only post-
CEEE.
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...with Limitations
Estonia's increased inclusion into a common European sphere is, however, limited 
also in France.
First,  just as in Germany, Estonia's inclusion into a common European sphere is 
limited by her depiction as a “new” member: (a) Estonia remains othered from Europe as to 
norms and memory, although Russia is othered even stronger. This confirms the shift of 
Easternness further eastwards in recent Western constructions of European identity (Kuus 
2007); (b) Estonia's depiction as a learner, despite increased inclusion during the accession 
period, continues to other her as to interests and memory and partially also as to norms and 
experience. Moreover, it often entails a patronizing tone reiterating Estonia's hierarchical 
inferiority; (c) discourses on Estonia as a place or source of insecurity continue to other her 
as to norms and partially as to experience and interests; (d) discourses on backwardness 
continue to other Estonia on a cultural/civilisational level with particular attention to moral 
backwardness. This focus on moral may be explained by the French ambition to spread 
certain  values  in  the  world  (as  outlined  above)  and  to  assist  EE  beyond  a  material 
development (Schuhman 1963 in Majza 2003). This position clearly others Estonia through 
her implied inferiority.
Second, a profound, ongoing disorientation concerning Estonia's status, belonging 
and  features  may  be  stated  with  regard  to  several  points:  (a)  the  national  framing 
perspective is chosen with regard to Estonia even more frequently after CEEE than before, 
and especially  during the  accession period.  France's  national  identity  being particularly 
strong (see above), this may be interpreted as a return to a safe stance in times of insecurity  
through  change.  (b)  Estonia's  othering  is  often  diffuse:  brief,  not  very  illustrated  and 
connected to a large variety of topics, e.g. in Estonia's association to Russia, her depiction 
as a learner and as a place or source of insecurity. This is especially evident with regard to 
the aspects of European identity: Whereas for Germany a dominant political-economical 
inclusion can be stated, for France no clear delineation is possible and political-economical 
aspects  alter  in  in-  and  exclusion  with  cultural-historical  ones.  Last,  (c)  Estonia's 
hierarchical non-positioning increases substantially and may indicate that journalists, being 
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unsure of where to position her, do not position her at all. 
Ongoing Re-Definition
In  France,  the  process  of  construction  of  European  identity  equally  seems  to 
currently be in a phase of profound re-construction. Several points suggest this with regard 
to homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989).
First,  as  to  Estonia's  geopolitical  categorisation.  the  almost  equal  weight  of  all 
categories – apart form the categorisation as a nation – indicates a lack of consensus in 
France on Estonia's geopolitical categorisation. This appears even clearer when considering 
that Estonia's geopolitical framing showed clear patterns of preferred categorisation before 
CEEE. This abrupt and radical change may be related to the fact that France's relations with 
Estonia  neither  reach back a  long time in  history  nor  have  been very profound (Stark 
2006:104).  Therefore,  fewer societal  frames (Van Gorp 2007) are  already available  for 
Estonia's framing: the need and the freedom to frame Estonia anew arises and results in a 
variety of equally weighted frames. This interpretation is strengthened by the emergence of 
new frames, like the Baltic State frame which only appeared in 2004 and gained popularity 
ever since. Last, the range of covered topics has almost doubled after CEEE and equally 
indicates  decreased  homogenisation  and  thus  an  ongoing  re-definition  of  identity 
constructions. 
7.3 Comparative note
Apart from the differences between France and Germany already mentioned in the 
respective evaluation, a few further aspects require discussion.
Discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia seem to be (1) more present, (2) 
more elaborate and (3) more strongly connected to a relatively defined range of topics in 
Germany than in France.  The first  point is  quantitatively noticeable,  but becomes even 
more obvious in the qualitative analysis: for all three qualitatively analysed discourses, the 
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French qualitative sample is much shorter and much less complex than the German one. 
The second point is connected to the recurrence of certain themes: whereas in Germany a 
certain number of relatively illustrated pictures recurs in relation to Eastern Europe (e.g. 
poverty, grey houses) the discourses in France seem to be more abstract, vaguer. The third 
point relates to the relatively clearly defined range of topics that discourses on Eastern 
Europe are related to in Germany, whereas in France the,  albeit  weaker,  discourses are 
connected to a larger variety of topics. All three points may be explained as follows: (1)  
East-Europe, and Estonia with it, is a largely undiscovered space for France (Stark 2006), 
whereas in Germany public imaginaries – and stereotypes – reach centuries back and have 
been more strongly influenced through the Cold War.  (2) Related to this  point,  Estonia 
receives  much  more  attention  in  Germany  than  in  France  –  which  also  leaves  more 
opportunities  for  framing  and  reiterating  patterns  of  representation.  The  influence  of 
national memory is further visible in the coverage of communism in France as opposed to 
post-communist transition in Germany. Communism being different from French national 
memories  may  invoke  interest  and  promise  an  interesting  story,  whereas  in  Germany 
memories of the own experience with post-communist transition render transition related 
topics more interesting.
Frames  seem,  furthermore,  to  have  different  popularity  and  possibly  different 
meaning  in  Germany  and  France.  Estonia  is,  for  instance,  before  CEEE  much  more 
frequently framed as Eastern European in France (25-33%) than in Germany (13-17%), 
which may be due to the non-existence of alternative frames, such as the Baltic State frame. 
The frequency of the Baltic State frame, in turn, decreases in Germany since Estonia's EU 
accession, but increases in France, which may be related to different connoted meanings in 
France and Germany. The precise meaning of frames, other than the ones researched here, 
would be worth considering in further studies.
Relating both points back to identity constructions, the assumption that Estonia's 
recognition  as  part  of  Europe  as  a  whole  is  easier  in  states  with  “shared  historical 
experiences  and  opportunities  for  communication”  (Lauristin  1997:31)  may  be 
contradicted: the creation of new, more inclusive frames seems to be easier in a context,  
where Estonia is to be (re-)invented after very sparse historical contact.
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8. CONCLUSION
On the basis of representation theory  (Saussure 1916, Hall 1997), framing theory 
(such as Scheufele 1999, Scheufele/Tewksbury 2007:13-16) and theories on the formation 
of collective identities (such as Edensor 2002, Tajfel 1982 and Turner/Oakes 1983), this 
dissertation has quantitatively and qualitatively analysed the framing of Estonia in French 
and German news magazines.  In conclusion of the analysis,  a visible  shift  in Estonia's 
position in German and French constructions of European identity may be stated.
In Germany, Estonia seems to be increasingly regarded as a part of Europe – yet 
predominantly  with  respect  to  political-economic  aspects.  An  inclusion  as  to  cultural-
historical  aspects  is  rare  and  mostly  connected  to  the  representation  of  Russia  as  the 
common  Other.  Furthermore  limits  of  inclusion  can  be  identified  in  (1)  her  inclusion 
mainly in relation to positively connoted topics and a German historical responsibility, (2) 
Estonia's  othering  as  a  “new” member  within  the  European frame and (3)  the  societal 
rootedness of certain othering frames, mainly with regard to security issues, impeding on 
the construction on an integrated European identity. Especially point (2) suggests the close 
interrelation of current German constructions of European identity with previous ones of a 
Western European identity:  Borders between East and West seem to have been relocated 
from outside the political entity to the inside the political entity and are now slowly – but 
steadily – in the process of dissolution.
For  France,  an  increased  inclusion  may  equally  be  stated.  It  is,  however,  also 
limited, mostly with regard to Estonia's othering as a “new” member within the European 
framework. Yet French constructions of European identity seem less marked by the Cold 
War era, i.e. more flexible to accommodate the new member states independently of an 
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Eastern  vs.  Western  divide:  Estonia's  representation  is  much  more  various,  Eastern 
European frames vaguer and less present in general, and her in- and exclusion cannot be 
assigned to political-economic or cultural-historical aspects in particular. Along with this 
goes  a  slightly  greater  openness  towards  a  profound re-definition  of  European identity 
independently of the previous (Western) European identity and a stronger independence of 
the cultural-historical project of Europe from its political-economic realisation.
The results suggest that beyond the inclusion into the political unit of the EU and 
Estonia's  similar  everyday  reality,  further  factors  influence(d)  dynamics  of  in-  and 
exclusion: (1) NATO enlargement, (2) the context: intra-European or Russia as the common 
Other  and  (3)  national  identity  with  (3a)  national  memory  and  (3b)  current  national 
ambitions. Surprising is the minor impact that Estonia's promotion of her Western national 
narrative  seems  to  have.  All  these  factors  need  to  be  tested  as  to  the  extend  of  their 
influence in further studies. Concerning theory, the exact interrelation of positive evaluation 
and  inclusion  needs  to  be  more  closely  determined  for  the  construction  of  collective 
identities.
In view of the slow development of constructions of collective identity, the results 
of  this  dissertation may be interpreted  as  a  sign for  the  development  towards  a  united 
Europe,  already prematurely proclaimed with CEEE as  an “historic  enlargement  which 
signified  the  re-unification  of  Europe  after  decades  of  division”  (see  European 
Commission: From 6 to 27 Members and Beyond). The crucial challenge is now not to get 
stuck mid-way at a partial level of inclusion, but to continue and foster exchange between 
East- and West-European countries in view of the emergence of a united Europe.
90
REFERENCES
Academic literature
Anderson, Benedict (1983): Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nations. London: Verso.
Appadurai, Arjun ([1996] 2005): Modernity at Large. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota.
Berger, Peter L./Luckmann, Thomas ([1966]1991): The social construction of reality. 
London: Penguin Books.
Billig, Michael (1995): Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Brown, Rupert (2000): “Social Identity Theory: past achievements, current problems and 
future challenges”, in: European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, pp.745-778.
Brubaker, Rogers (1998): “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism”, in: 
Hall, John (ed.):  The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of 
Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available online from: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/15_Myths_and  _  
Misconceptio  ns.pdf    (14.3.2012).
Bruter, Michael (2005): Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Buß, Eugen/Klein, Michael (2009): Ein neuer Stolz auf die Nation im Einklang mit den 
Herzen – Die Identität der Deutschen. Düsseldorf: Identity Foundation. Available 
online from: https://soziologie.uni-hohenheim.de/qisserver/rds  ?  
state=medialoader&objectid=4060&application=lsf  (26/04/2012).
Davis, Helen (2004): Understanding Stuart Hall. London: Sage.
De Beus, Jos (2001): “Quasi-national European Identity and European Democracy”, in: 
91
Law and Philosophy, 20, pp.283-311.
Edensor, Tim (2002): National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford: Berg
Ekecrantz, Jan (2004): “In Other Worlds. Mainstream Imagery of Eastern Neighbours”, in: 
Riegert, Kristina (ed.): News of the Other. Tracing Identity in Scandinavian 
Constructions of the Eastern Baltic Sea Region. Göteborg: Nordicom. 
Entman, Robert M. (1993): “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, in: 
Journal of Communication, 43, 4, pp. 51-58.
Fairclough, Norman (1989): Language and Power. London: Longman.
Feldman, Merje (2001): “European Integration and the Discourse of National Identity in 
Estonia”, in: National Identities, 3, 1, pp.5-21.
Fürnrohr, Walter (1995): “Der Ostseeraum seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts aus den 
wechselnden Perspektiven deutschen Geschichtsunterrichts”, in: Maier, Robert 
(ed.): Nationalbewegung und Staatsbildung. Die baltische Region im Schulbuch. 
Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg.
Gellner, Ernest (1983): Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Glynn, Carroll J./Herbst, Susan/O'Keefe, Garret J./Shapiro, Robert Y./Lindemann, Mark 
(2004): Public Opinion. Colorado/Oxford: Westview Press.
Hall, Stuart (1980): “Encoding/Decoding”, in: Hall, Stuart/Hobson, Dorothy/Lowe, 
Andrew/Willis, Paul (eds): Culture, Media, Language. London: Hutchinson.
Hall, Stuart (1997) (ed.): Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices. London: Sage.
Herman, Edward S./Chomsky, Noam (1988): Manufacturing Consent. The political 
economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Hettlage, Robert (1999): “European Identity – between Inclusion and Exclusion”, in: 
Kriesi, Hanspeter/Armingeon, Klaus/Siegrist, Hannes/Wimmer, Andreas (eds.): 
Nation and National Identity. The European Experience in Perspective. West 
Lafayette, Purdue University Press.
Kasekamp, Andres (2010): A History of the Baltic States. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Krippendorf, Klaus (2004): Content Analysis. Thousand Oaks/London: Sage.
92
Kürti, Láslzό (1997): “Globalisation and the Discourse of Otherness in the 'New' Eastern 
and Central Europe”, in: Modood, Tariq/Werbner, Pnina (ed.): Multiculturalism in 
the New Europe. Racism, Identity and Community. London/NY: Zed Books.
Kuus, Merje (2007): Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe's Eastern 
Enlargement. New York/Hapshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lauristin, Marju (1997): “Contexts of Transition”, in: Lauristin, Marju/Vihalemm, Peeter 
(ed.): Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the 
Estonian Post-Communist Transition. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
Lagerspetz, Mikko (2003): “How many Nordic Countries? Possibilities and Limits of 
Geopolitical Identity Construction”, in: Cooperation and Conflict, 38, 49, pp. 49-61.
Lash, Scott (2007): “Power after Hegemony. Cultural Studies in Mutation?”, in: Theory, 
Culture&Society, 24, 55, pp. 55-78.
Lieb, Julia (2008): “Die französische Kampagne zum Referendum über den Vertrag über 
eine Verfassung für Europa – Probleme mit der europäischen Wirklichkeit”, in: 
Baasner, Frank (ed.) (2008): Von welchem Europa reden wir? Reichweiten 
nationaler Europadiskurse. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Liulevicius, Gabriel Vejas (2009): The German Myth of the East. 1800 to the Present. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miard-Delacroix, Hélène (2008): “„Denk ich an Europa in der Nacht…“. Europa-Narration 
in Deutschland vom Ersatz für die Nation zur Interessen- und Wertegemeinschaft”, 
in: Baasner, Frank (ed.) (2008): Von welchem Europa reden wir? Reichweiten 
nationaler Europadiskurse. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Majza, Béatrice (2003): “La France et l'élargissement de l'Union Européene à l'Europe 
médiane, balkanique et du Sud-Est”, in: Picod, Fabrice (ed.): La France dans la 
construction européene. Annuare français de Relations internationales. Paris: 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Available from: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/FD001444.pdf  (2.3.2012).
Murawska-Muthesius, Katarzyna (2006): “On Small Nations and Bullied Children: Mr 
Punch Draws Eastern Europe”, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 84, 2, 
pp. 279-305.
Pettai, Vello (2010): “State identity in Estonia during the 1990: Inheriting and Inventing”, 
in: Metuzāle-Kangere, Baiba (ed.): Inheriting the 1990s. The Baltic Countries.  
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
Röseberg, Dorothee (2001): Kulturwissenschaft Frankreich. Stuttgart: Klett.
93
Seidendorf, Stefan (2008): “„Die Quadratur des Kreises“ oder: Wie gehen Nation und 
Europa zusammen?”, in: Baasner, Frank (ed.) (2008): Von welchem Europa reden 
wir? Reichweiten nationaler Europadiskurse. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Saussure, Ferdinand de ([1916]1995): Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot & 
Rivages.
Scheufele, Dietram A. (1999): “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects”, in: Journal of 
Communication, 49, 1, pp.103-122. 
Scheufele, Dietram A./Tewksbury David (2007): “Framing, Agenda-Setting, and Priming: 
Three Media Effect Models”, in: Journal of Communication, 57, 1, pp.9-20.
Skảlnes, Lars S. (2005): “Geopolicies and the eastern enlargement of the European Union”, 
in: Schimmelpfennig, Frank/Sedelmeier Ulrich (ed.): The politics of European 
Union Enlargement. Abingdon/Oxon: Routledge.
Spohn, Willfried (2005): “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged 
Europe”, in: Eder, Klaus/Spohn, Willfried (ed.): Collective Memory and European 
Identity. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Stammer, Silke/Thomas, Johannes (2004): “Deutsche und französische Kulturarbeit in den 
Beitrittsländern. Kurzdarstellungen und Materialien”, in: Dokumente, 60, 3, pp. 11-
16. Available online from: http://www.dokumente-
documents.info/uploads/tx_ewsdokumente/art_11032004.pdf  (26.1.2012).
Stark, Hans (2006): “La France et l'Allemagne face à l'Europe de l'Est”, in: Allemagne 
d'aujourd'hui, nr. hors série, pp. 104-111.
Stark, Hans (2010): “Rück- und Ausblick. Frankreich – Deutschland. Eine komplexe 
Beziehung”, in: Barrière, Anne-Lise/Claro, Céline/Clouet, Louis-Marie/Martens, 
Stephan/Mistral, Jacques/Nies, Susanne/Stark, Hans/Uterwedde, Henrik (2010): 
Deutschland-Frankreich: Fünf Visionen für Europa/France-Allemagne: Cinq 
Visions Pour L'Europe. Paris: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Available online from:  
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/882-1442-1-30.pdf  (5.12.2011).
Tajfel, Henri (1982): Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Temple, Bogusia (1997): “Research Note. Watch Your Tongue: Issues in Translation and 
crosscultural Research”, in: Sociology, 31, 3, pp. 607-618.
Titscher, Stefan/Meyer, Michael/Wodak, Ruth/Vetter, Eva (2007): Methods of Text and 
Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.
94
Todorov, Tzvetan (2008): “European Identity”, in: South Central Review, 25, 3, pp.3-17.
Triandafyllidou, Anna/Wodak, Ruth/Krzyżanowski, Michał (2009): The European Public 
Sphere and the Media. Europe in Crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Turner, C. John/Oakes, Penelope J. (1989): “Self-Categorization Theory and Social 
Influence”, in: Paulus, Paul B. (ed.): Psychology of Group Influence. Hove/London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Van Gorp, Baldwin (2007): “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture 
back in”, in: Journal of Communication, 57, 1, pp.60-78.
Von Laer, Hermann (2007): Osteuropa und Wir. Berlin: Lit. Verlag Dr. W. Hopf.
Von Oppeln, Sabine/Sprungk, Carina (2005): Constitution et Construction européenne: 
regards français et allemands. Paris: Institut Français des relations internationales. 
Availbale online from: http://www.ifri.org/files/VFAOppelnSprungk.pdf 
(27/04/2012).
Other sources
Association France-Estonie: http://www.france-estonie.org/ (14.3.2012).
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BPB) (2011): Völker in Osteuropa und Nordasien. 
Available from: http://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/russland/48410/voelker-in-
osteuropa-und-nordasien  (21.5.2012).
Der Spiegel (2011):  Auflagenmeldung IVW 4/2011. Available online from: 
http://www.spiegel-qc.de/deutsch/media/dokumente/partner/auflagen/sp_auflagen.pdf 
(21.3.2011).
Der Spiegel (2012): Sieben Gründe für eine Belegung. Available online from: 
http://www.spiegel-
qc.de/deutsch/media/dokumente/partner/basis/7_gruende_januar_2012.pdf (21.3.2012).
Der Spiegel: Konzept. Available online from: 
http://www.spiegelgruppe.de/spiegelgruppe/home.nsf/Navigation/440FBE98BAF7E2F8C1
256FD5004406DD?OpenDocument  (21.3.2012).
Der Spiegel: Geschichte. Available online from: 
http://www.spiegelgruppe.de/spiegelgruppe/home.nsf/Navigation/00725D93EF0ABA5BC1
95
256FD6003  30072?OpenDocument   (21.3.2012).
Die Zeit: Marketing. Available from: 
http://www.zeitverlag.de/category/pressemitteilungen/zeit-verlag/marketing/ (21.3.2012).
Die Zeit: Verlagszahlen. Available from: 
http://www.zeitverlag.de/category/pressemitteilungen/zeit-  verlag/verlagszahlen/   
(21.3.2012).
Die Zeit: Wie alles begann. Available from: http://www.zeit.de/2006/08/I_zeitintern_S 
(21.3.2012).
Deutsch Baltische Handelskammer: http://www.ahk-balt.org/ (15.3.2012).
Décret n°59-889 du 24 juillet 1959 PORTANT ORGANISATION DU MINISTERE 
CHARGE DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES (M. MALRAUX). Available online from: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?
numJO=0&dateJO=19590726&numTexte=&pageDebut=07413&pageFin= (15.3.2012).
Estonian Embassy in Berlin (2012):  Kultur, Bildung und Wissenschaft. Available from: 
http://www.estemb.de/estland_und_deutschland/kultur_bildung_und_wissenschaft 
(2.3.2012)
Estonian Embassy in France (2012): Relations culturelles. Available from: http://www.est-
emb.fr/estonie_france/aid-127 (2.3.2012).
Estonian Institutions fostering National Identiy are for example: 
Eesti Instituut (Estonian Institute): http://www.estinst.ee/est/avaleht/    ; 
Eesti Keele Instituud (Estonian Language Institute): http://www.eki.ee/eki/    ; 
Eesti Õiguskeele Keskus (Estonian Legal Language Centre): 
 http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022    ; 
Emakeele Selts (Estonian mother tongue society): http://www.emakeeleselts.ee/    ; 
Keeleinspektioon (Language inspectorate): http://www.keeleinsp.ee/index.php?
lang=1    ; 
Keelekümbluskeskus (Language Immersion Centre): http://www.kke.ee/index.php?
lang=eng     (12.3.2012).
European Commission: Candidate Countries. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/index_en.htm (14.3.2012).
European Commission: Enlargement Archives. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiation
s/eu10_bulgaria_romania/index_en.htm (21.3.2012).
European Commission: Enlargement. The Policy. Available from: 
96
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/index_en.htm (14.3.2012).
European Commission: From 6 to 27 Members and Beyond. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/from-6-to-27-members/index_en.htm 
(14.3.2012).
European Commission (2006): White Paper on a European Communication Policy. 
Available from: http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com2006_35_en.pdf 
(29.2.2012).
European Union: Constitution. Fact Sheets. Available from: 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/objectives_en.htm (2.3.2012).
European Union (1995-2012): Symbols of the European Union.  
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm  (29.2.2012).
Focus: Deutschlands Nachrichtenmagazin. Available online from: 
http://www.medialine.de/media/uploads/projekt/medialine/docs/bestellung_download/medi
adaten/focu  s/foc_objektprofil_2012.pdf    (21.3.2012).
Focus: Memo. Available from: http://www.focus.de/magazin/memo/memo-des-
chefredakteurs-das-war-  unser-start_aid_725162.html   (21.3.2012).
Goethe Insitut: Weltweit: http://www.goethe.de/uun/adr/wwt/est/deindex.htm (15.3.2012).
Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (2009): Etudes et intégration. Faire connaître les valeurs de la  
République. Paris: La documentation française. Available online from: 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/094000180/0000.pdf 
Ilves, Toomas Hendrik (1998): “Jõulumaa ehk vaimse geograafia enesemääramine”, Eesti  
Ekspress, 24.12.1998; reprinted in: Ilves, Toomas Hendrik (2006): Eesti jõudmine. Kõned  
ja kirjutised aastaist 1986-2006. Tallinn: Kirjastus Varrak.
Ilves, Toomas Hendrik (1999): Estonia as a Nordic Country. Speech to the Swedish  
Institute of International Affairs. Available online from: http://www.vm.ee/?
q=en/node/3489 (14.3.2012).
Ilves, Toomas Hendrik (2009): “Kes me oleme? Kus me oleme? Rahvuslik identiteet ja 
vaimne geograafia”, 22.4.2009 at University of Turku; reprinted in: Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: 
Suurem Eesti. Valik presidendikõnesid ja – kirjutisi. Tallinn: Varrak.
Institut Français Estonie: http://www.institutfrancais-estonie.com/fra (14.3.2012).
Le Nouvel Observateur: Positionnement et chiffes-clés. Available online from: 
http://www.regieobs.fr/marques/magazine-nouvel-observateur (21.3.2012).
97
Le Point: Contacts. Available from: http://www.lepoint.fr/html/contacts/contacts.jsp 
(21.3.2012)
Ministère de la Culture: Glossaire des termes de la presse. Available from: 
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/dglf/clemi/definitions.htm (21.3.2012)
Portail du Gouvernement (2008): “Le Premier ministre se rendra en Estonie et en 
Finlande”. Available from: http://www.gouvernement.fr/presse/le-premier-ministre-se-
rendra-en-estonie-et-en-finlande (12.3.2012).
Sarkozy, Nicolas (2006) : Intervention de M. Nicolas SARKOZY, Ministre d'Etat, Ministre  
de l'Intérieur et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Cotonou, Bénin, 26. Mai 2006. Available 
online from: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/le_ministre/interventions/archives-
sarkozy-2005-2007/19-05-  2006-deplacement-benin/view   (15.3.2012).
Süddeutsche Zeitung: Schreibwerkstatt. Available from: http://www.sz-
schreibwerkstatt.de/schreibtipps.php (21.3.2012).
98
APPENDICES
A) List of the quantitative Sample
Nr V1 Date V3 Title V4 Magazine
German magazines
1. 01/10/2011 Würmer, Trojaner und logische Bomben Focus
2. 18/07/2011 In der Schuldenfalle. Die Tricks des Tigers Focus
3. 05/02/2011 Gesamttitel: “Wir rechnen mit Millionen von 
Migranten”. Dort arbeiten, wo die freien Stellen 
sind
Focus
4. 05/02/2011 “Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten” Focus
5. 13/09/2010 Multinationales Europa Focus
6. 31/05/2010 Währungsunion Focus
7. 22/03/2010 Noch mehr digitale Attacken Focus
8. 15/03/2010 “Angst ist eine starke Waffe” Focus
9. 12/10/2009 Care-Pakete an die Armen Focus
10. 16/02/2009 Mittelmäßig gläubig Focus
11. 08/12/2008 NATO. Top Spion Focus
12. 08/09/2008 Boykott der Sänger Focus
13. 18/08/2008 Georgien. Klare Warnung aus Moskau Focus
14. 17/12/2007 Schengen Focus
15. 19/11/2007 Focus TV Reportage Focus
16. 15/10/2007 Europäische Union: Brüssel and die Macht Focus
17. 13/08/2007 Zur Sonne, zur Freiheit! Focus
18. 23/07/2007 EU-Korruption. Deutschland bockt Focus
19. 11/06/2007 Umschalten auf Fakten Focus
20. 14/05/2007 Estland. Ein zweites Polen Focus
21. 07/05/2007 Held gegen Held Focus
22. 30/04/2007 Russland. Sowjetische Strategie Focus
23. 19/03/2007 Kurse & Notizen. Tallinna Vesi: gut versorgt Focus
24. 23/10/2006 Genesen in Deutschland Focus
25. 18/09/2006 Gierige Rundfunker Focus
26. 15/05/2006 Kure & Notizen: Fonds, Grenzgänger Focus
27. 05/12/2005 EU-Musterknabe in Aufruhr Focus
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28. 23/05/2005 Vorreiter bei der Internet-Wahl Focus
29. 19/07/2004 Die Meistersinger von Tallinn Focus
30. 14/06/2004 Europa in Stuecken Focus
31. 29/05/2004 Beruf & Karriere. Knigge fuer Europa-ReisendeFocus
32. 10/05/2004 Boersenticker. Die Böerse in Stuttgart... Focus
33. 03/05/2004 1000 Herzen für Europa Focus
34. 03/05/2004 Tendenz-o-meter. Alle da? Focus
35. 03/05/2004 Slovakei, Kapitalbesteuerung Focus
36. 26/04/2004 Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München Focus
37. 05/04/2004 Reisen. Laendertest Baltikum Focus
38. 29/03/2004 Bedingungen zum EU-Beitritt Focus
39. 22/09/2003 Unsere Nachbarn haben es besser Focus
40. 18/08/2003 EU, no! Focus
41. 02/12/2002 “Es besteht ein enormes Risiko” Focus
42. 21/10/2002 Bildung vom Feinsten, EU, Estland Focus
43. 07/10/2002 EU, Estland. Raumschiff “Enterprise” Focus
44. 08/07/2002 Zeitbomben, Hochstapler und Nixen. 
Bezaubernd
Focus
45. 28/01/2002 Gaeste-Liste, preisverdaechtig Focus
46. 23/07/2001 Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer Focus
47. 08/01/2001 Genforschung: Erbgut im Angebot Focus
48. 10/10/2011 Korrektur Der Spiegel
49. 01/10/2011 Eine dicke Scheibe Estland Der Spiegel
50. 19/09/2011 Estland: Der smarte Staat Der Spiegel
51. 19/09/2011 Ein merkwürdiges Land Der Spiegel
52. 23/05/2011 Mehr Schutz vor Cyber-Attacken Der Spiegel
53. 06/12/2010 Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie 
estonienne
Der Spiegel
54. 06/12/2010 Mörderisches Baltikum Der Spiegel
55. 28/06/2010 Mission impossible Der Spiegel
56. 31/05/2010 Härter und bescheidener Der Spiegel
57. 26/04/2010 Weißer Ritter Der Spiegel
58. 09/02/2009 Hacker in Uniform Der Spiegel
59. 15/12/2008 Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim 
BND
Der Spiegel
60. 01/12/2008 Ein Riss im Bollwerk Der Spiegel
61. 24/11/2008 Zitate Der Spiegel
62. 17/11/2008 Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa Der Spiegel
63. 17/11/2008 Dicker Fisch Der Spiegel
64. 01/09/2008 Kalter Frieden Der Spiegel
65. 30/06/2008 Jagd auf “Jonny Hell” Der Spiegel
66. 01/01/2008 Verhängnisvolle Wende Der Spiegel
67. 10/12/2007 Euphorie im Osten Der Spiegel
68. 22/10/2007 Unangekündigte Kontrollen Der Spiegel
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69. 08/10/2007 Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel Der Spiegel
70. 20/08/2007 Tallinn Der Spiegel
71. 01/08/2007 “Man wird, was man tut” Der Spiegel
72. 20/07/2007 Dubioses Theater Der Spiegel
73. 25/06/2007 “Widerwärtige Vorwürfe” Der Spiegel
74. 21/05/2007 Wer steckt hinter dem Cyberangriff auf 
Estland?
Der Spiegel
75. 07/05/2007 Frustrierte Großmacht Der Spiegel
76. 26/02/2007 “Wenig anzubieten?” Der Spiegel
77. 22/01/2007 Befreier oder Besatzer Der Spiegel
78. 20/03/2006 Gestorben Lennart Meri Der Spiegel
79. 23/01/2006 Der Rebell als Mystiker Der Spiegel
80. 14/05/2005 Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an Der Spiegel
81. 14/03/2005 “Wunden in der Seele” Der Spiegel
82. 10/05/2004 Nordischer Block Der Spiegel
83. 26/04/2004 “Das muss aufhören” Der Spiegel
84. 29/03/2004 Baltischer Tigersprung Der Spiegel
85. 11/03/2003 Boomende Balten Der Spiegel
86. 25/11/2002 Feuer in den Kulissen Der Spiegel
87. 18/11/2002 Der Spiegel berichtete Der Spiegel
88. 30/09/2002 Aufgeblähte Verträge Der Spiegel
89. 18/06/2001 USA mit Schirm und Charme Der Spiegel
90. 28/05/2001 Osterweiterung weckt Phantasie Der Spiegel
91. 21/05/2001 Chronik Der Spiegel
92. 09/04/2001 “Sensibel für die eigenen Ängste” Der Spiegel
93. 06/12/2000 Steinerner Gast Der Spiegel
94. 09/10/2000 Erweiterung ohne Polen? Der Spiegel
95. 18/09/2000 Blut fürs Vaterland Der Spiegel
96. 29/05/2000 “Russland ist unberechnbar” Der Spiegel
97. 02/10/2000 “Ein Traum muss sein” Der Spiegel
98. 03/01/2000 Bomben am Bug? Der Spiegel
99. 22/12/2010 Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz 
Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur Estland 
nicht.
Die Zeit
100. 30/09/2010 Im Keller der Geschichte; Sofi Oksanenen 
mischt KGB-Akten mit bäuerlicher Idylle zu 
einem Leseabenteuer
Die Zeit
101. 02/09/2010 Freie Arbeitsplatzwahl in der EU Die Zeit
102. 09/10/2009 Paavo Järvi: Der wunderbare estnische Dirigent 
schöpft aus einem tiefen Stausee kultureller 
Einflüsse: Russische Seele, skandinavische 
Herbheit, europäischer Reichtum
Die Zeit
103. 20/08/2009 Singen für die Freiheit Die Zeit
104. 13/08/2009 Balten in der Krise Die Zeit
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105. 16/05/2007 Fragen zu Europa Im BMW nach Tartu Die Zeit
106. 03/01/2007 Arbeit wird wertvoll Die Zeit
107. 21/09/2006 Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin Die Zeit
108. 23/08/2006 Spielen Schach Die Zeit
109. 31/12/2007 Baltikum Schön eben Die Zeit
110. 16/03/2006 Finnen: Berauscht Die Zeit
111. 22/09/2005 Sie gehen so schnell Die Zeit
112. 08/09/2005 Arvo Pärt, Kommt ihr Brüder, helft mir klagen Die Zeit
113. 01/09/2005 Steuren. Niedrige Steuern für alle Die Zeit
114. 07/05/2005 Europareise. Bush feiert Osteuropas 
Demokratien
Die Zeit
115. 08/05/2005 Europareise. Russland am Pranger Die Zeit
116. 23/03/2005 Antikorruptionsplan Die Zeit
117. 23/03/2005 Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher Die Zeit
118. 17/03/2005 Tag der Absage Die Zeit
119. 11/11/2004 Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht Die Zeit
120. 16/09/2004 Architektur. Mit sanftem Schwung in die Kurve Die Zeit
121. 09/06/2004 EU Europas Sternchen Die Zeit
122. 15/04/2004 Literarische EU-Erweiterung. Das Boskop-
Land
Die Zeit
123. 01/04/2004 Osterweiterung. Invsion vom Pluto Die Zeit
124. 01/04/2004 Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne Die Zeit
125. 11/03/2004 Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die 
Datenautobahn
Die Zeit
126. 15/01/2004 Lesezeichen Die Zeit
127. 14/08/2003 Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen! Die Zeit
128. 24/07/2003 Estland. Freiheit für das Gemüse Die Zeit
129. 28/05/2003 Genforschung. Patriotisches Kataster Die Zeit
130. 31/10/2002 Aufschwung Ostsee Die Zeit
131. 29/05/2002 Livland – 12 Punkte Die Zeit
132. 23/05/2002 Hier spielt die Musik Die Zeit
133. 02/05/2001 Fegefeuer in Estland Die Zeit
134. 08/02/2001 Hast du mir was mitgebracht? Die Zeit
135. 17/05/2001 Geschichten, die das Leben schrieb Die Zeit
136. 24/08/2000 Die EU-Beitrittskandidaten Die Zeit
137. 21/06/2000 In fremden Betten Die Zeit
138. 02/05/2007 Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht Die Zeit
139. 04/01/2007 Paavo Järvi. Zugriff! Die Zeit
140. 09/12/2004 60 Sekunden für Übersetzer Die Zeit
141. 25/11/2004 Berichtigung Die Zeit
French magazines
142. 21/09/2011 Nausée baltique L'Express
143. 09/02/2011 Devoir de mémoire L'Express
144. 24/11/2010 La vie de château L'Express
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145. 03/11/2010 Esprit estonien L'Express
146. 20/10/2010 La quête de l'inouї L'Express
147. 08/09/2010 Les mystères de l'Est L'Express
148. 08/09/2010 Un Estonien à Paris L'Express
149. 01/09/2010 Tragédie balte L'Express
150. 26/05/2010 Hommage L'Express
151. 22/04/2010 Occasion L'Express
152. 11/03/2010 Elargissement: à chacun son protégé L'Express
153. 23/07/2009 A la page: une autre Europe L'Express
154. 12/03/2009 Russie. Un aveu pas du tout virtuel L'Express
155. 11/09/2008 Canard soviétique L'Express
156. 21/08/2008 “Les Russes ont l'impression d'être de retour” L'Express
157. 12/06/2008 L'estonien à la maternelle L'Express
158. 03/04/2008 Guerre électronique L'Express
159. 14/02/2008 Lotte, du village des inventeurs L'Express
160. 07/02/2008 Manoeuvres à l'Union L'Express
161. 03/01/2008 Estonie, Sandra Sule, 27 ans, dirige un service 
de l'académie des arts: “La mondialisation, c'est 
bien, non?”
L'Express
162. 13/12/2007 Estonie, high-tech L'Express
163. 29/11/2007 De Lisbonne à Tallinn L'Express
164. 11/10/2007 Amateurisme L'Express
165. 17/05/2007 La main de Moscou; Estonie L'Express
166. 17/05/2007 La main de Moscou L'Express
167. 03/05/2007 Les curieurses nostalgies de Moscou L'Express
168. 19/04/2007 International. Des Européens inégaux vus de 
Wahington
L'Express
169. 07/12/2006 Le tigre high-tech. Estonie L'Express
170. 27/07/2006 L'Europe des inégalités L'Express
171. 15/06/2006 Un paradis entre dunes et plages; Riviera balte L'Express
172. 04/05/2006 Energie: le défi balte; Europe L'Express
173. 15/12/2005 Le sumo se lève à l'ouest; Tendance L'Express
174. 29/09/2005 Accords parfaits; Arvo Pärt L'Express
175. 22/09/2005 Euro visions L'Express
176. 06/06/2005 Réévaluation de l'Histoire L'Express
177. 23/05/2005 En combien de langues la Constitution existe-t-
elle?
L'Express
178. 02/05/2005 “Voilà comment j'ai vécu votre Libération”; 
Jaan Kross
L'Express
179. 02/05/2005 A chacun sa mémoire; Pays-Baltes-Russie L'Express
180. 24/05/2004 Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à L'Express
181. 26/04/2004 Tiina ou la passion de la vieille ville; Les 
nouveaux européens 10. Les Estoniens
L'Express
182. 26/04/2004 Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à L'Express
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183. 05/04/2004 Alliance antiterroriste; OTAN L'Express
184. 01/03/2004 Départ immédiat L'Express
185. 07/08/2003 Tallinn: Du Moyen Age au wi-fi L'Express
186. 07/08/2003 Estonie pratique L'Express
187. 05/12/2002 Série Les futurs membres de l'union; 10. 
Estonie Les cicatrices de l'Histoire
L'Express
188. 03/10/2002 Interview: “Le communisme nous laisse des 
ruines gigantesque”
L'Express
189. 22/12/2010 Punk éthique Le Nouvel 
Observateur
190. 18/11/2010 Un roman estonien par Katrina Kalda Le Nouvel 
Observateur
191. 27/05/2010 L'euro séduit toujours Le Nouvel 
Observateur
192. 18/12/2008 Espionnage “Opération Jésus” Le Nouvel 
Observateur
193. 03/04/2008 Les exemples en Europe Le Nouvel 
Observateur
194. 03/01/2008 Les neuf nouveaux de Schengen Le Nouvel 
Observateur
195. 14/06/2007 Cybercombat contre l'Estonie Le Nouvel 
Observateur
196. 14/01/2007 Vote éléctronique Le Nouvel 
Observateur
197. 21/09/2006 Les talents de la Baltique Le Nouvel 
Observateur
198. 31/08/2006 L'Est en tête Le Nouvel 
Observateur
199. 22/06/2006 Ailleurs en Europe Le Nouvel 
Observateur
200. 25/05/2005 “About Estonia” Le Nouvel 
Observateur
201. 21/10/2004 Tallinn Le Nouvel 
Observateur
202. 03/06/2004 La déportation des juifs continue Le Nouvel 
Observateur
203. 27/05/2004 Tänan väga (Merci beaucoup!) Le Nouvel 
Observateur
204. 13/05/2004 danse Le Nouvel 
Observateur
205. 29/04/2004 Le tarte à l'Union Le Nouvel 
Observateur
206. 04/12/2003 Le chiffre Le Nouvel 
Observateur
207. 30/12/2011 Estonie architonique Le Point
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208. 21/07/2011 Les baltes Le Point
209. 27/01/2011 Hold-up sur le CO2. Fraude Le Point
210. 06/01/2011 L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrage Le Point
211. 25/11/2010 “Purge” Sofi Oksanen. Les vingt meilleurs 
livres de l'année
Le Point
212. 13/09/2010 Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie 
estonienne
Le Point
213. 26/08/2010 Premier Prix Le Point
214. 12/11/2009 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
215. 23/07/2009 6,6% Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
216. 19/03/2009 L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou Le Point
217. 08/01/2009 L'espion qui frimait. Estonie Le Point
218. 04/12/2008 75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
219. 18/09/2008 Lauréats de la Fondation HSBC Le Point
220. 21/08/2008 La mousson d'été Le Point
221. 12/06/2008 La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur Le Point
222. 21/02/2008 110 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
223. 31/01/2008 Les manoeuvres de Moscou Le Point
224. 24/05/2007 La Russie attaque par le Web. Estonie Le Point
225. 10/05/2007 Les manoeuvres de Moscou: Estonie-Russie Le Point
226. 03/05/2007 Serguei Mironov. En baisse Le Point
227. 25/01/2007 Une statue encombrante Le Point
228. 29/06/2006 13,1% Le Chiffre Le Point
229. 11/05/2006 La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction Le Point
230. 26/01/2006 Expositions: Arvo Pärt Le Point
231. 29/09/2005 Etats-Unis. Euro-Visions Le Point
232. 03/02/2005 Russie-etats baltes Le Point
233. 29/04/2004 Spécial Europe: Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: 
Capitales de la Baltique
Le Point
234. 22/01/2004 Union européenne: L'Estonie prend un coup de 
jeune
Le Point
235. 24/10/2003 Pays scandinaves: Alcool. La guerre des prix Le Point
236. 11/04/2003 A l'affiche Juha Parts, 36 ans Le Point
237. 14/02/2003 Estonie: La vengeance du passé Le Point
238. 30/11/2001 L'Estonie délie sa langue Le Point
239. 28/09/2001 A l'affiche Arnold Ruutel 73 ans Le Point
240. 18/05/2001 La photo de la semaine: Estonie le rêve 
européen
Le Point
241. 27/04/2001 Finlande: parrains de proximité Le Point
242. 08/12/2000 Estonie: une mine d'or génétique Le Point
243. 17/11/2000 Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur Le Point
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B) Coding Scheme for the quantitative Content Analysis
General Information
V1) Date
V2) Year
1) 2000
2) 2001
3) 2002
4) 2003
5) 2004
6) 2005
7) 2006
8) 2007
9) 2008
10) 2009
11) 2010
12) 2011
V3) Title
V4) Magazine
1) Focus
2) Der Spiegel
3) Die Zeit
4) L'Express
5) Le Nouvel Observateur
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6) Le Point
V5) Genre
1) none
2) other
3) article
4) interview
5) comment
6) announcement
7) reader's letter
8) correction
V6) Attention: Length of the article 
1) < 170 short note, corresponding to “brève”, “filet”, “Meldung”
2) 171-299 short article
3) 300-599 medium size article
4) 600-1999 long article
5) >  2000  documentation,  corresponding  to  “reportage”,  “dossier”,  “enquête”, 
“Reportage”, “Dokumentation”
Content
V7) Framing perspective
The framing perspective is determined by one of the three methods:
1) Evaluation of the primary unit of reference used in the article, e.g. in “Sieben Jahre 
lang mussten Arbeitnehmer aus den acht EU-Ländern Estland, Lettland, Littauen 
[…] auf die Öffnung der Grenzen warten. Wie gut ist Deutschland auf die neuen 
Jobsuchenden  vorbereitet?”  (Focus,  2/5/2011)  the  primary  unit  of  reference  is 
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Germany.
2) Evaluation of topics that have previously received a large amount of media attention 
in the respective entity, e.g. in “Pour l'heure, sur les 17 pays de la zone euro, 6 
seulement bénéficent du triple A […].” (Le Point, 15/12/2011) the topic of triple-A 
ranking clearly refers to France's recent loss of her triple-A, which indicates the 
national, French, perspective of the article. 
3) Evaluation of deixis and determination of the unit of reference of pronouns such as 
“us” and “they”.
Categories for  framing perspective  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) local
4) regional
5) French
6) German
7) Franco-German
8) EU15
9) other European region
10) Europe (EU 27)
11) NATO
V8) Geopolitical framing of Estonia (most important)
The geopolitical framing of Estonia is determined by:
1) Evaluation of  the context of Estonia's first explicit naming, unless at a later point 
significantly more attention is devoted to Estonia. Note: The simple mentioning of 
“Estonia” by her name is only evaluated as a dominant national framing, if it is not 
immediately  preceded  or  followed  by  another  spatial  specification.  Examples: 
“l'Estonie, république balte” (Le Point, 6/2/2011) is evaluated as the predominant 
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classification of Estonia as a Baltic State; “das kleine EU-Mitglied Estland” (Focus 
18/7/2011) as a predominant classification of Estonia as part of Europe as a whole. 
In both cases, the second most important framing is then national.
In addition can be evaluatd:
2) Groupings, such as in “aus den acht EU-Ländern Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, 
Slowakei, Slowenien, Tschechien und Ungarn” (Focus 2/5/2011) classifying Estonia 
as Eastern European through association with other CEE countries
3) Comparisons,  based  on the  assumption  that  comparisons  are  made with entities 
judged as appropriate to evaluate certain features because they have other features 
in common
4) Implicit associations, such as in “Cela lui permet de couper plus encore les liens 
avec  la  Russie.”  (Le  Point,  6/2/2011)  which,  by  insisting  on  Estonia's  active 
dissociation from Russia, implies her enduring association to Russia. 
Categories for  Geopolitical framing of Estonia  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) nation
4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
6) Eastern Europe
7) Northern Europe
8) Europe as a whole
9) some undefined “abroad”
10) associated to Russia
11) spontaneous  spacial  formations  drawn  in  the  article  on  the  basis  of  certain 
characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
12) NATO
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V9) Geopolitical framing of Estonia (second most important)
Determination as V8
Categories for  Geopolitical framing of Estonia  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) nation
4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
6) Eastern Europe
7) Northern Europe
8) Europe as a whole
9) some undefined “abroad”
10) associated to Russia
11) spontaneous  spacial  formations  drawn  in  the  article  on  the  basis  of  certain 
characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
12) NATO
V10) Geopolitical framing of Estonia (third most important)
Determination as V8
Categories for  Geopolitical framing of Estonia  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) nation
4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
6) Eastern Europe
7) Northern Europe
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8) Europe as a whole
9) some undefined “abroad”
10) associated to Russia
11) spontaneous  spacial  formations  drawn  in  the  article  on  the  basis  of  certain 
characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
12) NATO
V11) Framed content (most important topic related to Estonia)
Determination  of  the  relevance  of  a  topic  by  lengths  and  position  in  the  article  (first,  
second, third mentioned topic).
Categories for  Framed content  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) culture: travel
4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
5) culture: auditive; music, singing
6) culture: other topic
7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa
8) history: WWII
9) history; communism, Soviet rule
10) history: other topic
11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
14) politics: other topic
15) society: migration
16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
17) society: minorities
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18) society: other topic
19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
20) economy: EURO-introduction
21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
22) economy: other topic
V12)  Presence  of  discourses  on  Eastern  Europe  in  relation  to  Estonia  and  the  most  
important topic
Determination by content. Note:
1) Do not only take into account explicit content as in “Des Estoniens qui font peur” 
(Le Point,  17/11/2000)  for  category  5 –  insecurity,  but  also  code more  implicit 
allusion,  when a certain discourse is clearly discernible in an article,  as in “Wir 
rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten” (Focus, 2/5/2011), equally for category 5 – 
insecurity. 
2) Differentiate category 1 – backwardness from category 2 – development towards a 
Western  level.  Even  though  development,  in  this  sense,  always  implies 
backwardness only code articles as category 1 – backwardness when no perspective 
of development is mentioned as in “Geschickter Neuanfang” (Focus, 18/7/2011). 
3) Be aware that the mentioning of “smallness” does not necessarily equal “weakness” 
as in category 6. Only code a discourse of weakness, if Estonia is either repeatedly 
termed as “small”, or in relation to big neighbours, or explicitly as in “la fragile 
Estonie, longtemps broyée par le laminoir communiste” (L'Express, 21/9/2011). 
4) Discourses  on nationalism are  coded in mentioning of  patriotism,  proudness  on 
language and culture, as e.g. in “eine junge, hoch gebildete und patriotische Elite” 
(Focus, 29/3/2004).
Categories for  Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
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3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
5) insecure/source of insecurity
6) weak, victimized, marginalized
7) nationalist
V13) Evaluation of Estonia as to most important topic
Determination by:
1) Explicit evaluation, as in “die Esten sind ein Mustervolk” (Der Spiegel, 19/9/2011)
2) Assessment of the general tone of the article
Categories for  Evaluation of Estonia  
1) -
2) positive
3) neutral
4) negative
5) both
V14) Framed content (second most important topic related to Estonia)
Determination as V11
Categories for  Framed content  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) culture: travel
4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
5) culture: auditive; music, singing
6) culture: other topic
7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa
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8) history: WWII
9) history; communism, Soviet rule
10) history: other topic
11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
14) politics: other topic
15) society: migration
16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
17) society: minorities
18) society: other topic
19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
20) economy: EURO-introduction
21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
22) economy: other topic
V15) Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia and the second most  
important topic
Determination as in V12.
Categories for  Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe  
1) none than one of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
5) insecure/source of insecurity
6) weak, victimized, marginalized
7) nationalist
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V16) Evaluation of Estonia as to second most important topic
Determination as V13.
Categories for  Evaluation of Estonia  
1) -
2) positive
3) neutral
4) negative
5) both
V17) Framed content (second most important topic related to Estonia)
Determination as V11
Categories for  Framed content  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) culture: travel
4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
5) culture: auditive; music, singing
6) culture: other topic
7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa
8) history: WWII
9) history; communism, Soviet rule
10) history: other topic
11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
14) politics: other topic
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15) society: migration
16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
17) society: minorities
18) society: other topic
19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
20) economy: EURO-introduction
21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
22) economy: other topic
V18) Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia and the third most  
important topic
Determination as in V12.
Categories for  Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe  
1) none of the following
2) other than one of the following
3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
5) insecure/source of insecurity
6) weak, victimized, marginalized
7) nationalist
V19) Evaluation of Estonia as to third most important topic
Determination as V13.
Categories for  Evaluation of Estonia  
1) -
2) positive
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3) neutral
4) negative
5) both
V20)  Hierarchical  positioning  of  Estonia  with  reference  to  the  main  Western  Unit  of  
framing
Determination by 
1) evaluation of explicit and implicit comparisons
2) Tone of the article, e.g.  patronizing as in:  “Dans trois jours, dix nouveaux Etats 
viennent donc nous rejoindre dans l'Union européenne et, grosso modo, l'accueil qui 
leur est fait est assez simple à résumer: tout le monde s'en fout. Où est le minimum 
que dans n'importe quelle société humaine au monde on doive à des petits nouveaux 
qui rejoignent un club?” (Le Point, 29/04/2004)
Categories for  Hierarchical positioning of Estonia  
1) no hierarchical positioning 
2) both, superior and inferior depending on respective aspect
3) superior
4) equal
5) inferior
C) Samples for the qualitative Analysis
Estonia's Association with Russia
Nr. Date Title Magazine
German magazines
1. 10/02/2000 “Ein Traum muss sein” Der Spiegel
2. 06/12/2000 Steinerner Gast Der Spiegel
3. 18/06/2001 USA mit Schirm und Charme Der Spiegel
4. 23/07/2001 Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer Focus
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5. 23/05/2002 Hier spielt die Musik Die Zeit
6. 31/10/2002 Aufschwung Ostsee Die Zeit
7. 11/03/2004 Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die 
Datenautobahn
Die Zeit
8. 01/04/2004 Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne Die Zeit
9. 26/04/2004 Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München Focus
10. 11/11/2004 Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht Die Zeit
11. 14/03/2005 “Wunden in der Seele” Der Spiegel
12. 17/03/2005 Tag der Absage Die Zeit
13. 07/05/2005 Europareise. Bush feiert Osteuropas 
Demokratien
Die Zeit
14. 08/05/2005 Europareise. Russland am Pranger Die Zeit
15. 21/09/2006 Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin Die Zeit
16. 22/01/2007 Befreier oder Besatzer Der Spiegel
17. 26/02/2007 “Wenig anzubieten?” Der Spiegel
18. 30/04/2007 Russland. Sowjetische Strategie Focus
19. 02/05/2007 Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht Die Zeit
20. 14/05/2007 Estland. Ein zweites Polen Focus
21. 21/05/2007 Wer steckt hinter dem Cyberangriff auf 
Estland?
Der Spiegel
22. 07/05/2007 Held gegen Held Focus
23. 07/05/2007 Frustrierte Großmacht Der Spiegel
24. 25/06/2007 “Widerwärtige Vorwürfe” Der Spiegel
25. 20/07/2007 Dubioses Theater Der Spiegel
26. 08/10/2007 Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel Der Spiegel
27. 01/09/2008 Kalter Frieden Der Spiegel
28. 01/12/2008 Ein Riss im Bollwerk Der Spiegel
29. 08/09/2008 Boykott der Sänger Focus
30. 08/12/2008 NATO. Top Spion Focus
31. 18/08/2008 Georgien. Klare Warnung aus Moskau Focus
32. 17/11/2008 Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa Der Spiegel
33. 24/11/2008 Zitate Der Spiegel
34. 15/12/2008 Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim 
BND
Der Spiegel
35. 26/04/2010 Weißer Ritter Der Spiegel
French magazines
1. 27/04/2001 Finlande: parrains de proximité Le Point
2. 26/04/2004 Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à L'Express
3. 03/02/2005 Russie-Etats baltes Le Point
4. 02/05/2005 A chacun sa mémoire; Pays-Baltes-Russie L'Express
5. 25/01/2007 Une statue encombrante Le Point
6. 03/05/2007 Les curieurses nostalgies de Moscou L'Express
7. 03/05/2007 Serguei Mironov. En baisse Le Point
8. 10/05/2007 Les manoeuvres de Moscou: Estonie-Russie Le Point
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9. 17/05/2007 La main de Moscou; Estonie L'Express
10. 24/05/2007 La Russie attaque par le Web. Estonie Le Point
11. 14/06/2007 Cybercombat contre l'Estonie Le Nouvel Observateur
12. 31/01/2008 Les manoeuvres de Moscou Le Point
13. 11/09/2008 Canard soviétique L'Express
14. 18/12/2008 Espionnage “Opération Jésus” Le Nouvel Observateur
15. 08/01/2009 L'espion qui frimait. Estonie Le Point
16. 12/03/2009 Russie. Un aveu pas du tout virtuel L'Express
17. 19/03/2009 L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou Le Point
18. 13/09/2010 Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie 
estonienne
Le Point
19. 06/01/2011 L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrage Le Point
Estonia as backward
Nr. Date Title Magazine
German magazines
1. 03/01/2000 Bomben am Bug? Der Spiegel
2. 18/09/2000 Blut fürs Vaterland Der Spiegel
3. 02/12/2002 “Es besteht ein enormes Risiko” Focus
4. 14/08/2003 Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen! Die Zeit
5. 11/03/2004 Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die 
Datenautobahn
Die Zeit
6. 01/04/2004 Osterweiterung. Invsion vom Pluto Die Zeit
7. 16/09/2004 Architektur. Mit sanftem Schwung in die 
Kurve
Die Zeit
8. 22/09/2005 Sie gehen so schnell Die Zeit
9. 09/07/2006 Baltikum Schön eben Die Zeit
10. 23/10/2006 Genesen in Deutschland Focus
11. 03/01/2007 Arbeit wird wertvoll Die Zeit
12. 16/05/2007 Fragen zu Europa Im BMW nach Tartu Die Zeit
13. 01/08/2007 “Man wird, was man tut” Der Spiegel
14. 12/10/2009 Care-Pakete an die Armen Focus
French magazines
1. 03/10/2002 Interview: “Le communisme nous laisse des 
ruines gigantesque”
L'Express
2. 24/05/2004 Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à L'Express
3. 22/06/2006 Ailleurs en Europe Le Nouvel Observateur
4. 27/07/2006 L'Europe des inégalités L'Express
5. 21/02/2008 110 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
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6. 04/12/2008 75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
7. 23/07/2009 6,6% Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
Estonia as a Learner
Nr. Date Title Magazine
German magazines
1. 02/10/2000 “Ein Traum muss sein” Der Spiegel
2. 21/06/2000 In fremden Betten Die Zeit
3. 09/10/2000 Erweiterung ohne Polen? Der Spiegel
4. 18/09/2000 Blut fürs Vaterland Der Spiegel
5. 08/01/2001 Genforschung: Erbgut im Angebot Focus
6. 23/05/2002 Hier spielt die Musik Die Zeit
7. 07/10/2002 EU, Estland. Raumschiff “Enterprise” Focus
8. 30/09/2002 Aufgeblähte Verträge Der Spiegel
9. 31/10/2002 Aufschwung Ostsee Die Zeit
10. 11/03/2003 Boomende Balten Der Spiegel
11. 24/07/2003 Estland. Freiheit für das Gemüse Die Zeit
12. 01/04/2004 Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne Die Zeit
13. 11/03/2004 Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die 
Datenautobahn
Die Zeit
14. 29/03/2004 Baltischer Tigersprung Der Spiegel
15. 15/04/2004 Literarische EU-Erweiterung. Das Boskop-
Land
Die Zeit
16. 26/04/2004 Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München Focus
17. 26/04/2004 “Das muss aufhören” Der Spiegel
18. 29/03/2004 Bedingungen zum EU-Beitritt Focus
19. 09/06/2004 EU Europas Sternchen Die Zeit
20. 19/07/2004 Die Meistersinger von Tallinn Focus
21. 11/11/2004 Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht Die Zeit
22. 23/03/2005 Antikorruptionsplan Die Zeit
23. 23/03/2005 Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher Die Zeit
24. 14/05/2005 Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an Der Spiegel
25. 01/09/2005 Steuern. Niedrige Steuern für alle Die Zeit
26. 03/01/2007 Arbeit wird wertvoll Die Zeit
27. 20/08/2007 Tallinn Der Spiegel
28. 13/08/2009 Balten in der Krise Die Zeit
29. 31/05/2010 Härter und bescheidener Der Spiegel
30. 22/12/2010 Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz 
Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur 
Die Zeit
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Estland nicht.
31. 18/07/2011 In der Schuldenfalle. Die Tricks des Tigers Focus
32. 19/09/2011 Estland: Der smarte Staat Der Spiegel
33. 19/09/2011 Ein merkwürdiges Land Der Spiegel
French magazines
1. 17/11/2000 Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur Le Point
2. 18/05/2001 La photo de la semaine: Estonie le rêve 
européen
Le Point
3. 30/11/2001 L'Estonie délie sa langue Le Point
4. 14/02/2003 Estonie: La vengeance du passé Le Point
5. 07/08/2003 Tallinn: Du Moyen Age au wi-fi L'Express
6. 22/01/2004 Union européenne: L'Estonie prend un coup de 
jeune
Le Point
7. 05/04/2004 Alliance antiterroriste; OTAN L'Express
8. 26/04/2004 Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à L'Express
9. 29/04/2004 Le tarte à l'Union Le Nouvel Observateur
10. 21/10/2004 Tallinn Le Nouvel Observateur
11. 03/02/2005 Russie-Etats baltes Le Point
12. 29/09/2005 Etats-Unis. Euro-Visions Le Point
13. 04/05/2006 Energie: le défi balte; Europe L'Express
14. 11/05/2006 La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction Le Point
15. 29/06/2006 13,1% Le Chiffre Le Point
16. 31/08/2006 L'Est en tête Le Nouvel Observateur
17. 21/09/2006 Les talents de la Baltique Le Nouvel Observateur
18. 07/12/2006 Le tigre high-tech. Estonie L'Express
19. 19/04/2007 International. Des Européens inégaux vus de 
Wahington
L'Express
20. 11/10/2007 Amateurisme L'Express
21. 13/12/2007 Estonie, high-tech L'Express
22. 03/01/2008 Estonie, Sandra Sule, 27 ans, dirige un service 
de l'académie des arts: “La mondialisation, 
c'est bien, non?”
L'Express
23. 12/06/2008 La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur Le Point
24. 27/05/2010 L'euro séduit toujours Le Nouvel Observateur
25. 13/09/2010 Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie 
estonienne
Le Point
26. 06/01/2011 L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrage Le Point
27. 30/12/2011 Estonie architonique Le Point
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Estonia as a Place or a Source of Insecurity
Nr. Date Title Magazine
German magazines
1. 06/12/2000 Steinerner Gast Der Spiegel
2. 18/06/2001 USA mit Schirm und Charme Der Spiegel
3. 23/07/2001 Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer Focus
4. 02/12/2002 “Es besteht ein enormes Risiko” Focus
5. 23/05/2002 Hier spielt die Musik Die Zeit
6. 30/09/2002 Aufgeblähte Verträge Der Spiegel
7. 31/10/2002 Aufschwung Ostsee Die Zeit
8. 25/11/2002 Feuer in den Kulissen Der Spiegel
9. 11/03/2003 Boomende Balten Der Spiegel
10. 14/08/2003 Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen! Die Zeit
11. 11/03/2004 Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die 
Datenautobahn
Die Zeit
12. 29/03/2004 Baltischer Tigersprung Der Spiegel
13. 26/04/2004 Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München Focus
14. 26/04/2004 “Das muss aufhören” Der Spiegel
15. 14/03/2005 “Wunden in der Seele” Der Spiegel
16. 23/03/2005 Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher Die Zeit
17. 14/05/2005 Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an Der Spiegel
18. 16/03/2006 Finnen: Berauscht Die Zeit
19. 21/09/2006 Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin Die Zeit
20. 22/01/2007 Befreier oder Besatzer Der Spiegel
21. 26/02/2007 “Wenig anzubieten?” Der Spiegel
22. 02/05/2007 Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht Die Zeit
23. 07/05/2007 Held gegen Held Focus
24. 25/06/2007 “Widerwärtige Vorwürfe” Der Spiegel
25. 08/10/2007 Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel Der Spiegel
26. 17/12/2007 Schengen Focus
27. 01/09/2008 Kalter Frieden Der Spiegel
28. 01/12/2008 Ein Riss im Bollwerk Der Spiegel
29. 08/12/2008 NATO. Top Spion Focus
30. 17/11/2008 Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa Der Spiegel
31. 17/11/2008 Dicker Fisch Der Spiegel
32. 24/11/2008 Zitate Der Spiegel
33. 15/12/2008 Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim 
BND
Der Spiegel
34. 02/09/2010 Freie Arbeitsplatzwahl in der EU Die Zeit
35. 15/03/2010 “Angst ist eine starke Waffe” Focus
36. 26/04/2010 Weißer Ritter Der Spiegel
37. 22/12/2010 Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz Die Zeit
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Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur Estland 
nicht.
38. 05/02/2011 Gesamttitel: “Wir rechnen mit Millionen von 
Migranten”. Dort arbeiten, wo die freien 
Stellen sind
Focus
39. 05/02/2011 “Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten” Focus
French magazines
1. 17/11/2000 Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur Le Point
2. 27/04/2001 Finlande: parrains de proximité Le Point
3. 24/05/2004 Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à L'Express
4. 11/05/2006 La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction Le Point
5. 03/05/2007 Les curieurses nostalgies de Moscou L'Express
6. 17/05/2007 La main de Moscou; Estonie L'Express
7. 14/06/2007 Cybercombat contre l'Estonie Le Nouvel Observateur
8. 31/01/2008 Les manoeuvres de Moscou Le Point
9. 12/06/2008 La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur Le Point
10. 21/08/2008 “Les Russes ont l'impression d'être de retour” L'Express
11. 11/09/2008 Canard soviétique L'Express
12. 04/12/2008 75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
13. 18/12/2008 Espionnage “Opération Jésus” Le Nouvel Observateur
14. 08/01/2009 L'espion qui frimait. Estonie Le Point
15. 19/03/2009 L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou Le Point
16. 12/11/2009 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille Le Point
17. 21/07/2011 Les Baltes Le Point
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